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Do variations in state nuclear capabilities drive changes in strategic stability?  The importance of 
strategic stability’s causal relationship with nuclear capabilities is impossible to overstate, given 
the bulk of Cold War scholarship.  Viewed broadly, strategic stability is the degree of mutual 
deterrence from war between potential adversaries.  Since the close of World War II, tomes of 
research from scholars and practitioners alike have frequently coupled variations in nuclear 
capabilities with changes in strategic stability, treating the two conditions as if they existed in a 
mutually dependent relationship.  The results of the present research show that this unconditional 
causal relationship does not exist.  To determine the existence of the tight coupling of nuclear 
capabilities with strategic stability that scholarship has suggested, the present research examines 
case studies in which strategic stability changed in a dyadic state system where both sides had 
nuclear capabilities.  Early in the Cold War, any changes in nuclear capabilities should have driven 
changes in strategic stability as the United States and Soviet Union fought to develop and field 
ever larger atomic arsenals.  Throughout the 1950s and for most of the 1960s, the United States 
constructed atomic dominance, which afforded the government an opportunity to obtain strategic 
stability by denying the Soviet Union the ability to strike back if hit first.  However, the Soviet 
Union built more significant nuclear capabilities and, in the late 1960s, American dominance 
waned.  This enabled each side to achieve second-strike capabilities, breaking the capability–
stability causal relationship.  The case studies reported as part of this research detail events that 
 v 
occurred between 1957 and 1967, centered on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a time when the 
causal relationship between nuclear capabilities and strategic stability should have been at its 
strongest.  Viewed from the perspective of escalation theory, changes in strategic stability 
represent both positive and negative adjustments in dyadic state relations relative to dyadic state 
war.  The results of this research apply to all existing nuclear dyads, making early Cold War dyadic 
state relationships relevant in the here and now.  Advancing my claim further, any time that 
technological innovations of war have the potential to cause dyadic state strategic instability, this 
research shows that the causal factors of dyadic states driving toward and away from war will 
remain varied and not reliant on any singular weapon or capability.  Through the examination of 
these cases, I present the argument that nuclear capabilities are sometimes sufficient to cause 
changes in strategic stability, but are not a necessary component. 
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Preface 
This dissertation examines the role that the acquisition of advanced technologies has on 
changes in dyadic state strategic stability.  What does this mean?  Simply put, when two nations 
have a devastating piece of technology, I examine whether obtaining additional units causes more 
or less destabilization.  To conduct my research, I look at possibly the most influential piece of 
technology ever created, nuclear weapons.  Specifically, my research examines nuclear capabilities 
between the United States and Soviet Union, two states with a long and storied past in terms of 
both excessive nuclear acquisition and near confrontations.  While my research examines these 
two superpowers, I have a whole host of family members, friends, and mentors to thank because, 
without each of them, this project would have never been possible. 
First and foremost, I need to thank the American taxpayer.  As an active-duty Air Force 
officer, I would not be where I am without the support of those I have sworn to serve.  Moreover, 
on a day-to-day basis, I need to thank the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), the parent 
command throughout my studies.  Each AFIT staff member assigned to my chain of command had 
only one goal: my success. 
Special thanks are given to Ben McKechnie for providing grammatical editing services.  
No editing changed the context or content of the material contained herein.  All content is my own 
and represents only my personal opinions and not those of the United States Space Force, 
Department of the Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
Military members do not independently achieve large accomplishments; it usually takes a 
team.  This dissertation is no different.  Baked into military heritage, often during special 
presentations, is that military members take the time to thank those who helped them reach the 
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next level of their career.  This preface is my opportunity.  Instead of rattling off an infinite number 
of names without any meaningful context, I would like to take a different approach.  Those I wish 
to thank for helping me get to the end of my doctoral studies fit into three categories, Leadership, 
Strength, and Compassion.  Through these three categories, I wish to express my gratitude. 
Leadership 
Those who provided me with leadership blazed the path I followed each day of my 
academic program and beyond. 
I will forever give thanks to God, the author of my faith.  In the best of times and the hardest 
of times, this foundation provides me with the support I have come to rely upon. 
Temporally, special thanks go to Professor Ryan Grauer, my academic advisor, dissertation 
committee chair, and dare I say, friend.  Having never met me before the start of my studies, Ryan 
tirelessly put in extraordinary effort to move me through the doctoral program in record time while 
providing me with insights and perspectives that I will forever cherish.  I have completed all the 
requirements for this program because Ryan relentlessly provided leadership every step of the 
way. 
From the date of my first class to my oral defense, the remaining members of my 
dissertation committee also provided tremendous support.  Professors Phil Williams, Michael 
Poznansky, and Forrest Morgan provided unvarnished feedback based on their academic acumen 
and real-life experiences.  In my humble opinion, rarely has a committee comprised scholars and 
practitioners of such a high caliber.  My research in the pages that follow was made stronger 
because of the advice and direction provided by each of these esteemed scholars. 
Finally, I sincerely acknowledge those who selected me for this doctoral studies program.  
Much of what I have today derives from the leadership provided by Dean Jim Forsyth and the Air 
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Command and Staff College faculty selection committee.  Military academic institutions are unlike 
anything available in the civilian sector.  Individuals are valued less than teams in the military, 
which works in combat as well as education.  Academic collaboration trumps competition, and 
those who graduate the rigorous courses of study in military education generally do so in very 
compressed timeframes and have immediate impacts on the security of our great nation.  A typical 
graduated military member moves from cap and gown to significant national-level operational 
impacts within weeks of receiving their diploma.  Jim and the ACSC professorial staff introduced 
me to this unique avenue of military academia where I hope to serve for many years to come, 
serving those that serve our great nation. 
Without the leadership of those mentioned here, the dense forest of academia would have 
been almost impossible for me to navigate. 
Strength 
There is a special group of people that provided support and strength, keeping me going as 
I completed my academic journey. 
I am tremendously indebted to my in-laws, John and Marilyn Jackson.  My wife Susan and 
our children, Mary, Jonathan, Rachel, and Joseph had the unique opportunity to live near John and 
Marilyn throughout my graduate studies, allowing us to share in many family events.  Our children, 
for the first time in their lives, knew what it meant to live near their extended family, and I cannot 
help but think how much of a positive influence this was.  Along the way, my in-laws provided 
unconditional love, guidance, and wisdom, with unquestioning support.  I believe their example 
of solid family life and unconditional love taught me just as much as any of my doctoral studies. 
 xv 
My siblings Kim, Jim, Elisa, and Willis managed to provide a significant level of support 
and encouragement.  Each has a unique path in life, but all managed to coalesce around my studies.  
They will never know how much their support will forever mean to me. 
My father’s widow, Carol, provided a special level of strength throughout my studies.  In 
late October 2015, I called dad with the news of my acceptance into graduate school and the 
conversation we had that day would remain special for the rest of my life.  Dad mentioned how 
proud he was of my accomplishments, his optimism for the future, and, in his own way, how much 
he loved me.  Less than fifteen minutes after my phone call, Carol called me back to let me know 
that immediately after our phone call, while walking across the room, dad suffered a massive 
stroke.  In the blink of an eye, I became the last sibling to speak with him.  Later that week, I 
arrived at his hospital bedside with a college pennant in hand.  Dad never regained his cognitive 
functions.  It was in his hospital room that I took one last picture with my father and he passed just 
days later.  Dad will never see me publish my dissertation, receive my doctoral hood, or walk 
across the stage, but he will be with me during all those events.  I knew he was proud, and I kept 
his remembrance card on my desk, looking at it every day of my studies.  Carol and I would talk 
throughout my time at the University of Pittsburgh, where she would remind me of how proud my 
father was of me.  Her words brought him back to life every time we spoke. 
My mother provided no less support.  Mom is the daughter of Puerto Rican immigrants 
who settled in the Bronx borough of New York City in the early 1900s.  She fit the New York City 
stereotype of a self-supporting woman with the strength of a mountain and the heart of a saint.  My 
success in the doctoral program at the University of Pittsburgh would not have been possible 
without her prayers and weekly words of encouragement.  Mom took every opportunity to ask 
questions about my studies and remind me of the value working hard had in reaching my goal.  
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She was keenly interested in my work even if it did not always make sense.  I share this 
accomplishment with her because without her, I would not be who I am today.  I pray that mom’s 
strength, love, and compassion continue for years to come. 
Compassion 
Finally, I want to acknowledge those who supported me with compassion, a show of 
unwavering love and support. 
First and foremost, throughout the entire program, Ben and Jen Sweeney, along with their 
four beautiful daughters Megan, Sarah, Laura, and Katie, kept a smile on my face and became my 
escape during the height of studies and academic rigors.  Ben was by chance assigned to be my 
crew partner in 2003 when we were assigned as intercontinental ballistic missile launch officers 
and we have been together ever since.  Undoubtedly, the “Sweencoe” family is inextricably tied 
together and we would have it no other way. 
Special acknowledgement goes out to Matthew Maher, Christopher Pass, Elton Saunders, 
Phil Foret, Erick Chamblee, Reverend Jonathan Wilson, and Reverend Luke Mary Fletcher, CFR.  
Since my late teens, these Brothers have been by my side.  We all continue to speak on a daily 
basis and they never miss an opportunity to ground my ego or remind me of the places from which 
I come.  
Of course, there are my children, Mary, Jonathan, Rachel, and Joseph.  These four kids 
supported me every day.  I was granted a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in the pursuit of my 
academics.  Over the course of this program, however, I was given the chance to watch my children 
grow up in ways I never imagined.  The rigors of active-duty military life often mean foregoing 
the ability to attend school events, sporting matches, and so much more.  During my studies, I was 
given the flexibility to attend so many more of my children’s events than I had ever been able to 
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before.  In short, while my children cheered me on, I was able to connect on a much deeper level 
with each of them because of my doctoral studies, allowing me to provide mutual support and 
compassion to the four most important children in my life. 
Finally, I wish to acknowledge not only my best friend and confidant, but the very person 
whose daily efforts make all things possible.  By the time this dissertation is published, Susan and 
I will have been married for twenty-two years.  Over that time, Susan and I have lived in fifteen 
different houses across seven states.  She has kept our house together through multiple duty 
assignment changes, deployments, compressed doctoral studies, and anything else the Air Force 
has asked of our family.  Susan has accomplished everything with grace, poise, and a prayerful 
demeanor.  Her strength and support have allowed me to progress through eighteen years in 
uniform and she is not slowing down.  Looking ahead to the future, Susan is excited for all the 
challenges we are about to face in our upcoming assignments, and it is from her optimism and 
compassion that I find strength to continue on each day.  I have no idea why I have been graced 
with such a wonderful human; I only know that I would not be where I am today without her. 
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1.0 Introduction 
During the early Cold War, after the Korean conflict and before the end of the 1960s, a 
period existed where conventional thinking among scholars and practitioners alike tightly bound 
variations in nuclear capability to changes in strategic stability.  Holding tight the capability–
stability bond meant that any changes in nuclear capabilities drove a change in strategic stability, 
the degree of which mutually deterred potential adversaries from war.  Although the capability–
stability bond undoubtedly exists, I contend these two variables do not have a tight causal 
relationship.  Variations in nuclear capabilities manifest as a change in the total number of nuclear 
weapons, the number of transportation vehicles, or the number of nuclear weapons transported at 
one time.  Resulting from nuclear-capability variations, according to period scholarship and 
supported by some contemporary writers, deterrence from a war between two states becomes more 
or less likely.  Considering the arguments presented by countless scholars, I test existing claims 
tightly binding variations in nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability. 
The research conducted addresses the following question: do variations in state nuclear 
capabilities drive changes in strategic stability?  Specifically, I examine strategic stability through 
existing scholarship and research that tightly binds capability variations with changes in strategic 
stability before mutually assured destruction (MAD) began to dominate the Cold War.  Analyzing 
the results from my research shows that the unconditional causal relationship between capability 
and stability, as suggested through academic research and policymaker practice, does not exist; 
nuclear capabilities are not a necessary component and are only sometimes sufficient to cause 
changes in strategic stability.  The data examined in my research are comparisons of historical 
cases where changes in strategic stability occurred during the same timeframe as variations in 
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nuclear capabilities between two states.  Through my research, the bond between nuclear 
capabilities and changes in strategic stability is examined, specifically through researching 
historical cases between the United States and the Soviet Union, a data rich dyad, where changes 
to strategic stability occurred between 1957 and 1967, before the establishment of MAD later in 
the 1960s. 
What applicability does Cold War research have on international affairs today?  This 
question has two answers.  First, the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer the only 
nuclear-weapon states; nine states have nuclear capabilities today, and not all have positive 
international relations with the United States.1  Therefore, given the broader proliferation of 
nuclear capabilities internationally and the varying level of advancement in each state’s programs, 
a higher number of potential nuclear state dyads exist that have not reached the level of MAD, as 
was the case between the United States and the Soviet Union before 1967.2 
Second, just as technological advancement through the creation of nuclear weapons had an 
influence on strategic stability during the Cold War, today’s innovative technologies promise to 
cause changes in strategic stability.  The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides a summary of 
threats facing the United States today, which are “defined by rapid technological change, 
challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from 
 
1 According to the Arms Control Association, the nine countries with nuclear weapons are the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, China, and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North 
Korea).  In the 2017 National Security Strategy, Russia, China, and North Korea are all highlighted as states who 
have varying levels of adversarial relationships with the United States.  Kelsey Davenport and Kingston Reif, 
“Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance” (Arms Control Association, July 2019), www.armscontrol.org; 
Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy 2017” (US Government, 2017). 
2 A good example of two states that have not reached the level of MAD is India and Pakistan; two states with poor 
relations with one another and each having a rudimentary, pre-MAD, nuclear program.  Another dyadic state 
example includes the United States and North Korea, where North Korea cannot guarantee a second-strike capability 
which is a key part of MAD. 
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the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.”3  The next threat to 
strategic stability among one or more states need not come from variations in nuclear capabilities, 
but might very well originate from cyber attacks on national banking systems, space-based attacks 
on any part of the global multibillion dollar orbiting space-based infrastructure, or from sources 
not currently even imagined.  Relevant to international security today, technological advances, 
malicious computer attacks, and operations in and through space have the potential to cause an 
imbalance in state dyads leading to decreased mutual deterrence from war or decreased strategic 
stability in some circumstances, much like traditional scholarship attributes to nuclear capabilities.   
The results from my research show that variations in nuclear capabilities between the 
United States and the Soviet Union were consistently not necessary in the timeframe before the 
establishment of MAD and only sometimes sufficient to cause changes in strategic stability.  In 
the United States and Soviet Union dyadic system between 1957 and 1967, multiple movements 
to and from war occurred, although only some were attributable to variations in nuclear 
capabilities.  Severing the requirement for variations in nuclear capabilities to drive changes in 
strategic stability contextualizes nuclear weapons in today’s international arena, while opening the 
possibility for research for substitutions into other causal factors. 
 
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America; 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” (US Government, 2018). 
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1.1 Academic Research and Policymaker Practice 
What has scholarship and practice stated about variations in nuclear capabilities driving 
changes in strategic stability?  The answer, at first, was not much because much atomic work was 
accomplished in secret, but as time progressed, a tremendous amount of scholarship became 
available, almost all of it tightly upholding the capability stability connection.  From the inception 
of nuclear weapons in the late 1930s until each side developed second strike capability and MAD 
was obtained in the late 1960s, scholars tightly linked nuclear-capability changes to variations in 
strategic stability.  Three distinct periods evolved of scholarship discussing atomic influences on 
the capability–stability connection: Period 1 (1940–1950), Period 2 (1951–1960), and Period 3 
(1961–onward).  In each period, scholarship and practice corresponded to the state growth of 
nuclear capabilities and how they affected strategic stability. 
Defining Period 1 is scholarship and practice referencing American domination in nuclear 
capabilities, from 1940 until just after the Soviet Union gained nuclear capabilities in 1949.  The 
United States prior to 1949 enjoyed deterrence provided by the ability to strike first and unopposed 
against any actual or perceived Soviet aggression.  Period 2 begins at a time when the Soviets 
started building their capability in the early 1950s and into the early 1960s, but the United States 
could still conduct a second strike if attacked first.  Scholarship and practice from Period 2 
recognized the United States’ ability to conduct an unopposed strike found in Period 1, when the 
capability–stability bond was tightest, and then the loosening of the tight bond as the Soviets 
ramped up their nuclear capability.  Finally, Period 3 denotes the timeframe during which the 
Soviets gained a credible second-strike capability in the mid-1960s, weakening the capability 
stability bond.  Scholarship and practice produced during this period further loosened the 
capability–stability connection, eventually canceling one another out as MAD was obtained 
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between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The following sections describe each of the three 
periods and the transformation that occurred as the influence of nuclear capabilities on changes in 
strategic stabilities waned. 
1.1.1  Period 1: 1940–1950 
Characterizing the first period of scholarship and practice is the shock and awe spawned 
by the devastating power nuclear capabilities brought to traditional methods of war.  Before the 
first atomic explosion on 16 July 1945, the world had never experienced such a devastating 
implement of war.  In the epilog to his 1947 book, Revolution in Warfare, Basil Liddell Hart noted 
two conditions under which nuclear capabilities have the most significant influence on dyadic state 
strategic stability: “If one side possesses atomic power and the other does not, embattled resistance 
makes nonsense.  That spells the disappearance of warfare in such cases.  Resistance must be 
transferred into sublet channels, of non-violent or guerrilla type.”4  “Where both sides possess 
atomic power, ‘total warfare’ makes nonsense.”5  Liddell Hart bound the obtaining of nuclear 
capabilities tightly with the proximity two states have to or from war.  Stated differently, for Liddle 
Hart, nuclear capability on one or both sides of a dyadic state system had a direct connection to 
how the conflict should proceed between the states should it arise.  Putting into application Liddell 
Hart’s idea that nuclear capabilities directly influence strategic stability, in early 1950 President 
Harry Truman’s White House published A Report to the National Security Council on United 
 
4 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (New Haven: Yale university press, 1947), 85. 
5 Ibid. 
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States Objectives and Programs for National Security.6  In this document, the Truman 
administration tightly bound nuclear capabilities with strategic stability by stating the following: 
“There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government 
of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has 
come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the 
exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists.  The idea of 
freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery.  
But the converse is not true.  The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate 
the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles.  It is 
this fact which give the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.”7,8 
Truman made his point abundantly clear, each state obtaining nuclear capabilities drove the United 
States and the Soviet Union to a position of instability, going as far as to label the relationship 
under the banner of “crisis.” 
 
6 This document is more commonly referred to as NSC-68. 
7 Section I referred to in this quote is labeled “Backgrounds of the Present World Crisis.”  In this section, the 
document lays out the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Establishing the 
initial capability-stability connection, the document states, “On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief 
from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war.  On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area 
under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin 
with greater strength could be assembled.  It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of 
their strength stand in their deepest peril.” Harry Truman, “A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68” 
(US Government, April 12, 1950), 4, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf. 
8 Truman, 7. 
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1.1.2  Period 2: 1951–1960 
During Period 2, from 1951 to 1960, each state continued to gain capability.  The United 
States fielded enough nuclear capabilities to allow a second strike, while the Soviet Union 
continued to expand its nuclear arsenal.9  Put differently, during the second period, both the 
inequality and destabilizing nature of a first strike diminished as both the United States and the 
Soviet Union expanded their respective arsenals.  In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower 
reinforced a tight capability–stability relationship through publishing A Report to the National 
Security Council on Basic National Security Policy.10  In this report, the Eisenhower administration 
stated the following: 
“When both the USSR and the United States reach a stage of atomic plenty 
and ample means of delivery, each will have the probable capacity to inflict critical 
damage on the other, but is not likely to be able to prevent major atomic retaliations.  
This could create a stalemate, with both side reluctant to initiate general warfare; 
although if the Soviets believed that initial surprise held the prospect of destroying 
the capacity for retaliation, they might be tempted into attacking.”11  
Inherent in this passage from NSC 162/2 is Eisenhower’s foundational assumption that, before 
obtaining “atomic plenty,” variations in nuclear capabilities would drive changes in strategic 
stability.  President Eisenhower conveyed two ideas of the capability–stability bond through NSC-
162/2.  First, if the Soviets were to gain enough nuclear capability, war with the United States 
 
9 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (1959): 211–34. 
10 This document is more commonly referred to as NSC-162/2 
11 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “A Report to the National Security Council - NSC-162/2” (US Government, 1953), 4. 
 8 
could be negated through a properly placed or advantageous Soviet first strike.  Second, 
Eisenhower provided a foreshadowing of MAD in the decade to come by stating that a stalemate, 
or no movement to or from war, would ensue should both sides reach a level of comparable 
capability.  In both cases, Eisenhower exemplified the second period well, providing a view of the 
current tight capability–stability bond but looking ahead to the eventual dissolution of this 
connection once both sides obtain MAD. 
Published immediately after NSC-162/2 in July 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the father 
of the atomic bomb, directly tied his work realizing the atomic bomb to strategic stability with the 
Soviet Union in an article published in Foreign Affairs, where he stated the following: 
“Atomic weapons are not just one element of an arsenal that we hope may 
deter the Soviet Government, or just one of the means we think of for putting an 
end to a war, once started.  It is, perhaps, almost the only military measure that 
anyone has in mind to prevent, let us say, a great battle in Europe from being a 
continuing, agonizing, large-scale Korea.  It is the only military instrument which 
brings the Soviet Union and the United States in contact – a most uncomfortable 
and dangerous contact – with one another.”12   
According to Oppenheimer, the mere existence of dyadic state nuclear capabilities forced the 
United States and the Soviet Union to deal with each state’s grievance with the other.  This direct 
contact between the two states, brought about by the presence of nuclear capabilities, had a direct 
result in the maintenance of peace between the two states.  For Oppenheimer, the capability–
 
12 J Robert Oppenheimer, “Atomic Weapons and American Policy,” Foreign Affairs 31, no. 4 (July 1953): 528. 
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stability bond was tight because it forced each state to deal with the other, yielding a desirable 
peace in Europe. 
Further solidifying the capability–stability bond and laying the groundwork for MAD, 
during President Eisenhower’s 1954 State of the Union address to the Eighty-Third Congress, he 
made the connection that peace results from deterrence, which is, in part, derived from the 
capability to strike back.13  “Since our hope for all the world is peace, we owe ourselves and the 
world a candid explanation of the military measures we are taking to make that peace secure.  As 
we enter this new year, our military power continues to grow.  This power is for our own defense 
and to deter aggression.  We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have and will maintain 
a massive capability to strike back.”14  Eisenhower continued to see the need to counter the 
growing threat posed by what the administration perceived as an enormously growing Soviet 
nuclear arsenal.  “The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical 
in 1959 or early 1960.  The evidence further suggests the urgency of proper time-phasing of needed 
improvements in our military position vis-à-vis Russia.”15  For Eisenhower and the rest of the 
nation, it became a national imperative to produce enough nuclear capability to provide a massive 
retaliation, to absorb the first round of nuclear attacks and still be able to strike back against the 
Soviet Union. 
 
13 When referencing the concept of deterrence in this context, it is important to refer back to Thomas Schelling’s 
work outlining what deterrence truly is.  “The deterrence concept requires that there be both conflict and common 
interest between the parties involved; it is inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as 
it is to the case of pure and complete common interest.”  The common interests stated multiple times by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union was one of peace.  However, throughout the 1950s, it became evident that peace 
could only come as the result of deterrence, and deterrence was only obtained through the growth of nuclear 
capabilities.  Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 1st edition (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1960), 11. 
14 “Department of State Bulletin, 25 January 1954,” in Department of State Bulletin, vol. Vol. XXX, Publication 
6740, No. 758-770 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 77. 
15 Security Resource Panel, “Deterrence and Survival in The Nuclear Age (‘The Gaither Report of 1957’)” 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Defense Mobilization, November 7, 1957). 
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Reinforcing the capability–stability connection and the requirement each side had to build 
a nuclear capability, early Cold War strategist Albert Wohlstetter held that “to deter an attack 
means being able to strike back in spite of it.  It means, in other words, a capability to strike 
second.”16  For Wohlstetter, the only way to deter an attack, thereby keeping war at bay, is for each 
state to build a nuclear capability to provide the ability to conduct a second strike, thus reinforcing 
the capability–stability connection. 
Scholarship and practice produced during this timeframe held sacred the capability–
stability connection while the intellectual framework began the establishment of MAD, a period 
when both sides obtained the ability to launch a secured second strike independent of any 
additional changes in nuclear capabilities.17  Any one side independently obtaining a second-strike 
capability would continue to promote a robust capability–stability bond.  “Whereas a first strike 
involved counterforce, a second strike need be no more than counter value.”18  With only one side 
having the ability to conduct a second strike, scholarship supported a continued lopsided 
dominance where changes in nuclear capabilities had significant effects on existing strategic 
stability.19 
 
16 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” 213. 
17 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror”; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Jan Lodal et al., “Second Strike: Is the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Outmoded?,” 
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 145–52; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” 
Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 42–54; Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Abridged edition 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969). 
18 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 128. 
19 A good example of the confidence established with a one-sided ability to conduct a second strike; I reference this 
memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson.  In his writing to the President, 
McNamara not only touts American second-strike capability but also provides a quantitative outline of his assured 
destruction policy.  “An essential test of the adequacy of our posture is our ability to destroy, after a well planned 
and executed Soviet surprise attack on our Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Soviet government and military controls, 
plus a large percentage of their population and economy (e.g. 30% of their population, 50% of their industrial 
capacity, and 150 of their cities).  “Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson; 
Document 151, 6 December 1963.,” in Foreign Relations of the United States; National Security Policy, 1961-1963, 
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By 1960, the stage was set for explosive growth in nuclear capabilities on each side of the 
Cold War.  To acquire the coveted second-strike capability, the strategy for the United States 
became to obtain a greater nuclear capability than the opposing side.  Lacking the ability to obtain 
more nuclear weapons than the opposing side meant, for the Soviets, taking a different approach, 
one that afforded an opportunity to use nuclear capabilities in such a manner as to deliver a 
crippling blow before the United States launched a second strike.  In a declassified Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) report from 1960, the assessment was that the Soviet Union, through 
Nikkita Khrushchev, had developed an adequate level of nuclear capability to knock out a potential 
enemy while adopting a strategy of pre-emption, unexpectedly striking first.20  The CIA’s 
assessment of the Soviet embrace for pre-emptive nuclear strikes was not unfounded.  Also 
published in 1960, and declassified in 1992, was an article found in the Top Secret Soviet journal 
Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).  In this article, General of the Army Pavel Alekseyevich 
Kurochkin cited other contemporary military thinkers advocating for the primacy of nuclear 
capabilities.  General Kurochkin equated increased nuclear capabilities with yielding the ability to 
be successful in war. 
“If we follow the concepts developed by the authors of the articles mentioned, and 
doubtless agree that nuclear-missile weapons should have the decisive role in 
assuring the possibility ‘of concurring in a short time’, in a way, on the whole, or 
to achieve success in any operation, everything else seems relatively simple.  It is 
only necessary to supply the missile troops with adequate means, provide the 
 
vol. VIII, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1996), 28. 
20 Matthew Gallagher and W. P. Southard, “Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy,” Current Intelligence Staff Study 
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, January 19, 1960), 11. 
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necessary nuclear-missile means to the ground forces and other branches of the 
armed forces, review certain aspects of our military strategy and operational art, 
and thus are created the conditions for successful resolution of the course and 
outcome of all armed combat.”21 
By 1960, the United States believed that deterrence, and thus peace, could only be obtained through 
the ability to launch a second strike.  Fueling the United States’ push toward a second strike was 
the CIA’s assessment that the Soviet Union continued unfettered growth of its nuclear capability 
with a pre-emptive nuclear strike strategy, pushing nuclear capabilities to the frontline troops and 
the opening salvos of any conflict. 
1.1.3  Period 3: 1961–Onward 
By the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union had become convinced that nuclear conflict was 
imminent, and the United States was the one that would initiate a surprise attack.  “The masters of 
the imperialist bloc are preparing to wage nuclear war on a scale against the socialist countries by 
massive and surprise nuclear strikes.  The terms ‘defense,’ ‘retaliatory blow,’ and ‘massive 
retaliation’ are merely meant to conceal these preparations, which are all based on American 
superiority in nuclear weapons.”22  Against this backdrop, the Soviets needed to bolster nuclear 
stockpiles as a means of providing for a proper defense.  “To do this, it is essential to have the 
means for retaliation in constant readiness: Strategic Missile Forces, the Long Range Air Force, 
 
21 P. Kurochkin, “The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in it of the Various Branches of the 
Armed Forces,” trans. Central Intelligence Agency, Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), 1960, 6. 
22 Vasilii Dani Sokolovskii, ed., Soviet Military Strategy; Translation from Russian and Originally Published by the 
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, trans. Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and 
Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1963), 382–83. 
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and nuclear weapons, and it is necessary to master effective techniques for delivering rapid and 
devastating nuclear blows to the enemy, if the socialist countries are compelled to do so.”23  The 
Soviets entered the 1960s tightly binding nuclear capabilities to strategic stability. 
According to research from the 1960s, the abundant nuclear capabilities on both sides 
spawned by the Soviet view of American dominance, along with the constant threat of using the 
weapons, broke apart the tight capability–stability bond that had existed at the end of the 1950s.  
“The appearance of possessing both the ability and the resolution to make good threat and 
counterthreat becomes, then, of paramount importance as a condition for the success of mutual 
deterrence.”24  According to this quote from Hans Morgenthau, deterrence is viable only when 
both sides have viable capabilities to make substantiated threats of violence; lacking such validity 
negates the possibility of deterrence.  Moreover, Kenneth Waltz substantiated Morgenthau’s claim 
by recognizing bipolar balancing in the 1960s as “the nearly constant presence of pressure and the 
recurrence of crisis.”25  Unlike during the earlier era of nuclear capabilities, it was no longer 
suitable to have them as the only means of effecting strategic stability; since both sides could enact 
mutual deterrence, the effects of nuclear capability appeared to have been mitigated. 
Looking back at the developments made in nuclear capabilities during the 1960s, 
contemporary scholars break apart the strong capability–stability bond at the point each side 
obtained the capacity to perform a secured second strike. This break is the hallmark of the third 
period of scholarship and practice addressing the capability–stability connection.26  The abundance 
 
23 Sokolovskii, 410. 
24 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy.,” American Political Science Review 58, no. 01 
(1964): 24. 
25 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 883. 
26 Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power,” International Organization 69, no. 3 
(2015): 589–626; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability 
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of nuclear capabilities on both sides translates under a dyadic state MAD system to a reduced 
likelihood of nuclear conflict, because each side is assured they will suffer cataclysmic 
consequences for engaging in a nuclear war first.  “A MAD world is highly stable at the nuclear 
level, because there is no incentive for any great power to start a nuclear war that it could not win; 
indeed, such a war would probably lead to its destruction as a functioning society.”27 
According to available research, MAD breaks apart the mutually dependent relationship 
between nuclear capabilities and strategic stability because it reduces the incentives for either side 
to conduct a first strike.  Scholarship for the timeframe prior to MAD presented a tight capability–
stability causal relationship without questioning the possibility that variations in nuclear 
capabilities can exist without effecting a change in strategic stability.  This tight connection broke 
apart when the Soviets bolstered their nuclear capabilities.  The administration of President John 
F Kennedy initiated a movement toward a renewed and revised plan for conducting warfare 
acknowledged the tight capability–stability bond as well as the need to reduce the level of 
importance attributed to nuclear weapons in maintaining dyadic state strategic stability.  “In 
general, the administration felt past plans for general war were too rigidly geared to a massive 
retaliation to surprise attack.  It therefore sought means to expand the latitude of possible reactions 
to fit the wide range of circumstances in which conflict could be initiated.”28  As a means of 
isolating the purported influences that variations in nuclear capabilities have on strategic stability, 
as found in the first two periods, it is essential to study the period before the United States and the 
 
in an Era of Detente,” Foreign Affairs 54, no. 2 (1976): 207–32; Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t 
Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (1979): 617–33; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy; 
William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 
27 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 130. 
28 “History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-63” (History and 
Research Division: Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1964), 1. 
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Soviet Union obtained MAD along with the common belief that the capability–stability bond that 
existed then was at its strongest point. 
1.2 Framing Strategic Stability 
Implicit in relevant scholarship dating back to the 1950s, a four-part causal story appears, 
beginning with variations in nuclear capabilities and ending with changes in strategic stability.  In 
this section, I present a summary of the causal chain connecting variations in nuclear capability to 
changes in strategic stability.  Through this causal chain and according to the abovementioned 
scholarship, variations in nuclear capabilities should have led to changes in strategic stability. 
The first part of the causal story is simply a variation in nuclear capabilities.  Nuclear 
capabilities are composed of two parts, namely payload capacity and strategic nuclear warheads.  
These two components are mutually supportive of one another, both needing the other to supply 
value.  Nuclear warheads are useless unless they have a means of making it to the target, and 
payload capacity means extraordinarily little if there are no payloads.  However, together, as 
payload capacity or the number of strategic nuclear warheads change, so do nuclear capabilities.   
The second part of the causal story speaks to the use of varied nuclear capabilities, referred 
to as a utility.  In a nuclear state dyadic system, as nuclear capabilities vary up or down, they 
become more or less useful to conduct missions such as deterrence or brinkmanship.  State leaders, 
looking to existing nuclear capabilities, will feel emboldened or reserved based on what they have 
available for use.  The nuclear capability utility is a direct result of any variations made in either 
payload capacity or strategic nuclear warheads. 
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The utility of a state’s nuclear capabilities to conduct intended missions leads directly into 
the third part of the causal story, incentives.  Incentives to use nuclear-capability variations are not 
a mandated action but a choice provided to the state.  The incentives to conduct nuclear missions, 
if the state decides to use them, will vary based on the utility of the nuclear capabilities.  If state 
nuclear capabilities have a high utility, leaders may be willing to take more significant risks 
because their relative power against a prospective competitor may be more than it was previously, 
supplying an advantage.  Moreover, the lowering of a state’s utility will reduce the incentives of a 
state to take risks while also increasing the incentives of an adversary to take a risk. 
An example of utility leading to changes in incentives for use comes from President 
Richard Nixon’s placement of nuclear forces on elevated alert status in October 1969 while 
attempting to end the conflict in Southeast Asia.  Just before this period, the Soviets obtained 
second-strike capability, but the United States still had a significant lead over the Soviet Union in 
total nuclear capability.  Specifically, the United States, across the entire nuclear enterprise, had a 
payload capacity of 5,642 coupled with 5,882 nuclear warheads, compared with the Soviet Union’s 
1,777 payload capacity and 1,815 warheads.29  President Nixon’s placement of nuclear forces on 
elevated alert was his way of producing a forcing function, a means of driving the Soviets back to 
the negotiating table.  It is suspected that Nixon wanted to capitalize on the United States’ 
dominating nuclear capabilities as a means of forcing Moscow to re-engage with Hanoi regarding 
terms to end the war in Southeast Asia while also deterring a potential Soviet nuclear attack against 
 
29 P. L. Podvig and Oleg Bukharin, eds., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001); 
Robert Standish Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1997). 
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China.30  In summary, Nixon engaged in brinkmanship with the Soviet Union, risking the 
possibility of nuclear war, not because his capabilities placed him at a disadvantage but because 
the United States’ nuclear capabilities provided the utility to partake in such a risky endeavor. 
From the incentives chapter of the causal story comes the fourth and final part, strategic 
stability.  As state leaders feel more or less emboldened to conduct nuclear-capability missions, 
changes in strategic stability become a direct result.  Because strategic stability measures the 
proximation to or from war, when two states equally deter each other from war, resulting in full 
strategic stability, peace is the result.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, when states, 
emboldened by a varied nuclear capability, decide to conduct acts of brinkmanship, they run the 
risk of diminishing deterrence, resulting in the loss of strategic stability before war ensues. 
An old-fashioned pistol duel can act as an analogy for strategic stability.  An honorable set 
of pistol duelers from the 18th century would involve two people who both wished to protect their 
interests in the face of an equal but challenging opponent.  Each dueler would choose from one of 
two comparable guns loaded with a single bullet.  The duelers would use a common starting point, 
take an equal number of steps away from each other, turn on command, and shoot.  Three potential 
outcomes would await them: emerging unscathed by avoiding the opponent’s bullet, being 
wounded, or death. 
 Applying the strategic stability causal story above to dishonorable pistol duelers, all 
equality disappears.  From the beginning, changes in capability are analogous to one of the pistol 
duelers cheating by switching out their issued gun for one that is larger or more powerful.  The 
larger or more powerful weapon opens a series of opportunities for the cheating dueler that their 
 
30 M. Todd Bennett, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States; National Security Policy, 1969-1972, vol. XXXIV, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
2011), 232. 
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opponent does not have.  During the dueling sequence, the larger gun emboldens the cheating 
dueler to take more risks, turning and firing early or aiming the weapon at their opponent’s loved 
one as a means of trying to force capitulation.  In the end, the cheating dueler, with their more 
substantial or more powerful gun, changes the outcome of the duel not because each side fought 
with equality as the honorable duelers would have, but because the balance of power was shifted 
in their favor beginning with their enhanced capability. 
The four-part causal story is unpacked even further in the following sections.  The next 
three sections outline how changes in nuclear capabilities drive changes in potential usage, 
resulting in changes in strategic stability. 
1.2.1  Changes in nuclear capabilities 
Nuclear-capability variations, according to strategic stability scholarship, are the 
underlying causal drivers leading to changes in strategic stability.  Specifically, my research is 
most concerned with strategic nuclear capabilities, long-range rockets capable of being launched 
against an opposing state either as sea-launched nuclear missiles or from mainland bases, in 
addition to long-range bombers.  As states alter their nuclear capabilities, the manner in which 
states potentially use them changes and drives adjustments to actual or perceived incentives by 
state leaders, yielding changes in dyadic state strategic stability. 
Scholarship produced before each side obtained MAD supported the connection between 
changes in nuclear capabilities and changes in how states use them.  For example, Wohlstetter’s 
works throughout the early 1950s claimed the best way to use more and advanced nuclear-missile 
technology, capable of longer distances, was to pull basing on foreign soil back to the United 
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States, supporting only austere refueling bases to accommodate long-range bombers.31  For 
Wohlstetter, the change in nuclear-missile capabilities also changed how other components of the 
nuclear triad were used, while simultaneously not diminishing the nuclear mission.   
Graph 1-1 below charts constant variations in nuclear capabilities, measured through total 
payload capacity and total nuclear strategic warheads between the United States and the Soviet 
Union from 1957 to 1967, a period of frequent changes in strategic stability in this dyadic state 
system.  The payload capacity denotes the total number of operational strategic warheads 
deliverable through the nuclear triad.  Strategic nuclear warheads signify the total number of 
operational nuclear warheads deliverable through any method of the nuclear triad.  What makes 
payload capacity and strategic nuclear warheads emblematic of a state’s nuclear capability when, 
in reality, many additional components are part of the process as well?  The answer focuses solely 
around the nuclear warhead; replaced with anything else, the weapon would be substantially less 
lethal.  Nuclear capability is only concerned with how many warheads can be delivered, regardless 
of the delivery method, coupled with the number of available warheads.  One does not find value 
in existing without the other. 
 
31 Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman, “Defending a Strategic Force After 1960” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1954); Albert J Wohlstetter, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Strategic Studies Institute, Nuclear Heuristics Selected 
Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, ed. Robert Zarate and Henry D Sokolski (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government, 2009). 
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Graph 1-1: US vs. USSR Raw Nuclear Capability Comparison, 1957–1967 
 
1.2.2  Wielded nuclear capabilities 
In academic scholarship and policy, the presence of nuclear weapons prior to the 
establishment of MAD between the United States and the Soviet Union has long been considered 
both necessary and sufficient to influence strategic stability between nuclear powers.  Significant 
bodies of research have connected strategic stability with nuclear capabilities in a dyadic nuclear 
state system.  Framed in terms of offensive and defensive actions, this section addresses two 
theories outlining the use of nuclear weapons to effect change in strategic stability: brinkmanship 
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how a state in a dyadic nuclear system uses nuclear capabilities directly translates to both states’ 
incentives and the proximity to war with one another. 
1.2.2.1 Offensive nuclear capability 
One of the most iconic theories of the potential use of nuclear capabilities is that of 
brinkmanship. Brinkmanship is a coercive process for changing the status quo and is conducted 
by engaging in an activity that may get out of hand and brings some risk of disaster between the 
two states, even as an unintended consequence.32   Traditional components in the scholarship on 
brinkmanship include a desire by one state to change the status quo, escalation in hostilities 
between two states, the use of coercion, and the possible risk of war.  The threat of war is a 
necessary component to wage brinkmanship successfully.33 
Brinkmanship conducted by State A against State B carries an underlying fear of war; 
lacking such fear, State A’s coercion tactics lack credibility.  Prior to MAD being obtained, it was 
feared that war between the United States and the Soviet Union would inevitably mean a nuclear 
confrontation by at least one side, either as a retaliatory response to a conventional attack or a first 
strike.  Today, contemporary writing by Matthew Kroenig reference non-MAD situations coupled 
with the need to retain a nuclear advantage over any adversary as a means of dissuading potential 
challenges through the changing of nuclear capabilities.34  If variances in nuclear capabilities drive 
 
32 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 91; Powell, “Nuclear 
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changes in strategic stability, brinkmanship, applied as a means to coerce the opposing side into 
capitulation, is a vital tool to drive those changes.35  
 Before MAD is obtained between two nuclear states, does changing nuclear capabilities 
alter how a state potentially uses brinkmanship?  Once greater nuclear capabilities are obtained 
compared with those of a competitor, a state has the option of feeling emboldened and enacting 
brinkmanship tactics as a means of forcing capitulation.  With greater nuclear capabilities at the 
disposal of the state, leaders have the option to exercise the ability to impose state power over a 
competitor.36  On the other hand, following a decrease in nuclear capabilities compared with a 
competitor, state leaders may not find brinkmanship to be as valuable a strategy to pursue since 
the risk of war inherent in the theory may be too significant.  Stated differently, changing nuclear 
capabilities changes the incentives states have to flex their atomic muscle as capabilities grow, or 
to retract the leader’s ambition for the state as capabilities decrease. 
1.2.2.2 Defensive nuclear capability  
If brinkmanship threatens a direct use of nuclear capabilities to change the status quo while 
running the risk of war, then the second nuclear theory, deterrence, uses an indirect threat of 
violence as a means of keeping the status quo from ever changing in the first place.  Deterrence is 
defined as the prevention of war through the known assurance that any hostile actions would have 
devastating effects on each side.37  Prior to MAD, Schelling outlined that deterrence “is concerned 
 
35 Taken further, Kroenig develops his theory into what he calls “nuclear superiority theory,” associating the size of 
the nuclear to an increased level of resolve during a potential brinkmanship confrontation. Kroenig; Matthew 
Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International 
Organization 67, no. 1 (2013): 141–71. 
36 Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve.” 
37 John J. Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 9, no. 3 (1984): 19. 
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with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his 
expectations of how we will behave.  It involves confronting him with evidence for believing that 
our behavior will be determined by his behavior.”38  More contemporary scholars hold that 
deterrence is manifested as an indirect use of force to dissuade an enemy from initiating a hostile 
action.39  In theory, “to deter an attack means being able to strike back despite it.  It means, in other 
words, a capability to strike second.”40  
In the late 1960s, the MAD policies that developed between the United States and the 
Soviet Union relied on deterrence since both sides knew that in a nuclear exchange, each could 
conduct a second strike, leaving a “delicate balance of terror.”41  In a nuclear dyadic state construct, 
deterrence only occurs when both states equally acknowledge the other’s nuclear capabilities as a 
necessary component for keeping the peace.  States varying their nuclear capabilities, instead of 
trying to force capitulation as with brinkmanship, provides the potential to keep an opponent state 
at bay by making the threat of retaliation so costly that no incentive exists for waging war.  
As state nuclear capabilities change, deterrence becomes more or less attractive.  When 
nuclear capabilities increase, this emboldens state leadership to advertise the use of their nuclear 
arsenal as a means of keeping the status quo against a revisionist enemy.  During instances of 
nuclear capability decline, the state loses the ability to keep the status quo if challenged by a 
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dominant competitor.  A direct correlation exists between a change in nuclear capabilities and the 
effectiveness of a state’s ability to coerce an enemy through deterrence to maintain the status quo.42 
1.2.3  Incentivized nuclear capabilities 
Changes in the possibility of either deterrence or brinkmanship drive changes in both state 
leaders’ incentives to use nuclear means to effect changes in strategic stability.  Variations in 
offensive nuclear capabilities relate to each state’s stability across a broad spectrum of 
socioeconomic issues, as well as the desire or incentive a state has to start a conflict.  This section 
covers two incentive theories, political stability and crisis stability, each of which connects the 
benefits a state receives to the reason why changes in nuclear capabilities occur.  
1.2.3.1 Political stability 
 Do deviations in social, political, or economic problems, previously regarded as acceptable, 
become intolerable as utility increases?  Political stability, as applied to nuclear state dyads, is “the 
absence of incentives to take political actions that might lead to crisis or nuclear war.”43   Political 
stability encompasses variations in social, economic, and other factors that potentially drive 
international instability.44   On its own, political instability cannot start a nuclear conflict, but it 
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does feed into crisis stability.  In a dyadic nuclear state system, crisis chips away at strategic 
stability while inching toward war, the complete absence of strategic stability. 
1.2.3.2 Crisis stability 
Do riskier actions in crises look more or less attractive when brinkmanship or deterrence 
utility changes?  Crisis stability, applied to a nuclear state dyad, is the absence of incentives to fire 
the first shot, giving up the possibility of gaining the upper hand in a conflict.45  Changes in the 
defensive utility will likely reduce incentives to revise the status quo and contribute to crisis 
stability.  The incentives both states have to preemptively start a war drive stability, the “assurance 
against being caught by surprise, the safety in waiting, the absence of a premium on jumping the 
gun.”46   Crisis stability speaks to the heart of nuclear first strike policies, keeping in mind that no 
benefits await the first strike so long as each state in a nuclear dyad has a second-strike capability.  
Applied to the United States and the Soviet Union, early in the Cold War, both states acquired 
second-strike capabilities, eliminating the incentives for either side to strike first in hopes of 
delivering a knockout blow to their competitor. 
1.2.4  Section summary 
Scholarship suggests that, prior to obtaining MAD, changes in nuclear capabilities drive 
changes in how states use nuclear capabilities; these changes can put a state in either an offensive 
or defensive position.  Depending on the position resulting from the change in nuclear capability, 
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each state leader assesses their incentives to change strategic stability based on what is in front of 
them.  The actions of the states, based on the incentives created by the potential nuclear-capability 
use, drive changes in strategic stability.  Figure 1-1 below outlines the path variations in nuclear 
capabilities have on strategic stability.  Strategic stability, according to this understanding, does 
not independently change without influence from an outside causal driver.  Said differently, states 
do not spontaneously go to war without some level of justification.   
Additionally, according to this understanding, changes in nuclear capability are a consistent 
causal driver of changes in strategic stability.  My review of relevant scholarship and practice 
shows that nuclear-capability variation drives changes in the potential use of atomic weapons, 
which influence the incentives each state has to either react offensively or defensively.  The actions 
of the state then drive changes in strategic stability. 
Figure 1-1: Relationship between strategic stability and possible causal mechanisms 
 
1.3  Kargil 
Up to this point, the discussion has highlighted the dyadic state relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, which may raise questions about the utility of this research 
when applied to other dyadic state relationships or other technological advancements.  Does the 
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capability–stability connection only apply to the United States and the Soviet Union before MAD 
was obtained in the late 1960s?  During the summer of 1999, between May and July in the Kargil 
region of India, near Pakistan, a ground war broke out that tested the resilience of these two nuclear 
states.47  This conflict is a suitable analog for the pre-MAD relationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union before the late 1960s.  Both India and Pakistan had nuclear capabilities in 
the late 1990s, but neither side advanced its state program to the point of supplying assured second 
strike options.  The absence of MAD in this case study means variations in nuclear capabilities 
should drive changes in the potential use of nuclear weapons, which should in turn affect the 
offensive or defense incentives each state develops; the states, acting on their changed incentives, 
should then drive changes in strategic stability.  If the model created by scholarship addressing 
pre-MAD dyadic state relationships is correct, changes in nuclear capabilities between India and 
Pakistan should drive changes in strategic stability. 
In the pre-MAD India–Pakistan relationship during the late 1990s, the established nuclear 
state of India responded to militarized aggression initiated by Pakistan.48  Looking to compensate 
for the advantages of the Indian military, Pakistan relied on recently acquired nuclear weapons to 
provide a level playing field with India. Furthermore, Pakistan sought to change the status quo in 
the region by shifting the balance of power through brinkmanship.  Stated differently, Pakistan’s 
nuclear capabilities changed, which appeared to drive a change in utility compared with India.  
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Although a conflict had begun between these two states with nuclear capabilities, a nuclear war 
did not ensue. 
 What caused the conflict between India and Pakistan?  Pakistan’s altered nuclear 
capabilities seemingly resulted in an emboldened move toward brinkmanship in the Kargil region.  
Tensions in the region have historically been high between the two states.  Kargil district is located 
in the Kashmir region within India’s borders.  Kashmir sits on the border and is a point of dispute 
between the two states, with Pakistan claiming ownership from India.  In May 1999, Pakistani 
troops crossed the border, beginning the conflict.  
During May 1998, one year before crossing the border into India, an emboldened Pakistan 
crossed the threshold of advanced weaponry by detonating the state’s first nuclear warhead.49   The 
pursuit of nuclear capabilities by Pakistan had long existed as a means of compensating for an 
inferior military compared with that of India.  Consistent with the causal chain in Figure 1-1, 
Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities changed, and this change appears to have provided Pakistan with 
the operating space to act in the Kargil region, a contentious geographic region with India.  Using 
brinkmanship fueled through changed nuclear capabilities, Pakistan seemingly chose to act against 
India in a manner that incited crisis while pursuing efforts to overtake the Kargil region.  Pakistan 
desired state power equality with India and, while appearing to attempt a redefinition of the status 
quo, a war broke out.50  
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 History remembers the Kargil conflict clearly, but is this the right encounter to study?  The 
similarities of two nascent nuclear states confronting one another could misleadingly drive one to 
believe that Kargil is the perfect analog.  The recounting of the Kargil conflict seemingly 
exemplifies each of the links in the causal chain found in Figure 1-1.  Moreover, international 
affairs scholarship and research since the 1950s have addressed the insanity of using nuclear 
weapons in a major power dyad.  This insanity, coupled with increasing second-strike capability 
by one or both sides, is often thought to have brought about a mutual deterrence, keeping hostilities 
at lower thresholds below the level of nuclear war.51  
Unfortunately, the Kargil conflict does not clearly represent the ability of both sides to 
deter warfare through a decisive first strike, nor many of the nuanced aspects of each component 
of Figure 1-1.52  The Indian military was and continues to be qualitatively superior to Pakistan’s 
military forces, and the nuclear capabilities of India have been significantly more mature.  Strategic 
stability explains the degree to which dyadic states obtain a mutual deterrence from war, but given 
the superiority of India over Pakistan, strategic stability in this case can be argued to be the result 
of India’s restraint instead of true dyadic state stability.  Because of the lack of a good explanation 
through recounting the Kargil conflict coupled with a lack of research material, a more in-depth 
review of the data-rich Cold War interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union is 
more suitable for exploring the capability–stability connection in detail. 
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1.4 The Influence of Complete Annihilation 
Without MAD, an evolved policy that came of age in the late 1960s, changes in nuclear 
capabilities should result in changes to strategic stability.  This pre-MAD timeframe in both the 
United States and the Soviet Union should have tightly bound nuclear capabilities with strategic 
stability, creating a mutually dependent relationship.  Forming MAD policies should have then 
cleaved nuclear-capability variations from changes in strategic stability.  Since this dissertation 
seeks to examine the tight capability–stability bond, it is essential to know when state MAD 
policies developed, thereby breaking the very bond I seek to study.  Juxtaposed with the theories 
presented in the previous section, policies for both the United States and the Soviet Union 
underwent numerous maturations, beginning in the late 1950s, tightly binding capability variations 
with strategic stability, and ending in the late 1960s with a cleaving of the capability–stability 
requirement.  This section walks through the policy maturations experienced by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, ending in MAD and the absence of the capability–stability bond. 
Mutually assured destruction, for the purposes of this dissertation, refers to the ability of 
each nuclear state, following the initiation of a nuclear exchange, to respond with a second strike.53  
A second strike translates to the ability of a state to absorb an initial nuclear strike and have a 
sufficient nuclear capability to fire back at the aggressor, leaving each state vulnerable while 
causing a reliance on bilateral deterrence to keep the peace.54  Supporting the claim that bilateral 
second-strike capability promotes deterrence and cleaves the capability–stability bond, Robert 
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Jervis stated, “(b)ecause either side can use its nuclear weapons to destroy its opponent’s 
population centers, the danger of escalation would play a very large role in any war and could not 
be controlled by having more missiles, more accurate missiles, and more invulnerable missiles 
than the other side.”55  Once obtaining second-strike capability, the reliance on nuclear capabilities 
driving changes to strategic stability reduces because each state has the ability to cause the other 
state significant damage.  Therefore, examining cases of variations in nuclear capabilities that 
potentially effected changes in strategic stability before MAD took hold is crucial, because 
scholarship and practice tightly bind these two as interdependent. 
1.4.1  United States 
President Eisenhower’s nuclear policies originated from the Truman administration.  
Realizing the great need to build a suitable nuclear arsenal, Truman tried to develop and 
incorporate nuclear weapons through all branches of the military and into many aspects of his 
international policy.  Addressing this issue, Truman advocated through the 1950 NSC-68 policy, 
a “rapid and sustained build-up of political, economic, and military strength of the free world.”56  
Truman’s policy supported the growth of nuclear capabilities and provided the structural 
framework for the next president to refine nuclear capability policy further. 
Following the Truman administration, Eisenhower wanted to keep policy focus on nuclear 
capabilities as key to the national strategy to gain control of post-war economic issues.  During 
President Eisenhower’s time in office (1953–1961), he worked to accomplish three tasks: (1) 
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increase military effectiveness; (2) stabilize the post-war economy by reducing costs; and (3) use 
nuclear capabilities to enhance national strategy.  Under the Eisenhower administration, the only 
way to accomplish all three objectives meant moving away from Truman’s policy of massive 
military rearmament in favor of a new reliance on airpower and nuclear weaponry.57    
Eisenhower’s 1953 nuclear policy, outlined in NSC-162/2 and referred to as New Look, 
was credited with being the first dedicated strategy to address the expanded employment of nuclear 
capabilities.  The New Look shifted Truman’s massive spending approach focused on troop build-
ups to one concentrated on economic stability and nuclear capability production as a means of 
decreasing expensive conventional fighting forces.  A single nuclear bomb under the New Look 
policy would take the place of a multitude of conventional troops and machinery.  Furthermore, 
under the New Look policy, the bolstering of strategic stability came as the product of a stronger 
nuclear force, one capable of replacing expensive troops with comparatively cheaper nuclear 
capabilities.  Eisenhower’s policy also explicitly identified the Soviet Union as the primary threat 
to the United States, and he vowed to address the threat while avoiding “seriously weakening the 
US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions.”58    
Post-war economic stability became a vital issue during the Eisenhower presidency and 
was the driving force behind many of the New Look initiatives.  Eisenhower outlined the 
requirement to rebuild a robust economic base at home while providing a sound economic 
backdrop for our European allies.  Furthermore, the New Look policy outlined excess government 
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spending as needing to be controlled while cutting taxes to spur future economic growth.59   
Finally, the New Look policy found value in enhancing nuclear capabilities as a way of cutting 
costly conventional fighting forces. 
Eisenhower’s 1953 NSC-162/2 outlined what came to be known as the doctrine of massive 
retaliation.  In defense against the Soviet threat, massive retaliation mandated the following60:  
1) A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive 
retaliatory damage by offensive striking power; 
2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression 
by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and line of communication; and 
3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to 
ensure victory in the event of general war. 
To meet these objectives, the United States needed to enhance its nuclear capabilities from 
where they were at the end of the Truman presidency.  Eisenhower’s replacement of Truman’s 
conventional military build-up relied heavily on nuclear capabilities.  Such a shift, Eisenhower 
reasoned, would help the United States address pressing budgetary challenges in the wake of 
World War II and the Korean War while enhancing the country’s ability to deter perceived threats 
from the Soviet Union.  Under the Eisenhower administration, when changes to nuclear 
capabilities were to have a significant effect on strategic stability, his policy of “massive 
retaliation” was supposed to be the driving force for dyadic state strategic stability. 
The Kennedy administration continued Eisenhower’s overarching policy of maintaining 
strategic stability with the Soviet Union but chose a drastically different path.  Three specific 
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nuclear policy issues aimed at maintaining strategic stability dominated the Kennedy 
administration’s abbreviated time in office: flexible response, centralized nuclear command and 
control, and development of a strategy of peace with the Soviet Union.  Each of these three 
Kennedy administration nuclear policy efforts strove to maintain strategic stability in the face of 
changing capabilities at home and abroad. 
Flexible Response 
The first nuclear-related policy effort by the Kennedy administration, flexible response, 
moved nuclear weapons away from the initial stages of battle and toward the end of a gradual 
build-up of hostilities beginning with low-level conventional conflict.61  The flexible response 
strategy changed the very first formal nuclear-use doctrine developed under the Eisenhower 
administration, under the title of “massive retaliation,” which sought to use an overwhelming threat 
of nuclear retaliation as a means of deterring any hostile actions against the United States or its 
allies.  Kennedy and McNamara did not believe that massive retaliation’s promise of deterrence 
through the threat of nuclear holocaust posed a credible means of dissuading the enemy, and thus 
they turned to the concept of flexible response developed by U.S. Army General Maxwell Taylor 
in the beginning days of the administration. 
General Taylor, following retirement in 1960 and dismissed by his contemporaries on the 
Joint Staff, published The Uncertain Trumpet as a critical review of Eisenhower’s massive 
retaliation doctrine.62   In retirement, Taylor advised the incoming Kennedy administration of the 
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virtues of a nuclear policy that addressed a wide range of potential issues, appropriately dubbed 
“flexible response.”63  Taylor fathered the notion of moving the threshold of using strategic nuclear 
weapons further away from the start of the conflict and, in turn, McNamara institutionalized the 
policy and brought it to NATO partner states for the larger coalition.  The result, long before the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, was that the Kennedy administration began adopting a lineage of 
policies embracing graduated strategic nuclear responses instead of preemptive nuclear attacks. 
Practically, the Kennedy administration’s embrace of the flexible response doctrine proved 
beneficial during multiple crises.  The global community and academics saw nuclear capabilities 
as a deterrent from great power conflict, but not as a reasonable response to many low-level 
engagements.64  Examples of such low-level conventionally fought conflict during the Kennedy 
administration include the 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis, 1961 in Laos, 1961–1963 in Vietnam, and 1961  
in Berlin.65  Each of these crises brought the Kennedy administration in its early years to respond 
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with low-level conventional force without initial consideration of using nuclear capabilities.  The 
Cuban Missile Crisis represents the quintessential flexible-response success story.  President 
Kennedy began with conventional force deployments building to a naval quarantine, a strategy 
that kept various levels of strategic stability in place while continuing to place military pressure 
on the Soviet Union.  Flexible response changed strategic stability in a controlled fashion 
beginning with low-level conventional conflict while working toward the ultimate utilization of 
nuclear capabilities, breaking any tight bond between strategic stability resulting from changes to 
nuclear capability. 
Centralized Nuclear Command and Control 
Beginning in 1961, the second policy effort of the Kennedy administration was the 
adaptation of nuclear capability use to the flexible response doctrine.  Under the Eisenhower 
administration, nuclear-use doctrine centered on massive retaliation executed through various 
military commanders, who controlled nuclear capabilities in the field with no central hub of 
coordination or execution.  Between 1958 and 1960, from the various military units across all the 
services, wargames conducted at the national level identified over 200 targeting conflicts.66   In 
response to these identified conflicts and the fundamental lack of centralized control, General 
Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began a movement across all the 
services to coordinate nuclear-capability execution efforts.  Initially built as a centralized means 
of executing nuclear capabilities under the massive retaliation doctrine, these efforts to coordinate 
centralized nuclear command and control coalesced just before the Cuban Missile Crisis around 
President Kennedy’s direction to adapt to his flexible response doctrine.   
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In September 1961, Kennedy received his first briefing on the Single Integrated 
Operational Plan (SIOP).  The SIOP for Fiscal Year 1962 (SIOP-62), put together under the 
auspices of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy before Kennedy took office, went into effect 
across the military forces on 1 April 1961.  The JCS outlined two mission tasks assigned to SIOP-
62: “1) destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear capability and primary military and 
government controls of major importance.  2) Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the 
Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent necessary to paralyze the economy and render the Sino-Soviet Bloc 
incapable of continuing war.”67  Various military commanders and Department of Defense 
leadership, having never previously coordinated at this level, provided a game plan for United 
States responses using nuclear forces in reaction to a Soviet military attack, “preemptively if 
possible, but in retaliation if necessary.”68  The new Chairman of the JCS, General Lemnitzer, 
presented Kennedy with fourteen options, varied only by the state of military readiness, but all 
accomplishing the same objective: launching the entire United States nuclear arsenal against 
military or urban-industrial targets.69  In response to the SIOP-62 briefing, and with considerable 
influence from McNamara, Kennedy requested the war plan to be altered to allow varied choices 
in potential attack sequences.70  
The direction given to the military in reformulating SIOP-62 was to produce a revised plan 
that broke free from the massive retaliation doctrine’s rigidity and the requirement to launch the 
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entire nuclear arsenal all at once.71  While providing direction to the planners, the JCS directed  
SIOP-63 to be assigned three mission objectives: 1) Destroy or neutralize the military capabilities 
of the enemy; 2) Minimize damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence; 
and 3) End the war on the best terms possible for the United States and its allies.72  In August 1962, 
just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy approved SIOP-63, a modified nuclear 
capability plan that reflected his request for flexibility.  Additionally, reflecting Kennedy’s 
preference for a flexible response, SIOP-63 provided “options to permit withholding of reserve 
forces from initial attack; to avoid attacks on urban-industrial, population, and government control 
centers; to avoid attacks on one or more Sino-Soviet Bloc nations, and to provide adjustments in 
force readiness.”73   Under the United States’ military responses dictated by SIOP-63, leading into 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, strategic stability was further decoupled from changes in nuclear 
capabilities, with greater emphasis applied to lower levels of conflict over the massive retaliation 
responses seen in SIOP-62. 
Nuclear Peace Movement 
The Kennedy administration’s third policy effort was focused on establishing peace in a 
world populated with nuclear weapons.  This policy effort did not directly affect the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, but it was the main topic of discourse between Kennedy and Khrushchev before the 
discovery of missiles in Cuba in October 1962, exemplifying Kennedy’s mindset of peace, not 
proliferation.  Speaking at the American University to the graduating class of June 1963, President 
Kennedy outlined his concept of peace as a “gradual evolution in human institutions – on a series 
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of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned.”74   
Kennedy’s idea of peace advocated for international agreements reducing nuclear weapons while 
divorcing them as a requirement to obtain strategic stability.  During his administration, Kennedy 
began a journey toward nuclear peace through negotiating, signing, and presenting to the Senate 
for ratification the Limited Test Ban Treaty, concluded between the United Kingdom, Soviet 
Union, and United States in the second half of 1963. 
The origins of the Limited Test Ban Treaty efforts, supported by then-Senator John F. 
Kennedy, began under the Eisenhower administration with an unofficial moratorium on nuclear 
testing between the Soviet Union and the United States in late 1958.75  Immediately upon taking 
office in January 1961, Kennedy opened a dialog with Chairman Khrushchev on ways and means 
to transition the test ban into a formalized agreement.  Faced with the inability to monitor and 
enforce the informal test ban properly, the Soviets resumed nuclear testing in late 1961, followed 
by the United States.  Kennedy continued to communicate with Khrushchev to further negotiations 
on establishing a permanent test ban between the two states.  Breaking only during the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev continued a steady flow of diplomatic communiques 
concerning the nuances of a nuclear test ban.  Finally, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 
September 1963 and ratified by the United States Senate the following October.  
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Strategic stability under the Kennedy administration was supposed to be the result of 
controlling the use of nuclear capabilities, as seen through his Flexible Response Limited Test Ban 
Treaty policies.  Unfortunately, Kennedy never saw his policies reach full potential; following his 
assassination in November 1963, the Johnson administration came to power unexpectedly.  Amid 
the transition between administrations, Johnson kept Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense 
and General Maxwell Taylor as Chairman of the JCS, resulting in a continuity of nuclear policy.  
The policies developed under Johnson built on Kennedy’s flexible response strategy.  Under the 
Johnson administration, three nuclear policy priorities took shape: 1) the transition of NATO 
policy away from massive retaliation; 2) the evolution of flexible response in the United States; 
and 3) arms control.  Each of these policy issues sought, in part, to balance strategic stability by 
controlling variations in nuclear capabilities. 
President Johnson faced a post-crisis nation following Kennedy’s assassination.  In a short 
timeframe (1958–1962), the United States had endured two stand-offs with the Soviet Union in 
Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the assassination of a president.  Congress bolstered the fiscal 
year 1962 and 1963 budgets by $10 billion following the 1961 Berlin crisis, resulting in an 
increased number of combat divisions from 11 to 16, and emphasized more significant nuclear 
missile commitment with our European allies.76  In May 1962 and then again in June, McNamara 
attempted to sway NATO allies away from the prevailing massive retaliation mindset in Europe 
to one focused on flexible response.77  McNamara battled a NATO general assembly that embraced 
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the use of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible threshold during a conflict with the Soviet 
Union.78  As nuclear policy evolved in the United States, both McNamara and Johnson believed it 
was essential to ensure the United States was on the same page as NATO allies.  To counter the 
difference between the United States’ view of flexible response and NATOs embrace of massive 
retaliation, it became necessary for the United States to ensure allied partners of the importance of 
a restrained yet strong retaliatory force.79 
 Internally, the United States found itself moving away from the Kennedy-era strategy of 
flexible response.  Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara embraced a damage-limiting 
approach to the flexible response strategy through the no cities doctrine.80  Prominently highlighted 
in his Athens and Ann Arbor speeches, McNamara considered prevailing American nuclear 
strategy to be a counterforce approach, targeting only the military capabilities of the Soviets over 
civilian population centers.  Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara evolved his thinking 
into what became known as assured destruction for two reasons.81  First, counterforce required a 
substantial build-up of nuclear weapons to meet all the military-targeting objectives.  This massive 
build-up, in the mind of McNamara, proved to be too costly for the Department of Defense’s 
budget.  Second, the standoff over Cuba made McNamara believe nuclear weapons were not a 
useful tool for great power conflict.  Using only the counterforce doctrine, McNamara saw the idea 
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of nuclear-weapon use becoming an accepted component of warfare, so long as no one targeted 
civilians.  The normalization of nuclear weapons during a general war was unacceptable to 
McNamara, which drove his efforts to change how to use them. 
Evolving from flexible response, McNamara proposed a new strategy in the fiscal year 
1965–1969 budget: assured destruction.82  Three guidelines outlined this concept.  First, the 
strategic nuclear force structure needed to be sufficient to destroy 30% of the Soviet population, 
50% of the Soviet industrial capacity, and 150 Soviet cities.83  Second, the Soviets needed to have 
a comparable assured destruction strategy as well.84  Finally, with a redefined strategy, the force 
structure could be drastically limited compared with the needs of a counterforce doctrine.  With 
the new assured destruction strategy, once in place, strategic stability became even less tightly 
bound to variances of nuclear capabilities and more reliant on the constant threat of mutual 
annihilation.  Once both the United States and the Soviet Union obtained the capability to launch 
a second strike in the late 1960s, the reliance on variations in nuclear capabilities driving changes 
in strategic stability dissipated, breaking the capability–stability bond.   
The policy changes under the Johnson administration matured Kennedy’s flexible response 
doctrine into assured destruction and then into MAD, thereby driving a permanent wedge between 
variations of nuclear capabilities affecting changes in strategic stability by the late 1960s.  Under 
Eisenhower, the massive retaliation strategy required nuclear capabilities to be large enough to not 
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only survive the first strike from the Soviets but also to respond with overwhelming force to stop 
any future attacks.  Under Johnson’s assured destruction, the numbers of various nuclear 
capabilities could be cut so long as sufficient nuclear capability existed to accomplish the goals 
proposed under McNamara’s guidelines.  As state priorities changed, so too could the numbers of 
required capabilities to meet those priorities. 
1.4.2  Soviet Union  
The Soviet Union first detonated a nuclear weapon in 1949 under the leadership of Stalin, 
but it was still more than four years behind advances made by the United States in both technology 
and policy.  Coming to power in 1955, Khrushchev adopted three policy objectives as a means of 
compensating for the Soviet Union’s late start in building nuclear capabilities: 1) Coalesce all 
strategic rocket forces under a new branch of the military; 2) Emphasize strategic missile 
technology as a means of reducing costs, shrinking the military, and projecting power; and 3) 
Create a nuclear strategy that embraces preemptive attack.85  Meeting these objectives, Stalin 
planned on streamlining and reducing the post-WWII military while controlling costs to bolster 
the Soviet economy. 
The first policy objective under Khrushchev was the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s 
different strategic rocket units under a single branch of the military.  Under Stalin’s leadership 
following WWII, the artillery branch, Gvardeyskie Minometnyie Chasti (Guard Rocket Launcher 
Units), was the central organization charged with the initial development of Soviet missile 
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technology.86  The fielding and operations of nuclear capabilities, however, were spread among 
twenty different engineering regiments, driving nuclear weapon delivery into a crisis and lacking 
a focus in the face of decentralization.87 
Under Khrushchev, priorities for weapon-delivery methods changed from Stalin’s 
emphasis on bombers to one focused on rockets, theoretically allowing faster delivery times once 
launched in addition to higher levels of mass production.  Once the R-7 completed operational 
testing, entering military service in December 1959, the Soviet Council of Ministers began the 
process of transitioning the Guard Rocket Launcher Units into the new Strategic Rocket Forces 
(SRFs), elevating their status to one of the senior services in 1961.88  The elevation of the SRFs 
did not have an immediate effect on the fielded nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, and the 
change did not occur until 1967 when rocket production numbers began to increase significantly 
compared with years past. 
The second policy goal under Khrushchev was the bolstering of strategic rocket technology 
as a means of reducing costs, shrinking the military, and projecting power.  Leading up to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets were able to field both nascent intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) and sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities in addition to their existing 
bombers, providing capabilities to all three legs of their nuclear triad, which was equal to the 
United States but not considered sufficient for a second strike.  During the Chairmanship of 
Khrushchev, the burden of military power projection shifted onto the shoulders of Soviet nuclear 
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capabilities, moving away from pricier conventional forces.89  Khrushchev’s actions are similar to 
Eisenhower’s New Look policy, emphasizing the importance of nuclear capabilities as a way of 
reducing the financial burdens of conventional forces, overwhelming firepower, and destruction 
provided through nuclear capability, would supplant the logistical and expensive traditional 
army.90  
Oleg Troyanovsky, a foreign policy advisor for Khrushchev, recounted that the Soviet 
military was cut from 3.6 to 2.4 million troops; “producing nuclear missiles was cheaper than 
financing large land armies.”91  The Soviet military reductions were 2.7 times greater than what 
Eisenhower was able to accomplish between 1954 and 1957, following the 1953 publication of 
NSC-162/2.92   To reduce the size of the Soviet army, Khrushchev had to find a means of delivering 
nuclear capability efficiently, and ICBMs seemed to be the answer.   
Under Khrushchev, an aggressive build-up of ICBMs supplanted Stalin’s bomber 
initiative.  Khrushchev’s emphasis on ICBMs did not have a significant effect on the Soviet relative 
nuclear capability or the Soviet state’s ability to conduct a second strike.  As the number of fielded 
ICBMs increased, the available payload capacity should also have increased, driving Soviet 
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nuclear capabilities higher.  However, Soviet production numbers for the first few years (until 
1967) did not reach significant levels compared with the nuclear capability of the United States.   
Finally, the third policy objective undertaken by Khrushchev made full nuclear war 
inevitable as a result of a general conflict with the United States.93  Before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Chairman Khrushchev incorporated the concept of offensive surprise, launching nuclear 
weapons first when the enemy is least expecting it, as a means of striking a crippling blow early 
in the conflict.  The benefits afforded by ICBMs as the primary delivery vehicles fed directly into 
this policy.  Various regiments of the newly formed SRFs could launch instantaneous attacks on 
the United States with little or no warning, yielding devastating results. 
Furthermore, the consolidated work being performed by the SRFs during this time bore the 
first movement toward ballistic missile defense as a viable component of national defense.94   
When operational, ballistic missile defense eliminated incoming rockets while they were in flight 
but before they had the opportunity to destroy their targets.  Preemptively using existing Soviet 
nuclear capabilities while defeating the capabilities of the United States through ballistic missile 
defense continued to demonstrate Khrushchev’s reliance on strategic stability as a product of 
nuclear capabilities. 
For Khrushchev, his nuclear program was nascent and had little real influence on strategic 
stability as he started from a position of disadvantage from Stalin’s time in office.  Khrushchev’s 
work to build a nuclear force to compete with the United States supplied the basis for the MAD 
capability to come at the end of the 1960s.  However, a year after the assassination of President 
Kennedy, Khrushchev’s time in office came to an end.  No other Soviet nuclear policy initiatives 
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came into effect during 1963–1964.  Following a bloodless coup originating from inside the 
Kremlin, Khrushchev stepped aside, allowing Leonid Brezhnev to take over as Soviet Chairman.95  
Through to the end of his time in office, Khrushchev continued to work on his three main policy 
objectives: 1) Coalesce all strategic rocket forces under a new branch of the military; 2) Emphasize 
strategic missile technology as a means of reducing costs, shrinking the military, and projecting 
power; and 3) Create a nuclear strategy that embraces preemptive attack.96   
 The departure of Khrushchev from the Kremlin in 1964 resulted in a nuclear policy 
transformation as Brezhnev began his two decades as leader of the Soviet Union.  Undertaking 
three nuclear policy initiatives, Brezhnev embarked on an aggressive embrace of nuclear capability 
expansion.  Under Brezhnev, the policies adopted aimed to enhance and bolster Soviet military 
forces, specifically the nuclear forces.  The first policy initiative was an increase in both nuclear 
and conventional forces; the second was the race to catch-up with the United States both in overall 
numbers and technology; and the third policy initiative under Brezhnev was an immediate fielding 
of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology as a means of guarding against the 
technologically and numerically superior Americans.  Through these initiatives, Brezhnev hoped 
to boost the Soviet Union from what he had perceived as deficiencies resulting in a weak Soviet 
military leftover from the Khrushchev era. 
 As much as Brezhnev wanted a change in the military, explicitly in the nuclear forces, 
some strategic mindset continuities stemming from the late 1950s influenced his decision-making.  
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Consistent with the existing Soviet strategy, when Brezhnev took office he held tight to the belief 
that war with the United States would either start as nuclear or would initiate as a conventional 
conflict and then turn nuclear.97  However, given Khrushchev’s focus on cutting the budget and 
catching up with the United States’ nuclear capabilities, in 1964, Brezhnev faced a Soviet Union 
lacking the ability to address conflicts across the entire spectrum below the level of nuclear war.98  
Under the Soviet mindset that war with the United States is a nuclear conflict, any change in 
nuclear capabilities could give away any potential advantage, reinforcing the tight bond between 
variances in nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stability. 
Guarding against this vulnerable mindset of imminent war, as a matter of prevention for 
Brezhnev, building significant capabilities to conduct both nuclear and conventional wars became 
a significant imperative.99  Assisting Brezhnev in his policy of military build-up was an 
institutional proclivity for the accumulation of weapons, and a higher number of weapons, 
especially nuclear but also conventional, directly contributes to a higher probability of 
deterrence.100  Brezhnev entered office at a time when the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union 
continued to be significantly less than those of the United States, and which were insufficient to 
field a secured second-strike capability.  This trend, stemming from the very beginning of the 
Soviet nuclear program, continued until 1967 when Brezhnev’s efforts paid off with the very first 
increase in Soviet nuclear capability. 
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Under Brezhnev’s leadership, ABM technology took a dramatic leap forward, which was 
identified in the 1957 Gaither Report as potentially destabilizing.101  At that time, countering ABM 
technology was required to launch a higher number of missiles against the enemy in hopes that 
one or some of the warheads made it through the defenses.  A prototype ABM system was fielded 
around Moscow by 1962 while the United States continued to work on fielding an American 
version.  Technologies associated with ABM defenses led Brezhnev to begin work on the R-36 
missile, built specifically to counter ABM systems.  Later in 1969, the R-36 was developed into a 
system capable of deploying three nuclear warheads, defeating available ABM technology of the 
time.102  In 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union, recognizing the destabilizing nature of 
ABM technology, began negotiations to limit the use of such systems.  The result of these 
negotiations led to the 1972 signing of the ABM Treaty.  As ABM technology required more 
nuclear capability to perform the same destructive task as before, in the late 1960s, the capability–
stability bonds were loosened; strategic stability did not solely depend on variations in nuclear 
capabilities but also on the ability of this new system to stop incoming warheads. 
The leadership of Brezhnev ushered an aggressive technological revolution to the forefront, 
driven by long-standing mindsets shaped around the belief that war with the United States would 
turn nuclear if it occurred.  Needing to bolster Soviet nuclear numbers, Brezhnev had a significant 
gap to overcome with the limited numbers of already-fielded ICBM systems and few Soviet 
bombers.  Although progress ensued, Brezhnev’s efforts to build-up the nuclear force did not begin 
paying off until 1967, three years after he took office.  Furthermore, the Soviet ABM program, 
coupled with the development of the R-37 missile, set the groundwork to begin a future arms race, 
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because only more missiles could defeat such a system.  Thankfully, that arms race never occurred.  
However, Brezhnev’s policies, expanding the Soviet nuclear arsenal when and where possible, 
enabled the Soviet embrace of MAD at the end of the 1960s. 
1.4.3  Summary 
 At the outset of the period considered in this dissertation, during the late 1950s, nuclear-
capability variations were directly tied to changes in strategic stability.  Both Eisenhower and 
Khrushchev purposely tied variations in nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability 
because neither had a nuclear capability ‘upper hand’ or the ability to conduct a second strike; it 
was imperative that one side’s first strike could take out the opponent.  However, as nuclear 
capabilities grew on both sides, so too did the ability to conduct a second strike, and MAD was 
born.  The research I conducted is focused on the point when the capability–stability connection 
was at its highest levels, before both sides embraced MAD at the end of the 1960s. 
1.5  Case selection 
To study relationships between variations in state nuclear capabilities and the suspected 
tightly associated changes in strategic stability, my research focuses on the nuclear capability 
variances of the United States and the Soviet Union between 1957 and 1967.  During this 
timeframe, numerous quantified changes in nuclear capabilities occurred between the two states, 
in addition to multiple episodes of direct militarized confrontations.  The high rates of occurrence 
of nuclear capability changes and direct militarized confrontations make 1957–1967 an ideal 
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period in which to observe any potential capability–stability associations, if they existed as 
scholarship and practice have proposed. 
 Each state entered 1957 with previously fielded nuclear capabilities: the United States with 
a high number of long-range bombers and the Soviet Union with a much smaller number of 
bombers, but also a small number of fielded SLBMs.  Over the next ten years, policies adopted by 
each state aggressively led to a build-up in each leg of the nuclear triad to include long-range 
bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.  The bolstering of each state’s triad capabilities during this 
timeframe supplies the basis of measurement for the present research.  To determine any potential 
capability–stability associations during times when changes in nuclear capabilities occurred, my 
research conducted assessments on cases of decreased strategic stability at points when nuclear 
capabilities varied. 
 During the 1957–1967 timeframe, ten cases of militarized confrontation occurred between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  At the center is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which, 
based on the scholarship available, represents a definitive change in strategic stability between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as both sides moved toward an armed confrontation during a 
period of relative nuclear-capability build-up.  The proximity of confrontation to nuclear capability 
build-up coupled with the notoriety of the Cuban Missile Crisis made this an ideal focal point. 
The primary case selection used in my research originated from an analysis of interstate 
conflicts coded in The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0 (more 
popularly known as the Correlates of War [COW] dataset) with initial qualitative case descriptions 
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provided by Douglas Gibler.103  Cases selected for analysis were required to meet the following 
criteria:  
1)  A direct militarized interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
2)  A change in dyadic state strategic stability had occurred. 
The selection of the first criterion was based on the need to only focus on the conflict 
between each state.  During 1957–1967, both the United States and the Soviet Union interacted on 
several political, civil, and militarized levels.  However, this research is concerned with the conflict 
that occurred separately from any other interaction.  The second criterion was chosen as a means 
of producing measurable change between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Given the 
criteria and timeframe, six cases occurred between 1957 and 1961, before the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and three occurred in the years that follows before 1967. 
 Why are these ten cases the right examples to study?  At the heart of this research is the 
requirement to find the nexus between changes in strategic stability and changes in nuclear 
capabilities.  Subject scholarship and practice have tightly connected changes in strategic stability 
to changes in nuclear capabilities.  With the high number of confrontations and massive nuclear 
capability build-up, if the capability–stability connection exists, the 1957–1967 timeframe, more 
so than any other time before or after, provides the best opportunity to show such a tight binding.  
Stated differently, the 1957–1967 timeframe is data-rich with a high number of cases identified as 
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either least or most likely.104  Least likely cases are those where changes in strategic stability were 
not likely to be explained through variations in nuclear capabilities.  The research I conducted 
focuses on most likely cases, representing instances of strategic stability change almost certainly 
caused by variations in nuclear capability.105  The most likely cases presented are ones that if 
nuclear capabilities drove strategic stability, it would be present in these cases.  If the capability–
stability connection cannot hold during this timeframe, favoring the outcome in most likely cases, 
for all cases of changed strategic stability, there would be reason to question the strength of the 
bond as portrayed by scholarship and practice. 
1.6 Methods and findings 
Methodologically, I performed a qualitative analysis for each of the ten cases, overlaying 
changes in strategic stability with any variances in nuclear capabilities for either side of the dyadic 
nuclear state system.  For each of the ten cases, multiple changes in strategic stability occurred and 
were evaluated separately, yielding thirty-nine nodes of unique strategic-stability measurements.  
From the thirty-nine independent nodes, twenty-nine represented instances of change in strategic 
stability; twenty-one showed strategic-stability changes that occurred during times of change in 
nuclear capabilities; and, after qualitative analysis, only three nodes showed that changes in 
strategic stability could tie back to changes in nuclear capabilities on either side of the dyadic state 
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system.  Testing the hypothesis across each of the cases and nodes showed that most changes in 
strategic stability occurred independently of any change in nuclear capabilities. 
 Comparisons of the ten cases that occurred between 1957 and 1967 resulted in only three 
instances where variations in nuclear capabilities led to changes in strategic stability.  The data in 
Table 1-1 below summarize the findings from the research conducted.  Cases were broken down 
into two categories based on the occurrence of measurable nuclear-capability changes during the 
year of the case.  Cases occurring during years of nuclear-capability change (Type-I) numbered 
seven, whereas only three cases occurred when no change in nuclear capability (Type-II) was 
measurable.  Strategic stability changed among the ten cases a total of twenty-nine times. 
Table 1-1: Summary of findings 
 
 The implications of this research are that variations in nuclear capabilities are not 
necessary, although they are sometimes sufficient to change strategic stability.  Breaking the bond 
of necessity with variations in nuclear capabilities opens the possibility that influences on strategic 
stability can come from other sources.  Future strategic stability research can focus on 
technological influences, implications of national security policy, and human error, to name just a 
few areas. 
Strategic Stability 
Change
Capability-Stability 
Connection
Type I (7 Cases) 21 3
Type II (3 Cases) 8 0
TOTAL 29 3
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1.7  Structure of the dissertation 
Across six chapters, I examine the bond between changes in strategic stability caused by 
variances in nuclear capabilities.  The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 supplies the research introduction and methodology.  Chapter 3 covers the first six cases 
of changes to strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union, which occurred 
between 1957 and 1961; the first quantified change of relative nuclear capabilities occurred in 
1960.  Chapter 4 covers the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the events before, during, and after; 
this chapter captures each 1962 change in strategic stability and is composed of the following three 
sections: 1 January to 15 October 1962, 16–28 October, and 29 October to 31 December.  Chapter 
5 covers three cases that occurred after the Cuban Missile Crisis between 1963 – 1967.  Finally, 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the analysis from Chapters 3–5 and provides the conclusion 
along with recommendations for further research. 
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2.0 Methods and Cases 
Measuring a change in strategic stability and its possible connection to variations in nuclear 
capabilities requires a defined methodology to establish the presence or absence of a causal 
connection.  The strategic stability scholarship and research that tightly bind nuclear-capability 
variations with changes in strategic stability assists in establishing the capability–stability 
connection.  Existing scholarship assumes a linkage between strategic stability and nuclear 
capabilities but lacks a comprehensive assessment to support the connection.  The research I 
performed, through the methodologies outlined in this chapter, began the process of testing the 
capability–stability connection. 
Outlined in this chapter are the qualitative methods devised to create a repeatable process 
of case study analysis in a nuclear dyadic state system.  Changes in strategic stability, the principal 
critical criterion for case consideration, had to occur in an instance that involved both the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, this chapter provides background terminology used 
throughout the remainder of the dissertation, along with the analytical efforts performed to 
determine variations in nuclear capabilities. 
2.1 Key concepts defined 
This section undertakes two tasks: explaining the components of measurement in this 
research and justifying why a potential alternative measure to my independent and dependent 
variables reliant on leader perceptions was excluded.  These tasks are presented in four subsections.  
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First, I provide further explanations of the independent and dependent variables, nuclear 
capabilities, and strategic stability.  Second, to judge the influence that variations in nuclear 
capabilities have on strategic stability, I outline the necessity and sufficiency criteria as they apply 
to variable changes. Third, I define a key component of measurement, the rate of escalation, and 
highlight actions that can drive states closer to or further away from war.  Fourth and finally, I 
address leader perceptions and explain why they were not used to define my key variables despite 
their being a common factor cited in modern research on states’ decisions to engage in conflict. 
2.1.1  Variables 
2.1.1.1 Independent Variable 
The independent variable (IV) used throughout my research is nuclear capabilities.  
Nuclear capabilities are defined as a composite term of reference that describes the various 
components of nuclear weaponry, including nuclear warheads, delivery methods, and payload 
capacity.106  The nuclear triad is the ability of the state to deliver nuclear capabilities from the land, 
sea, and air.  For the work outlined in this research, these three methods are the only delivery 
mechanisms of nuclear capabilities for state actors. 
As an IV, nuclear capabilities allow for a clean and repeatable quantification of a state’s 
nuclear capabilities.  This variable can be transported outside this research and applied to any state 
as a means of explaining nuclear capabilities.  States that have nuclear capabilities have 
traditionally kept true and accurate accounting of stockpiles at the highest level of classification.  
 
106 No effort is made to differentiate nuclear warheads based on calculated yield.  For the purposes of this research, 
the yield of a nuclear warhead has does not change the calculated nuclear capabilities of any state. 
 58 
Therefore, limitations on this variable include accurate and accessible accounting of nuclear 
capabilities along with the technological competency of the state to mass-produce any component 
of its nuclear capabilities.  However, these limitations were not an issue in the present research for 
two reasons.  First, the nuclear component accounting numbers used throughout this research are 
the best available unclassified bookkeeping available.  Second, if in the future newer or better 
numbers become available, the processes proposed in this research are repeatable.  Applying the 
nuclear capabilities IV to any state, and specifically to the United States and the Soviet Union, 
allows for a quantified accounting of that state’s ability to conduct a nuclear strike.  
2.1.1.2 Dependent Variable 
Strategic stability, the dependent variable (DV) in this research, is the degree of mutual 
deterrence from war between potential adversaries.  This definition of strategic stability clearly 
distinguishes the objective of stability, the avoidance of war, in addition to defining the 
participants, the potential adversaries.  Notably, there is no inherent reference to nuclear weapons. 
This is in contrast to much scholarship published since the dawn of the nuclear age, which has 
often hijacked the term and bound it to nuclear capabilities and nuclear-capable states. 
2.1.2  Necessity and Sufficiency 
At the heart of this research is the pursuit to uncover whether changes in the IV, nuclear 
capabilities, are either necessary or sufficient to change the DV, strategic stability.107  This task is 
 
107 Practically applying necessity and sufficiency comes in the form of both Hoop and Smoking Gun tests.  Passing a 
Hoop Test confirms that necessity of a condition while failing such a test discounts the condition from further 
considerations.  However, passing a Smoking Gun Test will likewise also confirm the sufficiency for a hypothesis 
but failing said test only weakens the hypothesis while not discounting it from future considerations.  David Collier, 
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undertaken through process tracing the relationship between the two, relying upon the practices 
recommended in works by various scholars of qualitative research methods.108  The case study 
analysis performed should either contradict or validate contemporary research on strategic stability 
through the determination of one of the following four conclusions.  If the scholarship connecting 
nuclear capabilities and strategic stability is correct, one of the first three conclusions must be 
correct:109 
1.  Variations in nuclear capabilities are necessary causes of changes in strategic stability 
but not always sufficient. 
2.  Variations in nuclear capabilities are sufficient but unnecessary causes of changes in 
strategic stability. 
3.  Variations in nuclear capabilities are both necessary and sufficient for changes in 
strategic stability. 
4.  Variations in nuclear capabilities are neither sufficient nor necessary for changes in 
strategic stability. 
 
Conclusions 1, 2, and 3, if validated, would show that variations in nuclear capabilities 
result in changes in strategic stability. 
 
“Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–30; James Mahoney, 
“The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” Sociological Methods & Research 41, no. 4 (2012): 
570–97. 
108 Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 
179–89; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 1st Edition (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997); Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences”; Collier, 
“Understanding Process Tracing.” 
109 Zaks would consider this a key part of process tracing and part of “Casting the net widely for alternative 
explanations.”  Sherry Zaks, “Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending 
Hypotheses in Process Tracing,” Political Analysis 25, no. 3 (July 2017): 344–62. 
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2.1.3  Escalation 
Measuring how much nuclear capabilities change, as noted above, is an empirical science. 
Measuring changes in strategic stability, by contrast, is a little less concrete.  For the purposes of 
this investigation, changes in strategic stability are accounted for in terms of escalation.  Escalation 
describes actions in a dyadic system as each state independently, or in concert, moves between 
peace and war.  If changes in nuclear capabilities are necessary or sufficient for causing changes 
in strategic stability, then process tracing should reveal a correlation between alterations in the 
empirical measures of the former with shifts in escalatory and de-escalatory moves within the 
relevant dyad. 
The scholarship on escalation congregates around two views describing the order of 
movement between peace and war.  The first view of movement originates in the mid-1960s during 
the chilliest parts of the Cold War with Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder theory.  Kahn described 
escalation as “an increase in the level of conflict in international crisis situations.”110  To illustrate 
his theory, Kahn outlined a linear forty-four step “ladder,” broken into seven categories of 
differentiated levels of hostility, meant to describe the devolution into conflict beginning with 
“ostensible peace” and terminating with “spasm or insensate war.”111  Although Kahn did not 
explicitly prescribe a requirement for reaching each rung of the ladder methodically before 
progressing higher, his theory advocated a linear movement where lower level rungs occur before 
those further up the ladder.112   Viewed as a form of brinkmanship, escalation, according to Kahn, 
 
110 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), 3. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Kahn, “Escalation as a Strategy.” 
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is a two-sided interaction where the shared risk of war forces one state into capitulating to the 
second state’s will.113  Table 2-1 below outlines the complexity of Kahn’s forty-four step escalation 
ladder as it progresses from the initiation of crisis to insensate war.  Under Kahn’s complex forty-
four step theory, escalation begins during a crisis and, if left unchecked, progresses through lower 
levels of conflict while heading on a path toward unadulterated nuclear war. 
Table 2-1: Herman Kahn's Forty Four Step Ladder114 
 
 
 
113 Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 200. 
114 Kahn, On Escalation. 
Starting 
Point
Cold War
1 Ostensible Crisis 4 Hardening of Positions 10
Provocative 
Breaking Off of 
Diplomatic 
Relations
21 Local Nuclear War - Exemplary 26
Demonstration 
Attack on Zone of 
Interior
32
Formal 
Declaration of 
"General" War
39 Slow-Motion Countercity War
2
Political, 
Economic, and 
Diplomatic 
Gestures
5 Show of Force 11 Super-Ready Status 22
Declaration of 
Limited Nuclear 
War
27
Exemplary Attack 
on Military 
Targets
33
Slow-Motion 
Counter-
"Property" War
40 Countervalue Salvo
3
Solemn and 
Formal 
Declarations
6 Significant Mobilizations 12
Large 
Conventional War 23
Local Nuclear War 
- Military 28
Exemplary Attack 
against Property 34
Slow-Motion 
Counterforce War 41
Augmented 
Disarming Attack
7
"Legal" 
Harassment - 
Retortions
13 Large Compound Escalation 24
Unusual, 
Provocative, and 
Significant 
Countermeasures
29 Exemplary Attack against Population 35
Constrained Force 
Reduction Salvo 42
Civilian 
Devastation 
Attack
8 Harassing Acts of Violence 14
Declaration of 
Limited 
Conventional War
25 Evacuation 30 Complete Evacuation 36
Constrained 
Disarming Attack 43
Some Other Kind 
of Controlled 
General War
9 Dramatic Military Confrontations 15
Barely Nuclear 
War 31
Reciprocal 
Reprisals 37
Counterforce with 
Avoidance Attack 44
Spasm or 
Insensate War
16 Nuclear "Ultimatums" 38
Unmodified 
Counterforce 
Attack
17 Limited Evacuations
18
Spectacular Show 
or Demonstration 
of Force
19
Justifiable 
Counterforce 
Attack
20
Peaceful 
Worldwide 
Embargo or 
Blockade
Don't Rock the Boat 
Threshold
Nuclear War is 
Unthinkable 
Threshold
No Nuclear Use 
Threshold
Central Sanctuary 
Threshold
Central War 
Threshold
City Targeting 
Threshold Aftermaths
End Point
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The second collection of views on escalation, championed by Lisa Carlson and developed 
over 30 years after Kahn’s original work, contend that escalation occurs in the form of state actions 
crossing perceived boundaries while acting as the coercive component of bargaining, bilaterally 
imposing costs, and increasing the “intensity and scope” of conflict.115  Variations in nuclear 
capabilities that drive toward a potential use and heightened incentives for the use of nuclear 
capabilities become a method for imposing costs, driving the breaching of boundaries and dyadic 
state escalation.  Carlson defined escalation boundaries using the same construct made useful in 
the COW dataset.116  Carlson’s useful adoption of the COW boundaries allows for the uniform 
measurement of escalation across multiple conflicts and crises below the threshold of war between 
any two state participants.  The boundaries outlined by Carlson and the COW dataset begin with 
peace or the absence of war and end with the breakout of war.  This defined spectrum of escalation 
boundaries ties closely with strategic stability since the latter is the mutual deterrence of war.  
Therefore, Table 2-2 below shows the tight correlation between strategic stability and Carlson’s 
escalation boundaries.  Tying escalation levels to various stages of strategic stability is used in 
case analysis to describe the dyadic state system’s proximity to or from war. 
 
115 Forrest E Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, Project Air Force 
(Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Lisa J. Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 511–34. 
116 Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict”; J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates of War (New 
York: Free Press, 1978). 
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Table 2-2: Correlation between escalation boundaries and strategic stability117 
 
Comparing Kahn’s escalation ladder and Carlson’s theory of escalation, both address the 
same issue, explaining the causal pathway between peace and war.  However, Kahn’s ladder fails 
to explain those instances where states engage in activities that do not neatly step through each 
rung of his linear process.  Put differently, Kahn’s ladder does not address what has become known 
as a “bolt out of the blue” or, in some instances, preemption.118  When conducting this research, I 
found that almost all the cases selected jumped from peace to higher levels of escalation in short 
order, often missing many of Kahn’s intermediary steps.  Carlson’s theory on escalation addresses 
the possibility that states could jump from peace to severe hostility in short order and then back 
down again, a scenario observed in each of the case studies repeatedly.  Carlson’s parsimonious 
work was therefore used in this research as the basis for measuring how states move to or from 
conflict with a stronger explanatory power in each of the case studies. 
Next, using Carlson’s framework, it was crucial to define what constitutes each end of the 
strategic stability spectrum.”  If mutual deterrence from war defines strategic stability, what is each 
 
117 This table is a derivative of Carlson and Singer’s work, showing a correlation between strategic stability and 
escalation.  Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict”; Singer, The Correlates of War. 
118 Christopher Chivvis et al., Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 
2017); Sagan, “SIOP-62”; Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution, 1982); George H. Quester, “Crises and the Unexpected,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18, no. 4 (1988): 701–19. 
Level of Strategic Stability Full Reduced Partial Diminished Absent
Escalation Level 1 2 3 4 5
Escalation Category No Hostility Threat Display Use War
Qualifying Actions Threat to use force Show of troops Boder violation Begin interstate war
Threat to blockade Show of ships Blockade Join interstate war
Threat to occupy Show of planes Occupation of territory Use of WMD
Threat to declare war Alert Seizure
Threat to join war Mobilization Clash
Fortify border Raid
Declaration of war
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state trying to maintain and, at the same time, avoid?  Defining peace is the easiest of the two terms 
as it is the lack of any militarized hostility.  In a dyadic system, peace is the baseline status between 
two states and is maintained when neither state is performing militarized armed conflict against 
the other state.  On the opposite end of the spectrum is war, a status each side usually desires to 
avoid.  The COW dataset set a widely accepted standard for defining war as any interstate conflict 
yielding 1,000 battle related deaths.119  To count as a participant, a state needs to contribute a 
minimum of 1,000 troops and suffer at least 100 battle related deaths.120  The Soviet Union and 
the United States comprised a dyadic state system at a time when both could use nuclear 
capabilities to inflict severe combat casualties.  Although both states spent the majority of the time 
between 1957 and 1967 in a state of peace, had either side decided to use nuclear capabilities then 
the thresholds for war would have easily been attained. 
Table 2-2 also identifies qualifying actions for each of the five defined levels of escalation.  
These qualifying actions allow for an assessment of each state’s activities in a dyadic state 
competition to be associated with a correlated escalation level and subsequent strategic stability 
status.  For example, in September 1973, the escalation level between the state of Israel bordering 
Arab neighbors in the region, specifically Egypt, was maintained at Escalation Level-1, given that 
no militarized hostilities were occurring.  During September 1973, the existing peace dissipated in 
early October when Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal to attack Israel from the South while 
 
119 Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, 
Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007, Correlates of War Series (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2010); Melvin 
Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, 2nd Edition (Beverly Hills, 
Calif: Sage Publications, 1982); Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, and Michael C. Horowitz, “A Revised Look at Interstate 
Wars, 1816–2007,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 5 (2016): 956–76; Maoz et al., “The Dyadic Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” 
120 Small and Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980; Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to 
War; Reiter, Stam, and Horowitz, “A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816–2007”; Maoz et al., “The Dyadic 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” 
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Syrian forces joined the onslaught later by attacking from the North in the Golan Heights region.  
The crossing of borders by the Egyptians constituted a change to Escalation Level-4 through the 
actions of the southern border raid.  After Israel mobilized its national defense forces, bringing a 
full national militarized response resulting in thousands of troops called into action, another change 
occurred as the interstate conflict warranted a change to Escalation Level-5.  These qualifying 
actions, used in demonstrating the tight coupling of escalation levels to strategic stability during 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, provide a consistent basis of assessment when judging changes in the 
strategic stability obtained between states. 
2.1.4  Perceptions 
Since the determination to undertake actions that alter the balance of strategic stability, 
including war, is a human decision made by state leaders, it was essential to address the topic of 
perceptions in this research.  Perceptions are the conclusions decision-makers draw from the 
observable actions of other world leaders, potentially independent of the underlying “objective” 
reality.121  Are changes in state leader perceptions a better measure of nuclear capabilities and 
strategic stability, or a dyadic state system’s proximity to war, than the more objective measures 
outlined above?  Put differently, should variations in nuclear capabilities and strategic stability be 
assessed in terms of leaders’ beliefs about the nuclear balance and how close or far they are from 
war, rather than the number of weapons in each state’s arsenal and the discrete actions that states 
take?  This section explains why perceptions were not used to measure changes in strategic stability 
 
121 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1976). 
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when so many authors have written about their value when explaining conflict.  It is not my 
intention to degrade the value of perceptions when accounting for state leader decisions to enter 
into conflict; my goal, as stated, is to identify the most useful and portable measure of the influence 
that actual quantitative variations of nuclear capabilities have on strategic stability. 
How can perceptions be operationalized in reference to variations in nuclear capabilities 
and changes in strategic stability?  The answer revolves around leaders believing that changes in 
either the IV or DV occurred based on the observed actions of other state leaders.  For example, if 
a state leader believes changes in an opposing state’s nuclear warheads, payload capacity, or 
available payload have occurred, then that state leader would assume a variation in the nuclear 
capabilities of the opposing state have also occurred.  Moreover, regardless of any actual variations 
in nuclear capabilities, if a state leader believes their state is closer to war with another state than 
before, the strategic stability between the two states will change.  In both examples provided, the 
leader believed that changes occurred in either the IV or the DV independent of any quantifiable 
changes in state arsenals or activities. 
Throughout this research, the rules used to measure the quantitative variations in nuclear 
capabilities over time did not change.  By contrast, measuring individual perceptions across 
multiple state leaders and time would have been supremely complex while adding very little 
fidelity in examining the research question.  My research was intended to create both a 
parsimonious and portable model for evaluating influences that variations in nuclear capabilities, 
or indirectly, technology, have on changes in strategic stability.  Accounting for perceptions would 
needlessly complicate the assessment model presented in this dissertation, making the end result 
neither parsimonious nor easily portable. 
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While there is little reason to believe that measuring changes in nuclear capabilities or 
strategic stability through reference to the perceptions of the leaders in question would provide 
significantly more analytical leverage than the more objective measures employed in this research, 
I did check for their influence in the cases examined. In each case study addressed in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5, leader perceptions are noted in the recounting of events.  To this end, there was a 
robustness check in each of the case studies, which ensured that my operationalization of changes 
in nuclear capabilities and strategic stability did not drive the results. 
2.2 Research Questions 
The specific research question addressed in this research is as follows: Are variations in 
nuclear capabilities tightly connected to changes in the degree of strategic stability in a dyadic 
nuclear state system?   Stated differently, when State A executes a change in nuclear capabilities, 
does this new variation drive a change in proximity to war with State B?  In a practical application, 
in 1963, when the United States drastically increased the fielded nuclear capabilities of its ICBM 
force while maintaining no significant changes in either its bomber or SLBM forces, did this move 
increase the possibility of war with the Soviet Union?122  Deliberately designing the research 
question in this manner allowed for an examination of the possibility that strategic stability is an 
absolute function of variations in nuclear capability. 
Case study research addresses the identified question and supplies a suitable vehicle to test 
the selected hypotheses.  The selection of the case studies was performed after candidates met 
 
122 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996. 
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criteria showing variations in nuclear capabilities, by either state, transpiring during periods of 
change in strategic stability.  Picking cases in this fashion is what Stephen Van Evera would call 
a rudimentary Hoop Test.  “Predictions of high certitude and no uniqueness provide decisive 
negative tests: a flunked test kills a theory or explanation, but a passes test gives it little support.”123  
For cases with changes in strategic stability during the same year as variations in nuclear 
capabilities, further examination against each of the primary and secondary hypotheses was 
warranted.  However, for cases with changes in strategic stability outside of years when variations 
in nuclear capabilities occurred, evaluations against only the secondary hypothesis were 
conducted.  Using the questions derived from the observable indicators for each of the hypotheses, 
an evaluation of each case was undertaken.  The results from each of the questions determined 
whether the causal factors presented in the evaluated case connected to the hypothesis. 
To test the causal pathway, starting with variations in nuclear capabilities and leading to 
changes in strategic stability, two hypotheses were necessary.  These hypotheses originated from 
Cold War deterrence scholarship and research, which claimed that changes to strategic stability 
were caused by variations in nuclear capabilities driving increased utility for a state, resulting in a 
shift in incentives.  This bank of research is appropriate for this purpose because its authors 
attempted to explain changes in strategic stability or how to maintain it during the 1950s through 
the 1980s, when continuous variations in nuclear capabilities occurred.  
 
123 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. 
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2.2.1  Hypotheses 
2.2.1.1 H1 
 This first hypothesis holds that the unbalancing of strategic stability occurs as a result of 
variations in nuclear capabilities.  Stated differently, when changes in nuclear capabilities happen, 
strategic stability is altered through the new capabilities influencing both how a state views the 
potential use of nuclear weapons and the incentives for their use.  This hypothesis derives directly 
from the theory presented in Chapter 1 and displayed in Figure 1-1.  Varied nuclear capabilities 
afford the state an ability to reassess the potential uses for its new nuclear arsenal. 
States reassessing the potential use of their newly defined nuclear capabilities can choose 
one of two paths: brinkmanship or deterrence.  Brinkmanship entails the threat of nuclear-
capability use or the use of force that may lead to war with an action or set of actions that carries 
some level of risk of an unintended disaster.124  Brinkmanship is observable when states flex 
nuclear capabilities in such a way as to threaten conflict in an attempt to compel another state into 
changing the status quo.  Under brinkmanship, nuclear capabilities simultaneously act as the big 
stick used to threaten an enemy as well as the weapon to be used to attack that enemy if an 
unintended disaster occurs. 
 The second path along which a state may potentially choose to use newly changed nuclear 
capabilities is deterrence.  “Deterrence is concerned with influencing the choices that another party 
will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave.  It involves 
confronting him with evidence for believing that our behavior will be determined by his 
 
124 Schelling, Arms and Influence; Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy. 
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behavior.”125  Wohlstetter opened the parameters even wider when he specifically associated 
successful deterrence with the state’s ability to conduct a second or retaliatory strike during a 
nuclear exchange.126  Deterrence is observed in states when nuclear capabilities can be used to 
dissuade changes to the status quo.  Put differently, deterrence is carrying a big stick and credibly 
threatening to use it as a means of avoiding change.   
 How a state views the potential use of nuclear weapons, either through brinkmanship or 
deterrence, translates into potential changes in incentives that state has for altering the actual use 
of nuclear weapons.  Scholarship advocating incentives as a driver of change in strategic stability 
can be broken into two categories: political stability and crisis stability.   
Political stability is evident when states in a dyad avoid political actions that may cause 
either crisis or nuclear confrontation.127  Walton and Gray noted how comprehensive the concept 
of political stability is, remarking that “the conditions that might contribute to such instability are 
myriad - social, economic, technological and other factors can create the conditions for 
international instability, either brief or prolonged.”128  If changes in nuclear capabilities make 
either brinkmanship or deterrence more practicable for a state, then social, economic, 
technological, and other factors that were previously deemed tolerable may no longer be thought 
of in such terms; states may be incentivized to move away from previously defined levels of 
political stability. Observation of political stability is possible following states’ determination of 
 
125 Bolstering Schelling's idea of deterrence, Professor John Mearsheimer embraced what Schelling had put forward 
in the 1960s in the 1980s stated that deterrence was “the best way to prevent war is to ensure that it would have 
devastating consequences for all the participants.” Schelling, Strategy of Conflict; Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons 
and Deterrence in Europe.” 
126 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror.” 
127 Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes.” 
128 Walton and Gray, “Chapter 3: The Geopolitics of Strategic Stability: Looking beyond Cold Warriors and Nuclear 
Weapons.” 
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potential uses of new nuclear capabilities.  If they make efforts to move away from previously 
obtained political arrangements, stability would decline, whereas if they make no such effort, 
stability would remain. 
Crisis stability is “the absence of incentives to preempt in time of crisis.”129  It refers to the 
“strategic condition wherein the very character, readiness, and mobilization procedures of armed 
forces in confrontation should not themselves comprise the proximate cause of war.”130  “Crisis 
stability and the means of achieving and maintaining it - crisis management - are not about 
warfighting.  They are about building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, 
to avoid war without backing down.”131  Mutually assured destruction (MAD) exemplifies an 
extreme case of crisis stability.  Formulated under Secretary of Defense McNamara in the 1960s, 
MAD is “when two states possess secure second-strike capabilities, both sides have the ability to 
launch a devastating nuclear response even after absorbing an enemy first strike.”132  So long as 
neither state can obtain an advantage over the other, there exists no incentive to initiate a strike on 
one’s opponent.  Put differently, the MAD strategy controls strategic stability by controlling state 
incentives to attack, capitalizing on the innate fear that a first strike will draw a devastating 
counterstrike.  Lacking an incentive to attack, a nuclear dyadic state system will control the crisis, 
removing the desire to preempt. If changes in nuclear capabilities make brinkmanship more 
 
129 Nye also conveyed in the work of Nitze where he talks to the gains neither side would benefit from should crisis 
stability faulter.  Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes”; Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in 
an Era of Detente.” 
130 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered,” Daedalus 109, no. 4, (1980): 135–54. 
131 Forrest E. Morgan, Crisis Stability and Long-Range Strike: A Comparative Analysis of Fighters, Bombers, and 
Missiles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). 
132 Kroenig's view of MAD is also reflected in the work of John Mearsheimer who believed that as long as both 
sides could hold one another as bay with nuclear capabilities, neither side could benefit from any incentives brought 
upon by power or superiority over the other.  Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve”; John J. 
Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2 (1990): 35–50. 
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practicable, states will be more likely to attempt it, even during times of crisis; by contrast, if 
changes in capabilities make deterrence more practicable, no such incentive to strike first in 
periods of high tension will exist and crisis stability will be reinforced. 
Changes in the political and crisis incentives of states may then yield changes in strategic 
stability, or the distance two states are from war.  Such changes are not guaranteed because even 
incentivized states do not always act.  Observations of changes to strategic stability between states 
occur when the actual actions between them become more or less hostile, as defined in Table 2-2.  
For example, states that threaten the use of force are further away from war than those that conduct 
border incursions or low-level skirmishes with troops from the other side.  Likewise, states that 
mobilize troops for combat are closer to conflict than states that do not undertake any militarized 
action at all. 
 Determination the validity of H1 in the presented cases is performed through asking the 
following question: Can the variation of nuclear capabilities explain changes in strategic stability?  
An affirmative answer would support H1, whereas a negative response would drive an examination 
of the case details against H2. 
2.2.1.2 H2 
 The second hypothesis asserts that nuclear-capability variations do not solely drive changes 
in strategic stability.  Stated differently, strategic stability changes arise from a multitude of 
sources, not all of them related to variations in nuclear capabilities.  Scholarship explicitly 
embracing this perspective is thin compared with the decades and tomes of nuclear-based research 
outlined above.  However, the lack of scholarship outlining non-nuclear-based causes for changes 
in strategic stability does not negate the existence of this potential reality. 
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 Non-nuclear capability driven changes in strategic stability fall under two categories: 
technological substitutes for nuclear capabilities and “everything else.”133  Because the 
“everything else” category can encompass an endless array of explanations driving changes in 
nuclear capabilities, the most straightforward category to explain is technological substitutes.  
Current scholarship on technological substitutes capable of affecting strategic stability is in the 
nascent stages of maturity as relevant technologies continue to improve and authors begin to see 
the viability of non-nuclear technological influences on strategic stability.  Erik Gartzke and Jon 
Lindsay presented an excellent example of non-nuclear-based research highlighting technological 
influences on strategic stability.134  Gartzke and Lindsay proposed that strategic stability in a 
nuclear state dyad could be “a function of relative offensive and defensive cyber capacity.”135   
Although Gartzke and Lindsay’s version of cyber influences on strategic stability can entail driving 
variations in nuclear capabilities, an avenue also exists where cyber capabilities on their own will 
drive changes in strategic stability. 
 Defined by the vast array of potential causal factors leading to changes in strategic stability, 
no one set of defined H2 indicators exists.  Instead, H2 indicators can be defined as those that do 
not have any association with variations in nuclear capabilities while simultaneously triggering a 
change in strategic stability.  To confirm a case against the H2 indicator, a two-part test was used.  
First, the case would have to not be able to answer H1 affirmatively.  Responding favorably to the 
 
133 It is easy to believe that further categories are possible in addition to technological substitutions.  Such other 
categories could be human error, rogue players looking to further personal or ideological agendas, misperception of 
intentions, and so on.  However, as explained earlier in this chapter, my research has an underlying desire to look 
specifically at technological disruptors to strategic stability.  Also mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is no way 
to pick out all potential technological disrupters, but that is not the point.  Identifying a gap between nuclear 
capabilities and strategic stability is only the first step in future academic explorations to identify equally as potent 
disruptors to dyadic state strategic stability that are not based on nuclear capabilities. 
134 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (2017): 37–48. 
135 Gartzke and Lindsay. 
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H1 validating question would negate the possibility of a positive response to the H2 validating 
question.  The second part requires the case to provide a positive answer to the following question: 
Can changes in strategic stability be explained by causal mechanisms other than variations in 
nuclear capabilities? 
2.2.1.3 Hypotheses Summary 
 The data in Table 2-3 summarize the proposed hypotheses.  Without many nuances 
between each of them, each hypothesis touches on one of two indicators used to explain changes 
in strategic stability.  Outlined with each hypothesis is the indicator used to explain the hypothesis 
in relation to the others presented.  Finally, each hypothesis’ validating question is included as a 
means of allowing for a charted comparison among each of the hypotheses.  If a case evaluation 
did not pass the H1 test, then that case could still be evaluated against H2.  The same goes for a 
case evaluated against H2; a failure to match the hypothesis would not negate the case and H1 
would remain a possibility. 
Table 2-3: Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Indicator Validating Question
H1 Variations in nuclear capabilities unbalance strategic stability
Variations in nuclear capabilities tightly connect 
to changes in strategic stability
Can the variations of nuclear capabilities of a 
state drive changes in potential usage, affecting 
state leaders incentives, resulting in a direct 
correlation to changes observed in strategic 
stability?
H2 Causes of strategic stability change are non-nuclear
Changes in strategic stability come from a 
multitude of causal factors, not necessarily 
related to variations in nuclear capabilities
Can changes in strategic stability be explained 
by causal mechanisms other than variations in 
nuclear capabilities?
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2.3 Methodology 
Regarding the core methodology used to test each of the hypotheses, a qualitative analysis 
of the case studies was employed.  Each of the case studies was analyzed using congruence testing, 
identifying cases that had both variations in nuclear capabilities occurring during the same year as 
changes in strategic stability.  The cases that passed congruence testing were then analyzed with 
process-tracing techniques to identify case-specific causal mechanisms for each change in strategic 
stability.  Posing the hypotheses questions found in Table 2-2 against each case following process 
tracing introduced a repeatable process into this research. 
2.3.1  Data Collection 
Before summarizing how data collection was performed, it is vital to outline what type of 
data was collected.  When referencing nuclear capabilities for both the United States and the Soviet 
Union during 1957–1967, both states had combinations of strategic and tactical weaponry.  
Strategic weaponry refers to capabilities able to travel farther than 5,500 kilometers, whereas 
tactical weaponry is shorter in range and used in specific battles or geographic regions.136 
The research I conducted is concerned with strategic nuclear effects, most commonly 
delivered through strategic or long-range missiles and bombers.  However, there is one exception.  
In 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union placed twenty-six medium- and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba.  These particular missiles fell short of 
 
136 “PART 1: Nuclear Terms and Definitions in English,” in NATO-Russia Glossary of Nuclear Terms and 
Definitions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2007), https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng-nuclear/. 
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the 5,500-kilometer threshold and were placed on the doorstep of the Florida coastline.  Even 
though these missiles did not constitute a change in nuclear capabilities as defined, it was 
determined best to include this case as part of the research.  Viewed historically, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis is the quintessential episode of Cold War brinkmanship and a frontal assault to crisis 
stability.  Furthermore, although this case is a crucial Cold War conflict, the number of nuclear 
warheads and payload capacity added onto the Cuban Island did not amount to enough to cause a 
significant change relative to the United States.  During the brief period the Soviet missiles became 
operational on Cuba, the ability of the Soviet Union to strike the United States mainland increased 
slightly and the United States correspondingly reacted, thereby driving a change in strategic 
stability, rendering the case worthy of analysis. 
Nuclear capabilities referenced throughout this research are composed of two parts, namely 
the delivery payload capacity and the warhead; each component is rendered useless without the 
other.  Payload capacity is calculated in terms of the number of nuclear warheads a given delivery 
platform can carry, and warheads require little explanation.  For example, in 1959, the American 
B-52 bomber was capable of carrying two nuclear warheads, while the ATLAS-D intercontinental 
ballistic missile could only carry one warhead.  The total payload capacity calculated between one 
B-52 airframe platform and a single ATLAS-D for 1959 therefore equals three.  
Even with historical records becoming increasingly available for analysis, finding accurate 
numbers for payload capacity and strategic nuclear warheads in both states is a difficult task at 
best.  My research is reported in Table 2-3, providing a summary of nuclear capabilities for each 
state during the timeframe of interest.  For the United States’ nuclear capabilities, the work of 
Norris, Standish, and Cochran provided the basis of the dataset, while Podvig and Bukharin’s work 
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provided the foundation of the Soviet arsenal component of the dataset.137  In the cases of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, Kristensen’s work on the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
Nuclear Notebook provided a reliable reference and invaluable supplemental information.138   
Every effort was made to accurately depict each state’s delivery mechanism and strategic nuclear 
warheads during 1957–1967.   
Table 2-4: Summary of Year to Year Nuclear Capabilities139 
 
2.3.2  Combined Relative Nuclear Capability Score 
 Indisputable in the 1950s through to the end of the Cold War in 1990 was the nuclear 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Both states raced feverishly to 
increase nuclear capabilities as a means of either playing catch-up or outdoing one another.  
Lacking in this massive build-up on both sides of the dyadic state system was a means of 
adequately comparing the capabilities of one state with the other.  My research employed a method 
for conducting a relative comparison of strategic nuclear capabilities in a dyadic state system, 
 
137 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996; Podvig and Bukharin, 
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
138 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, accessed 
December 10, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia. 
139 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996; Podvig and Bukharin, 
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Delivery Platforms 1,605   1,620   1,551   1,559   1,532   1,653   1,812   2,012   1,888   2,139   2,268   
Strategic Payload Capacity 2,520   2,610   2,496   3,127   3,110   3,267   3,612   4,244   4,603   5,311   5,798   
Strategic Warheads 2,460   2,610   2,496   3,127   3,153   3,451   4,050   4,718   5,055   5,744   6,226   
Delivery Platforms 68        97        148      203      249      302      368      469      503      693      1,117   
Strategic Payload Capacity 126      182      243      304      352      405      471      572      606      792      1,201   
Strategic Warheads 102      186      283      354      423      481      589      771      829      954      1,349   
United 
States
Soviet 
Union
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shown in the equation below, using a derivative of the total payload capacity (𝑃!) plus a derivative 
of the total strategic warheads (𝑊!)	to create the “combined relative nuclear capability” (CRNC) 
score.  The CRNC score, calculated for each state during an identified year, provides a metric for 
comparing the nuclear capabilities each state brings to a nuclear dyadic state system. 𝑃! +𝑊! = 𝐶𝑅𝑁𝐶 
 The scholarship on strategic stability since the 1940s holds multiple instances of relative 
verse absolute references to power and capability.140   Why is a relative comparison of dyadic state 
nuclear capabilities favored?  The answer is scope.  This dissertation only examines the nuclear 
dyadic state system between the United States and the Soviet Union.  An absolute comparison 
would be concerned with the entirety of the nuclear capabilities in existence at any one time, 
whereas a relative analysis would be limited to only those states being compared.  Stated 
differently, absolute measurements are concerned with the sum of known parts and are 
independent, whereas relative measurements are limited in scope and dependent upon only a few 
specific parts.  In this research, absolute measurements of nuclear capabilities would have 
conveyed the same information but with less fidelity than a dyadic state relative measurement.141  
Staying with the relative comparison between the United States and the Soviet Union, only 
nuclear capability growth between 1957 and 1967 was considered.  To compare growth between 
 
140 Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, and William T. R. Fox, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World 
Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946); Nitze, “Assuring 
Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente”; Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter”; Robert A. Levine, The 
Strategic Nuclear Debate (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987); Chivvis et al., Strengthening Strategic 
Stability with Russia. 
141 Authors like John Mearsheimer speak to the importance of relative measurements of state power.  Mearsheimer 
holds that as a state increases in power, relative to a competitor, the chances of an attack go down.  Furthermore, 
relative power measurements are key in determining balance of power outcomes, specifically in Europe.  John J. 
Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 174; John J. 
Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Timothy 
Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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the two states, for each component used to calculate the CRNC, across all delivery platforms 
available at the time, the relative minimum and maximum totals were used to calculate a total 
number, which was then divided by ten and provided a numerical value between 1 and 10.  The 
numerical range of 1–10 was selected as a means of providing a clear and concise breakdown of 
potential change in this relative comparison.  Selecting values greater than ten would warrant 
continuous indications of change while ranges below ten would miss significant opportunities to 
show change.  Table 2-4 below converts the numerical value of the calculated sum for each part 
making up the CRNC score into a value ranging from 1 to 10.  The calculated numerical value for 
each component is then combined to create the CRNC score. 
Table 2-5: Capability Calculator Chart 
 
Payload capacity calculations take into consideration the available payload capacity during 
any given year for ICBMs, SLBMs, and aerial bombers.  The final number results from adding 
each component to yield P', which is then used in part to calculate the CRNC. 𝐼𝐶𝐵𝑀"#$%&#' + 𝑆𝐿𝐵𝑀"#$%&#' + 𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟"#$%&#' = 𝑃′ 
Min Max Score Min Max
0 580 1 0 623
581 1161 2 624 1247
1162 1742 3 1248 1871
1743 2323 4 1872 2495
2324 2904 5 2496 3119
2905 3485 6 3120 3743
3486 4066 7 3744 4367
4067 4647 8 4368 4991
4648 5228 9 4992 5615
5229 5809 10 5616 6239
Strategic Payload 
Capacity
Strategic Warhead 
Capacity
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Strategic nuclear warheads undergo an identical process as the one described for payload 
capacity.  The only difference, visible in Table 2-4, is the increments used to determine the 
assigned value between 1 and 10. 𝑃! = 597 + 160 + 2855 = 3612 = 7 𝑊! = 597 + 160 + 3293 = 4050 = 7 1963	𝑈𝑆	𝐶𝑅𝑁𝐶 = 7 + 7 = 14 
The above repeatable process was then conducted for each year between 1957 – 1967.  The 
CRNC values for each year and each state were compared with the year before to determine if a 
change in nuclear capability occurred significant enough to raise or lower the calculated score.  
Table 2-5 below shows the final year by year calculated CRNC score from all data collected for 
each state, and each category between 1957 and 1967.  The results from just the CRNC analysis 
confirmed the desire of both sides to rapidly grow their nuclear capabilities while showing a total 
of seven CRNC score increases, four changes based only on the United States, one based only on 
the Soviet Union, and two years where both the United States and Soviet Union both had CRNC 
changes.  Years showing a CRNC score changes from just the year prior became eligible to host 
case studies following the congruence testing described in the next section. 
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Table 2-6: Combined Relative Nuclear Capability Calculation Chart142 
 
2.3.3  Analysis 
The first step of the present case study analysis was congruence testing, or what Van Evera 
called “congruence procedure type 2.”143  The argument I tested holds that changes in nuclear 
capabilities must occur in order for there to be changed strategic stability; congruence testing 
assesses this connection.  Congruence testing identified through in-case analysis instances when 
changes in the DV, strategic stability, occurred during the same year as variations in the IV, nuclear 
capabilities.   
 
142 Numbers for ICBM, SLBM, and Bomber columns derived from: Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic 
Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996; Podvig and Bukharin, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
143 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 181. 
Payload 
Capacity
Strategic 
Nuclear 
Warheads
Payload 
Capacity
Strategic 
Nuclear 
Warheads
Airframe 
Payload 
Capacity
Strategic 
Nuclear 
Warheads
Relative 
Payload
Relative 
Warhead
Combined 
Relative 
Nuclear 
Capability
1957 - - - - 2520 2460 4 5 9
1958 - - - - 2610 2610 5 5 10
1959 6 6 - - 2490 2490 5 5 10
1960 12 12 32 32 3083 3083 6 6 12
1961 57 57 80 80 2920 3016 6 6 12
1962 203 203 144 144 2920 3104 6 6 12
1963 597 597 160 160 2855 3293 7 7 14
1964 907 907 384 384 2953 3427 8 8 16
1965 854 854 736 736 3013 3465 9 8 17
1966 1004 1004 1264 1264 3043 3476 10 10 20
1967 1054 1044 1552 1552 3192 3630 10 10 20
1957 - - 10 10 116 152 1 1 2
1958 - - 12 12 170 250 1 1 2
1959 - - 33 33 210 310 1 1 2
1960 2 2 63 63 239 354 1 1 2
1961 12 10 87 87 253 382 1 1 2
1962 38 36 104 69 263 392 1 1 2
1963 96 99 104 69 271 440 1 1 2
1964 193 191 104 69 275 522 2 1 3
1965 226 281 104 72 276 532 2 2 4
1966 420 416 104 75 268 546 2 2 4
1967 820 818 143 72 238 576 3 3 6
ICBM SLBM Bombers CALCULATED SCORE
Soviet 
Union
United 
States
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Congruence testing is best applied when  “(1) many observations of values on the IV and 
DV are possible; and/or (2) values on the IV or DV vary sharply over time or across space (across 
the region, institution, group, and so on) within a case.”144   The IV used for congruence testing 
was nuclear capabilities, whereas the DV was strategic stability.  The CRNC score, calculated per 
year for each state, was used as a tool to determine if changes in nuclear capabilities occurred from 
the year prior. 
Congruence testing classified a case as either Type I or Type II.  Type-I cases were those 
where strategic stability change occurred during years when variations in nuclear capabilities by 
either side also took place.145  Type-II cases were those where strategic stability changes occurred 
outside of years when nuclear capability variations also occurred.  Type-I cases potentially address 
the research question: are changes in strategic stability tightly connected with variations in nuclear 
capabilities?  Lacking a clear connection between variations in nuclear capabilities and changes in 
strategic stability, Type-II cases were not analyzed further but contributed to the conclusion that 
showed variations in nuclear capabilities were only sometimes sufficient to drive changes in 
strategic stability, as seen in some Type-I cases, but they were not necessary, as seen in Type-II 
cases. 
Following congruence testing, Type-I cases, those most likely to show a tight bond between 
variations in nuclear capabilities and strategic stability, were subjected to process tracing.  This 
 
144 Van Evera, 62. 
145 The research in this dissertation is conducted using a calendar year system (i.e. 1961, 1962, 1963, etc.).  It can be 
argued that different results may be obtained if twelve calendar months were used before or after any noted change 
to strategic stability rather than designated years.  Using calendar months makes the most sense during Type-II cases 
when variations in nuclear capabilities occurred the year before.  However, the numbers used to calculate nuclear 
capabilities are only reported on a year to year basis with no designation given to month to month.  It is impossible 
to know consistently if the Soviet Union fielded more systems in March or September vice any particular whole 
calendar year.  Therefore, fidelity on causal factors driving changes to strategic stability is tightly bound with the 
year to year reporting of variations in nuclear capabilities. 
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second form of case study testing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed 
outcomes.”146  “Process tracing tests can be used to help establish that (1) an initial event or process 
took place, (2) a subsequent outcome also occurred, and (3) the former was a cause of the latter.”147  
Figure 2-1 presents a flow diagram of what each case undergoes from congruence testing to causal 
determination.  For all Type-I cases, the diagram shows process tracing continuing through to 
causal determination.  For Type-II cases, the diagram shows that each case is non-nuclear by 
nature; strategic stability changed during years when variations in nuclear capabilities did not. 
Figure 2-1: Analytical case study flow model 
 
Through process tracing, the determination made in all the cases analyzed resulted in 
multiple instances of strategic stability change occurring as each case progressed from beginning 
to end.  At each change in strategic stability, process tracing was applied to determine if the cause 
of strategic stability change was due to nuclear capability variations or it was non-nuclear.  
Changes in strategic stability investigated through process tracing on all cases determined only 
sixteen instances of strategic stability change that were also Type-I cases, and only four changes 
(one quarter) were due to variations in nuclear capabilities.   
 
146 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA 
Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 6. 
147 Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.” 
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2.4 Case study selection 
To examine the relationship between variations in nuclear capabilities and associated 
changes to strategic stability, I focused on dyadic state interactions following WWII and 
throughout the early years of the Cold War, the period most likely to present the conditions 
necessary for significant variations in both the IV and the DV.148   Three criteria were taken into 
account when selecting case studies for research: possession of nuclear capabilities, the volatility 
of the dyadic state relationship, and data richness.  The greatest of efforts were made to include a 
concise timeline for study with the largest number of cases available for analysis. 
Nuclear capabilities following the end of WWII became a highly sought-after addition to 
national power for any state able to obtain these weapons of mass destruction.  In the two decades 
following WWII, five states, together composing the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council, obtained nuclear capabilities.  The United States obtained nuclear capabilities in 
1945, followed by the Soviet Union in 1949, then the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, 
and finally China in 1964.  The United States and the United Kingdom continued an allied 
relationship following WWII while the Soviet Union drifted further into communism and began 
competing with the United States, and by the time France obtained nuclear capabilities in 1960, 
the United States and the Soviet Union had over a decade of peer competitor experience.   
Possessing nuclear capabilities is not enough to test the relationship between variations in 
nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stability; there needs to be some level of volatility in 
the dyadic state relationship.  Volatility is best captured when states recently obtained nuclear 
 
148 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. 
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capabilities since, over time, national interests change.  States may feel emboldened after obtaining 
nuclear capabilities but, after learning of the destructive power and perceptions in the international 
community, may nevertheless give way to more reserved prudence in the use of nuclear 
capabilities.149  Stated differently, “new nuclear states, with a nascent arsenal and lack of 
experience in nuclearized disputes, play the ‘nuclear card’ more often than their more experienced 
nuclear counterparts, making them more likely to reciprocate militarized disputes. Possibly 
counterintuitively, more experienced nuclear states reciprocate disputes less frequently, which 
suggests perhaps that opponents learn over time about how to calibrate their challenges against 
nuclear powers.”150   Applied to the years following the end of WWII, the antagonistic relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred at the same time as both states had new 
nuclear capabilities, and they had the potential to create higher instances of strategic stability 
changes as both states challenged one another. 
With the United States and the Soviet Union bolstered by newly acquired nuclear 
capabilities, data richness became an easy criterion to meet.  Table 2-6 below, derived from the 
latest version of the COW dataset, outlines dyadic state militarized interstate disputes between all 
five states with nuclear capabilities throughout the entirety of the post-WWII timeframe and the 
subsequent Cold War (1945–1990).  Table 2-7 outlines instances of participation in a militarized 
interstate dispute where 1) both states took part, and 2) at a minimum, a display of force occurred, 
and at a maximum, both sides took part in a war.151  The dyad with the largest number of militarized 
 
149 Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes.” 
150 Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict; Does Experience Matter?,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 234–57. 
151 There are instances where known allies have quantified values reporting in Table 2-6.  A good example of this is 
the United States and the United Kingdom, both states have continued a fruitful allied relationship following WWII 
but have twelve cases where both took part in the same militarized interstate dispute.  Further examination of this 
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interstate disputes by far is the United States and the Soviet Union, with twenty three.  Further 
examination of these reported disputes between 1945 and 1990 between the two states revealed 
that the period of 1957–1967 held the highest number of disputes overall with a total of ten or 
almost half of all the disputes for this dyad. 
Table 2-7: Dyadic state MID participation: 1945–1990152 
 
The timeframe of 1957–1967 thus captures a large number of cases in which the United 
States and the Soviet Union both engaged in militarized conflicts and were likely to have 
aggressive international policies, increasing the possibility of disruptions in strategic stability.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 1.4, the MAD between the United States and the Soviet Union 
significantly influenced the cases selected; MAD meant that each side could absorb an initial 
nuclear attack and launch a retaliatory second strike.  Discussed further in Chapter 1, when both 
sides achieved the level of MAD, the influence of variations in nuclear capabilities upon changes 
in strategic stability decreased.  For the United States and the Soviet Union, MAD was obtained 
 
phenomenon reveals that many of the cases are instances of allied coalitions taking part on the same side in a war, 
i.e. the Korean conflict, Vietnam, etc. 
152 Maoz et al., “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” 
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between the two sides toward the end of the 1960s.  Given the high number of instances of hostility 
between the two states occurring between 1957 and 1967, if a connection between variations in 
nuclear capabilities and changes to strategic stabilities should exist without undue influence from 
the existence of MAD, this timeframe would be the best opportunity to find the highest number of 
representative cases.153   
Chapters 3 and 4 report case studies most likely not influenced by MAD considerations, 
that is, when variations in nuclear capabilities had the greatest potential to effect change in strategic 
stability.   The Cuban Missile Crisis, covered in detail in Chapter 4, is often regarded as the most 
emblematic historical case in which changes in nuclear capabilities brought about changes in 
strategic stability.  The idea of Khrushchev’s placement of missiles on the island of Cuba, causing 
Kennedy to respond militarily, is often thought of as the very definition of strategic stability 
changing as a result of variations in nuclear capabilities.  However, this is not entirely the case as 
strategic stability changed multiple times throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, each for a different 
reason, and not all because of variations in nuclear capabilities.  Chapter 5 reports cases that 
occurred at a time when both sides began to reach the point of possessing MAD capabilities.  As 
the United States and the Soviet Union entered the end of the 1960s, the prospect of MAD reduced 
the chances that variations in nuclear capabilities would significantly influence the dyadic state 
strategic stability. 
 Aside from the Cuban Missile Crisis, the other nine instances of change in strategic stability 
with a minimum show of force all followed the same pattern.  Starting at full strategic stability 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, between two and three changes to strategic 
 
153 Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science.” 
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stability occurred, each for independent reasons and not all having to do with variations in nuclear 
capabilities.  After analyzing each of the twenty-nine resultant changes in strategic stability, only 
four could be clearly credited to variations in nuclear capabilities. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Throughout the next three analytical chapters, the repeatable investigative process outlined 
in this chapter is applied to the ten cases of strategic stability change that occurred between 1957 
and 1967.  As described, no deliberate attempt was made to shape or selectively identify cases in 
which the United States and the Soviet Union may have experienced changes in strategic stability 
that were not caused by changes in nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, if existing scholarship 
and practitioner thought from the era is correct, any change of strategic stability in this particular 
nuclear state dyadic system during this particular time period should have been caused by 
variations in nuclear capabilities.  The reality is, using the repeatable process outlined in this 
chapter, instances of strategic stability change caused by variations in nuclear capabilities explain 
a small fraction of the total number of changes to strategic stability.  Although changes in nuclear 
capabilities are sometimes sufficient to cause changes in strategic stability, the data and analysis 
presented clearly show they are not necessary.  
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3.0 Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis: 1957–1961 
The late 1950s and early 1960s represent a period of aggressive nuclear-capability growth 
for both the United States and the Soviet Union.  This chapter captures the initial stages of nuclear 
capability growth between two bourgeoning nuclear powers before the onset of MAD.  In addition 
to examining the nuclear capability growth for each state, this chapter reports six case studies 
occurring between 1957 and 1961 showing instances of hostility between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  Because of the high number of conflicts occurring in the nuclear dyadic state 
system, this timeframe provides the best opportunity to show, if scholarship is correct, variances 
in nuclear capabilities driving changes in strategic stability.  The concluding analysis shows only 
a minimal association of variances in nuclear capabilities affecting changes to strategic stability. 
The study of nuclear learning contends that state powers that recently acquired nuclear 
weapons are more aggressive when challenged than states that have either had nuclear weapons 
for an extended period or do not have nuclear weapons at all.154  This chapter’s timeframe, 1957–
1961, begins just over a decade after the United States obtained nuclear weaponry and less than 
eight years after the Soviet Union joined the nuclear weapons club.  With the newness of each 
state’s nuclear capabilities, coupled with the tensions of the Cold War, events that occurred in 
these early years are the most likely to show changes in strategic stability driven by variances in 
nuclear capability, if a tight connection exists. 
The six cases in this chapter represent some of the most famous instances of confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union outside of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is 
 
154 Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict; Does Experience Matter?” 
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covered later in Chapter 4.  Sputnik (1957) sounded the alarm for the United States that the Soviet 
Union was not only the first to reach space, but it had also developed ICBM technology sooner 
than expected.  Additionally, three aircraft shootdowns occurred, all following the same pattern of 
events; an American aircraft was found to be in a foreign adversary’s airspace and the Soviet 
military justified the defense of its borders through a militarized response.  Although all three 
shootdowns raised the Escalation Level, only one of the three shootdowns occurred during a period 
of nuclear capability change and can be tied back to such variations. 
Finally, on two separate occasions between 1958 and 1961, Escalation Levels increased as 
tensions elevated over the Western occupation of Berlin, as outlined in the Potsdam protocols.  
Neither of these Berlin incidents occurred at a time when there were changes in nuclear capabilities 
and both ended peacefully following intervention from high-level government officials.  In all six 
of this chapter’s cases, the United States and Soviet Union began their interaction with a status of 
full strategic stability in the dyadic state system, then one or more events occurred that raised the 
Escalation Level while decreasing strategic stability, and drove one or both sides to take actions 
to defuse the tensions with the goal of returning the dyadic state relationship to full strategic 
stability.  This cycle of strategic stability degradation and rehabilitation occurred repeatedly, but 
the presence of changes in nuclear capabilities was sporadic at best and nonexistent most often. 
 Figure 3-1 below provides an overview of this chapter’s case studies with a particular 
emphasis on comparing changes in strategic stability along with any association with variances in 
nuclear capabilities.  The unshaded area in Figure 3-1 represents 1957–1961, this chapter’s period 
of concern.  Most visible in Figure 3-1 is the stark contrast between the total number of cases 
during this timeframe and the number of cases that occurred during a change in the CRNC score.  
Most of the cases between 1957 and 1961 occurred at a time when there were no changes in nuclear 
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capabilities.  Additionally, during this chapter’s period of interest, the single change in nuclear 
capabilities occurred in favor of the United States while the Soviet Union remained stagnant. 
Figure 3-1 associates nuclear capability variations and the changes in strategic stability that 
occurred in the six case studies.  The evaluation of each case explored the necessity of and 
sufficiency that variations in nuclear capabilities had in relation to changes in strategic stability. 
Figure 3-1: Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis in Context: 1957–1963 
 
The years 1957–1961 represent a period of high expectations for changes in strategic 
stability as each state looked to expand its nuclear capabilities aggressively.  Neither state during 
this period had stockpiled significant nuclear capabilities to ensure either assured destruction or 
MAD.  If the theory is correct, a high rate of nuclear capability expansion should yield tightly 
connected changes in strategic stability.  Among the six cases presented in my research, twenty-
two data points were collected, yielding sixteen data points reflecting changes in strategic stability.  
Of the sixteen data point changes to strategic stability, only one exhibited a change in strategic 
stability attributable to changes in nuclear capabilities; the remaining fifteen data points either 
represented changes to strategic stability occurring outside any changes to nuclear capabilities or 
changes to strategic stability, shown following analysis, not connected to changes in nuclear 
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capabilities.  The data from the cases presented in this chapter showed that nuclear capabilities 
were not required to change strategic stability. 
This chapter proceeds in three sections, analyzing six case studies that occurred before the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, between 1957 and 1961.  Section 3.1, Nuclear capabilities, provides an 
overview of each state’s nuclear capabilities, growth that took place from the beginning of the 
timeframe to the end, and any significant changes in CRNC score.  Additionally, Section 3.1 
presents initial congruence testing, dividing cases into two categories, comparing case events to 
changes in the CRNC score.  Section 3.2, Case studies, provides details for each of the six cases, 
and process-traces the causal factors using existing theories of strategic stability.  Finally, Section 
3.3, Conclusion, provides a summarized overview of findings, looking across all of the cases; 
furthermore, the section presents a summary table showing how each case’s data points compare 
with the expectations of existing theories of strategic stability.   
3.1  Nuclear capabilities 
Figure 3-1 shows that, in the years preceding the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United 
States maintained clear nuclear-capability dominance over the Soviet Union.  Eisenhower’s 1953 
NSC-162/2 and massive retaliation doctrine provided the basis for the United States’ supremacy.155   
Here, Eisenhower advocated building the military to both survive the first wave of attacks from 
the Soviet Union as well as respond in such a manner as to be decisive in the exercise of retaliatory 
 
155 Desmond Ball, “United States Strategic Policy Since 1945: Doctrine, Military-Technical Innovation and Force 
Structure,” in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 87. 
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power.156  The success of massive retaliation rested upon the threat that any war would escalate to 
a full-war and any action against the United States, regardless of size or scope, would yield a full-
blown military response that included nuclear weapons.  To effect this doctrine, Eisenhower 
increased nuclear spending under the Department of Defense to build a mostly survivable and 
capable nuclear force. 
Table 3-1 below outlines the United States and Soviet Union state strategic nuclear 
capabilities between 1957 and 1961.  As explained in Chapter 2, the CRNC value assigned to each 
state for each year is a two-state comparative score based on relative values assigned to fielded 
nuclear payload capacities and strategic warheads.157  The United States entered 1957 with only a 
bomber delivery capability but two and a half times the fielded nuclear capacity of the Soviet 
Union, as reflected in the CRNC score displayed in Table 3-1.158  The Soviet Union entered 1957 
with the ability to deliver strategic nuclear weapons via bombers and SLBMs but with a 
significantly lower CRNC because of the calculation of relative capability as compared with the 
United States.  By 1960, both states were able to strike one another with each of the triad delivery 
methods: ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.159 
 
156 Eisenhower, “NSC-162/2.” 
157 Outlined in Chapter 2, by “relative,” it is meant that category weight for each state is only given using the total 
numbers presented for each respective category; the minimum and maximum is then divided into 10 equal parts to 
derive the category’s calculated score.  Use of the relative scoring system is limited to states whose categories were 
used to calculate the minimum and maximum score.  Any additional input from outside states, potentially drives a 
new relative weight calculation. 
158 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996. 
159 Referenced together, the three deliver methods: ICBM, SLBM, and bombers, are known as the ‘triad.’ 
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Table 3-1: US and USSR Nuclear Capabilities, 1957–1961160 
 
While the overall Soviet strategic nuclear warheads and payload delivery capability grew 
between 1957 and 1961, the arsenal did not grow enough to change the CRNC score.  
Khrushchev’s initial efforts built up the Soviet bomber force to provide a responsive weapon 
against the United States’ power capabilities.161  From 1957, the Soviet Union was able to deliver 
nuclear capabilities through SLBMs and bombers; it did not gain ICBM delivery capacity until 
after the 1957 launch of Sputnik.  The limited numbers, however, plagued the Soviet Union the 
entire time between 1957 and 1961.  During the same timeframe in the United States, rapid ICBM 
and SLBM expansion provided for higher numbers of launcher payload capacities as well as 
strategic nuclear warheads, increasing its CRNC score from 10 to 12 in 1960.   
Viewed from a different perspective, by 1960, Khrushchev changed course and adopted 
the offensive surprise policy, reflecting his thoughts that any war with the United States would 
automatically yield a full-blown nuclear war and it would be best to strike first.162  In response to 
 
160 Podvig and Bukharin, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic 
Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996. 
161 Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev. 
162 Catudal, 49. 
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Combined 
Relative 
Nuclear 
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1957 - - - - 2520 2460 4 5 9
1958 - - - - 2610 2610 5 5 10
1959 6 6 - - 2490 2490 5 5 10
1960 12 12 32 32 3083 3083 6 6 12
1961 57 57 80 80 2920 3016 6 6 12
1957 - - 10 10 116 152 1 1 2
1958 - - 12 12 170 250 1 1 2
1959 - - 33 33 210 310 1 1 2
1960 2 2 63 63 239 354 1 1 2
1961 12 10 87 87 253 382 1 1 2
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ICBM SLBM Bombers CALCULATED SCORE
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the offensive surprise policy, the Soviets consolidated efforts behind their SRFs and the ICBM, 
which, although not perfect in its targeting, proved to be a more responsive nuclear delivery option 
than the heavy lift bomber.  Finally, Table 3-1 highlights a vital issue with Soviet nuclear 
capabilities evident before the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Discussed further in Chapter 4, the Soviet 
Union could strike the United States with bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs without relying on the 
placement of shorter-range missiles on Cuba and within easy reach of the United States military 
forces. 
3.1.1  Congruence Testing 
Outlined in Chapter 2, congruence testing evaluates each case against the hypothesis, 
validating the existence of congruent variations in the IV and DV during periods of change.163  
Explicitly applied to this study, using cases occurring between 1957 and 1961, along with 
congruence testing data found in Table 3-2, changes to the CRNC score identified and matched 
with cases that occurred during the same whole-year timeframe.  Cases that passed congruence 
testing with a variation in CRNC score occurring at the same time as observed changes in strategic 
stability were labeled Type-I.  Cases where the IV and DV did not change at the same time were 
labeled Type-II.  As noted above, given the general trends of the research on strategic stability and 
the emergent scholarship on state actions during the first years after they obtain nuclear weapons, 
the 1957–1961 timeframe should feature several Type-I cases.164 
 
163 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 181–204. 
164 Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict; Does Experience Matter?” 
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Table 3-2: Congruence testing case stratification: 1957–1961 
 
Evaluating six cases of variations in strategic stability during 1957–1961, using congruence 
testing, Table 3-2 presents four cases that met Type-I criteria.  As noted in Table 3-1, 1958 and 
1960 were the only years where the CRNC changed for either the United States or the Soviet 
Union.  In the following section, organizing the cases according to their congruence testing 
typology, process tracing is employed to examine each of the cases and either confirm or reject 
the congruence testing results. 
3.2 Case studies 
On six separate occasions between 1957 and 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union 
confronted each other either directly or indirectly.  This section accomplishes three tasks: it 
presents historical data on each of the six cases of conflict, applies data from each case to process 
tracing, and conducts an in-case analysis.  The six cases presented in this section yielded twenty-
two data points representing sixteen changes in strategic stability. 
Typological classifications resulting from congruence testing determined the presentation 
order for each of the six cases.  The first category, Type-I, comprises the one case in which a 
change in strategic stability occurred at the same time as a change in the CRNC score.  The second 
Date Case CRNC CRNC Favored Rationale
DC-6 Shoot Down
C-130 Shoot Down
Berlin Crisis (I)
1960 U-2 Shoot Down +1 US
US CRNC increase caused by influx of bomber manufacturing and the 
beginning of ICBM & SLBM production.  US Capable of launching 
across all three legs of triad with a dominent bomber lead over USSR.
1957 Sputnik Launch - - No CRNC change during case study
1961 Berlin Crisis (II) - - No CRNC change during case study
TY
PE
-I
US CRNC increased following additional nuclear capable bombers and 
nuclear warheads coming available for use.+1 US
TY
PE
-II
1958
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category, Type-II, encompasses changes in strategic stability that did not occur during a change of 
the CRNC score.  Analysis of case-specific data revealed that only one of the four Type-I cases 
contained a data point representing an instance of correlation between variance in nuclear 
capabilities and strategic stability.  The remaining Type-I data points and all the Type-II cases did 
not present evidence that changes in strategic stability were driven by changes in nuclear 
capabilities.  The overwhelming pattern of data presented in this chapter, for all six cases 
presented, casts significant doubt on the assumption that variations in nuclear capabilities are 
fundamentally connected to changes in strategic stability.165 
3.2.1  Type-I Cases  
3.2.1.1 1958: DC-6 and C-130 border incursions 
The first instances of measurable change in strategic stability during the period in question 
occurred in 1958 when, on two separate occasions, the Soviet military responded with the use of 
force following border incursions of aircraft belonging to the United States.  The first aircraft 
shootdown became public on 30 June 1958, following the publication of a New York Times article 
concerning the bringing down of an American transport plane with nine personnel aboard.  The 
article outlined requests by the United States government for the return of nine service members 
 
165 As outlined in Chapter 2, Escalation Levels are the selected means of measuring the proximity of an event to full 
strategic stability or the absence of strategic stability manifested in interstate war.  In a dyadic state system starting 
from a state of peace or no war, escalation is an increase of hostile actions crossing threshold(s) considered 
significant by one or more states.  Thresholds defining each of the Escalation Levels, outlined in the previous 
chapter, are based on a ranking from 1, representing full strategic stability, to 5 signifying the complete absence of 
strategic stability or interstate war.  Not all cases in this section require changes in nuclear capabilities to change 
strategic stability as scholarship would suggest.  Kahn, On Escalation; Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: 
Managing Escalation in the 21st Century; Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict”; Maoz et al., 
“The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” 
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and their DC-6 aircraft, which had been brought down by Soviet military personnel in the area as 
it strayed into Armenian airspace.  Soviet government officials accused the United States of 
deliberately sending the aircraft 100 miles into Armenian airspace.166  In response, the United 
States only apologized for the “inadvertent navigation error” during a routine cargo flight, 
dismissing the incident as an accidental episode of poor navigation.  In July, the Soviet military 
returned all personnel to the United States alive, closing the aircraft downing episode without any 
further issues. 
Thirty-five years after the June 1958 shootdown, the National Security Agency declassified 
another incident of the use of force by the Soviet Union against the United States.  In this second 
incident, occurring in September 1958 and instigated through a nonintentional border incursion by 
the United States, Soviet air forces shot down an American C-130 with 17 personnel onboard as 
they conducted intelligence operations along the Armenian border region.167  Located 55 km south-
west of Yerevan, inside Armenia’s border, the aircraft wreckage laid wasted as a result of Soviet 
military firepower.  In stark contrast to the June 1958 downing of the DC-6, not all the crew 
members survived.  The Soviet government only returned six bodies of the deceased C-130 crew 
members from the incident while the remaining eleven remain missing. 
Nuclear Capability 
In 1958, the nuclear capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union looked 
very similar to those in place during 1957.  Additionally, as noted in Table 3-1, the 1958 CRNC 
 
166 Gibler, International Conflicts, 1816-2010, 1 & 2:939; Max Frankel, “U.S. Hands Soviet Note On 9 Airmen: 
Requests Prompt Release of Fliers Forced Down by Russian Fighters,” New York Times, 1958. 
167 Michael L Peterson, “Maybe You Had to Be There: The SIGNIT on Thirteen Soviet Shootdowns of US 
Reconnaissance Aircraft,” Cryptologic Quarterly 22 (1993): 1–44. 
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value increased for the United States from the 1957 scores, explaining the Type-I case designation 
for both the DC-6 and C-130 shootdowns.   
In 1958, the United States still relied on bombers to deliver any strategic nuclear 
capabilities.  Meanwhile, the Soviets had a relatively small 1958 bomber fleet with a payload 
capacity of 170 compared to the United States’ 2,610.  However, the Soviets continued to be the 
sole possessors of SLBM capabilities, affording them the ability to threaten a surprise attack on 
the mainland United States by launching from waters off the United States coast.  Even though 
both sides lacked diversification of their nuclear capabilities, they demonstrated a willingness to 
continue maintaining what nuclear capabilities they had compiled up to 1958.   
Strategic stability 
Both the DC-6 and C-130 shootdowns were very similar in how they impacted strategic 
stability.  Both incidents involved three separate changes to strategic stability.  Moreover, both 
1958 cases began from the same level of strategic stability, namely Escalation Level-1.  
Furthermore, the details of each case have the same essential elements: a United States aircraft 
with multiple airmen onboard crossing the Armenian border without permission and the Soviet 
military responding by downing the aircraft through firepower.  Finally, in each case, following a 
period of diplomacy and a final exchange of casualties, all information available shows the 
situation ended with a return to Escalation Level-1 and no further tensions carried forward.  
Similarities in each case study’s timeframe and events allowed for parallel analysis of both cases.  
This parallel analysis continued to further reinforce the lack of tight bonding variations in nuclear 
capabilities have with changes in strategic stability.   
The initial change in Escalation Level for each case occurred when the United States 
crossed the sovereign border into Armenian airspace without permission.  According to the 
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Escalation Level definitions found in Chapter 2, such border violations represent an Escalation 
Level-4 event.  In each case, both the DC-6 and the C-130 crossed into Armenia without 
permission, resulting in a quick jump from full strategic stability to a higher Escalation Level and 
jeopardizing strategic stability. Regardless of changes to nuclear capabilities, aircraft border 
violations result in decreased strategic stability. 
The second change in the Escalation Level, more akin to a lateral movement, resulted from 
the use of firepower to bring down the offending aircraft, reflecting an Escalation Level-4 use of 
force action by the Soviet military.  In both the DC-6 and C-130 incidents, upon identification of 
the offending United States aircraft, the Soviet military reacted accordingly to defend the borders 
with the use of firepower.   
Finally, the Type-I DC-6 and C-130 cases confirm a pattern of universal conflict initiation 
and resolution.  Starting from a position of full strategic stability, Escalation Level-4 obtained 
following perceived hostilities committed by the United States, and then a lateral move to another 
Escalation Level-4 event occurred following a Soviet response to the perceived hostilities, and, 
finally, a return to Escalation Level-1 occurred following a period of diplomacy.   
Case analysis 
  The analysis performed on each of the two shootdowns resulted in identifying change in 
strategic stability three separate times for each case.  However, following the variations in nuclear 
capabilities occurring in 1958, no evidence presented showing either state changed utility.  Stated 
differently, the CRNC scores reflected in Table 3-2, in favor of the United States, do not coincide 
with any perceivable changes in actions by the United States in either actions taken to increase 
deterrence or perform acts of brinkmanship.  Lacking a change in utility, the causal pathway 
connecting variations in nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability breaks.  The details of 
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the cases do not present evidence that variations in nuclear capabilities drove either the actions of 
the United States or the militarized shootdowns performed by the Soviet military.  Instead, 
evidence presented in both cases suggested the Soviet militarized responses were an acceptable 
reaction to unplanned border incursions by a competing foreign military. 
Case summary 
The DC-6 and C-130 cases followed the same pattern: case initiation at Escalation Level-
1 prior to the incident, procession to Escalation Level-4 driven by some egregious airspace 
violation by the United States, a Soviet response that laterally drives another Escalation Level-4 
event, and finally a return to Escalation Level-1 following a period of diplomacy.  In both 
shootdown cases, it does not seem that the presence or absence of nuclear capability changes 
influenced the course of events. 
3.2.1.2 1958–1959: Berlin I 
Berlin, more so than any other location, represented the tenuous relationship influencing 
strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Located securely within East-
German borders and bound by the 1945 Potsdam Protocols splitting the city into four quadrants, 
Berlin became a continuous display of East vs. West.  Great Britain, France, and the United States 
held the West portion of the city while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) occupied the East 
in addition to all surrounding land.  Remarking on the tactical disadvantage of having Western 
troops stationed inside the city, Eisenhower noted that “Berlin’s actual defense lay only in the 
West’s publicly expressed intention that to defend it we would, if necessary, resort to war.”168   
 
168 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years, 1st ed., Book, Whole (Garden City, 
N.Y: Doubleday, 1965). 
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War with the Soviet Union for Eisenhower, under the massive retaliation doctrine, would not only 
be a complete collapse of strategic stability but would also have meant the use of nuclear weapons. 
In December 1957, following the October launch of Sputnik, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles met with NATO heads of state in Paris to announce the willingness of the United States to 
participate in the placement of nuclear weapons in Europe, releasable to NATO commanders 
should hostilities erupt with the Soviet Union.169  By September 1958, while the German East–
West border was still open to the free flow of traffic, immigration had reached 10,000 East 
Germans migrating to the West each month.  East-German migrations to West Germany, 
calculated over ten years, would top three million. 
Khrushchev made a speech to the Moscow chapter of the Soviet–Polish Friendship Society 
on 10 November 1958.  Coinciding with Khrushchev’s speech was an increase in NATO 
firepower, bolstered by the United States, and a mass exodus of people and labor from East 
Germany.  Khrushchev reiterated Stalin’s 1948 sentiments regarding the importance of creating a 
unified Berlin under Soviet influence, arguing that it was time for the Western powers to give up 
their rights in Berlin and imposed a six-month timeline for withdrawal.170 
 Reinforcing his 10 November public speech, on 27 November, Khrushchev sent the United 
States, Great Britain, and France a letter outlining the details of his plan for expelling the Western 
states from Berlin while proclaiming that “the Soviet Union regards as null and void the ‘Protocol 
of the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
 
169 Robert J. Watson, Secretaries of Defense Historical Series; Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, vol. IV, Secretaries 
of Defense Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 465; 
Troyanovsky, “Chapter 9: The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy.” 
170 Robert M. Slusser, “The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 and 1961,” in Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a 
Political Instrument, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), 
356. 
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States of America, and the United Kingdom on the zones of occupation in Germany and on the 
administration of Greater Berlin.’”171   Providing a justification for his six-month timeline while 
referencing Dulles’ negotiations with NATO regarding the placement of missiles in Europe, 
Khrushchev added the following to his letter: “they included West Germany in the North Atlantic 
bloc, which was created behind the back of the Soviet Union and, as everyone is aware, against it, 
and are now arming West Germany with atomic and rocket weapons.”172  Khrushchev perceived 
the Western powers to be tightening a nuclear noose around the neck of the Soviet Union through 
the power of NATO.  Loosening the ever-increasing Western power chokehold required pushing 
Western powers further away from Soviet interests in East Germany.  
In response to Khrushchev’s letter, Eisenhower conveyed the position of the United States, 
Great Britain, and France through an open press release by stating that “the United States will not 
acquiesce in a unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Union of its obligations and responsibilities 
formally agreed upon with Britain, France, and the United States in relation to Berlin.  Neither will 
it enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union which, whatever the form, would have the end 
result of abandoning the people of West Berlin to hostile domination.”173  Tensions continued to 
increase and, by January 1959, Eisenhower had approved graduated military options to provide 
messaging detectable by the Soviets that the United States and the rest of NATO were willing to 
 
171 “Department of State Bulletin, 19 January 1959,” in Department of State Bulletin, vol. Vol. XL, Publication 
6756, No. 1021 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 86. 
172 “Department of State Bulletin, 19 January 1959,” 83. 
173 “Department of State Bulletin, 15 December 1958,” in Department of State Bulletin, vol. Vol. XXXIX, 
Publication 6740, No. 1016 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 948. 
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take the fight for Berlin seriously, even if it meant movement toward war.174   Each side began to 
take a stand in yet another challenge to the Western presence in Berlin. 
Khrushchev had a significant interest in establishing a peace treaty with East Berlin and, 
in turn, expelling Western powers.  A peace treaty would shift the German balance of power in 
favor of the Soviets.  Soviet efforts to legitimize East Germany through a peace treaty as an 
independent government meant turning over Soviet control of East Germany to the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR,) nullifying the Potsdam Protocols.175    
Defusing the tensions over Berlin, both sides agreed to meet in Geneva.  The Geneva 
Conference ran from May to August 1959 and sought to establish a path toward peace with regard 
to the Berlin crisis, create bilateral peace, and settle issues surrounding post-WWII Germany.  
Almost immediately, Khrushchev used the opportunity to begin a one-sided discourse denouncing 
the placement of missile units in Italy and Greece, as had been negotiated through Secretary of 
State Dulles, while at the same time advocating for nuclear-free zones in the Balkans.176  As 
Khrushchev’s outward rhetoric became inflamed, Eisenhower seized the opportunity to invite the 
Soviet leader to the United States as a guest.  Khrushchev responded favorably to Eisenhower’s 
invitation and the Berlin situation defused along with the erasing of the six-month timeline.177  
Nuclear capability 
 
174 Eisenhower’s embracing of a graduated series of responses was not necessarily out of line with the massive 
retaliation policy.  Stretching back as far as 1957, Secretary of State Dulles, often credited with being the father of 
massive retaliation through his November 1953 speech, had written an article in Foreign Affairs where he found the 
possibility of utilizing tactical nuclear weapons.  Slusser, “The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 and 1961,” 353; Jonathan 
Samuel Lockwood and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, The Russian View of U.S. Strategy: Its Past, Its Future, 2017. 
175 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-
1965, V:154. 
176 Slusser, “The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 and 1961,” 378–79. 
177 Slusser, 380; Schnabel, Watson, Condit, Fairchild, et al., History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7:127. 
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In late October 1959, the United States became the first state to field ICBMs when its Atlas-
D missiles became operational on Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.178   The Atlas-D was 
a liquid-fueled missile, launched above ground and mated with the 1.4 megaton yield W49 nuclear 
warhead.  While the Americans were fielding the Atlas missile, the Soviets increased their already-
fielded SLBM payload capacity, from 10 in 1957 to 33 by 1959.  Additionally, the Soviets 
continued to slowly expand their bomber payload capacity, almost doubling it from 116 in 1957 
to 210 in 1959.  It was unmistakable; each side continued to value nuclear capabilities and 
expressed this value in the form of continued growth and variation across all available platforms. 
On a smaller scale, variations in nuclear capabilities occurred with a shift in Eisenhower’s 
policy.  Consistent with the New Look policy, Eisenhower saw an opportunity to reduce costly 
troop deployments and reassure allies seeking protection under the United States’ nuclear 
umbrella.  President Eisenhower, through Secretary of State John Dulles, proposed to the NATO 
allies an extension of the United States’ nuclear protection through the deployment of 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe.  Dulles, taking Eisenhower’s policy of 
IRBMs in Europe to NATO, initiated negotiations in 1957.  In 1959, Thor and Jupiter missiles 
became operational in Great Britain, Turkey, and Italy, but not in numbers large enough to change 
the Americans’ CRNC score.179  This move with IRBMs, reassuring to its NATO allies, did 
nothing to numerically change the nuclear capability advantage the United States already had over 
the Soviet Union. 
 
178 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996, 14. 
179 In Turkey, only 15 Jupiter missiles were deployed, and they did not begin to become operational until between 
November 1961 and March 1962.  In Chapter 4, these same Jupiter missiles will be the subject of negotiations 
during the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear assets from Cuba following the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Watson, Secretaries 
of Defense Historical Series; Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, IV:539–43; Schnabel, Watson, Condit, Fairchild, et 
al., History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7:46. 
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Strategic stability 
The 1958–59 Berlin I Crisis began and ended at Escalation Level-1 and underwent three 
changes to strategic stability.  In the Berlin I case, before Khrushchev ordered the military to close 
the autobahn to Western troops, the first change to strategic stability occurred when the perception 
of Escalation Level-1 for both sides transformed following the building of missile sites for 
placement of Thor and Jupiter missiles in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey.  The United 
States and the Soviet Union, under Eisenhower’s plan for NATO IRBMs, had to adjust their 
perception of what constituted normal strategic stability.  No longer were only the United States 
bombers an American nuclear capability threat to the Soviet Union; now, small numbers of IRBMs 
were within striking distance of the Soviet mainland.  The IRBMs did not deploy in high enough 
numbers throughout Europe to change CRNC scores by themselves or cause further movement 
through the causal chain to drive changes in utility, but their placement was still a threat to the 
Soviet Union and altered each side’s perception of nuclear capability normalcy at Escalation 
Level-1. 
The second change to strategic stability occurred in November 1958, with Khrushchev’s 
speech in Moscow and the 27 November letter from Moscow to the Western powers of the United 
States, Great Britain, and France regarding the termination of the Potsdam Protocols in Berlin.180   
In the letter to the Western powers in Berlin, Moscow justified the call for disbanding the Potsdam 
Protocols due to the inclusion of West Germany into NATO and the potential placement of nuclear 
missiles close to Soviet interests.  Actions taken between these two events constituted a change in 
strategic stability while moving toward Escalation Level-2 as Khrushchev established a six-month 
 
180 Schnabel, Watson, Condit, Fairchild, et al., History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7:120. 
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timeline for expelling the Western states, tacitly threatening war if the Western states failed to turn 
over West Berlin according to his demands.  Eisenhower moved forward with graduated military 
options, reinforcing Escalation Level-2 while Khrushchev was demanding the expulsion of 
Western powers from East Berlin.  Each side of the conflict inched toward a mutual degradation 
of strategic stability without the mobilization of troops. 
The last change in strategic stability came during the Geneva Conference in May 1959.  
President Eisenhower’s invitation to Khrushchev to visit the United States defused the previous 
Escalation Level-2 tensions.  With Khrushchev’s acceptance of Eisenhower’s offer and removal 
of the states’ six-month expulsion timeline from Berlin, Escalation Level-2 returned to Level-1, 
fully restoring strategic stability. 
Case analysis 
Capability 
 The shutting down of Berlin to Western powers, specifically the United States, took place 
at a time when changes to nuclear capabilities occurred.  The United States’ increase in available 
nuclear-capable bombers, referenced in Table 3-1, was enough to drive an increase of the CRNC 
score by one, making this a Type-I case.  Since the European IRBMs and the increase in the United 
Stares’ CRNC score occurred concurrently, the effects of the increased nuclear capability from 
both sources should be viewed as a single effort. 
Utility 
 The utility change for this case occurred when the United States and the Soviet Union 
interlocked in brinkmanship over the closure of the city to the Western allies.  Khrushchev’s 
actions of shutting down the city mutually increased the risk of war, while driving Eisenhower to 
begin publicly speaking of an armed response as a means of regaining access, which had been 
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guaranteed under the Potsdam Protocols.  Outside the view of the public, Eisenhower looked to 
his expanded nuclear capabilities to supply the ability to strike the Soviet Union as part of the end 
results in a graduated attack plan.  Furthermore, in 1959, the United States’ first six ICBMs became 
operational, supplying Eisenhower with the ability to strike the Soviet mainland from the 
continental United States.  Eisenhower’s ability to counter Khrushchev’s shutting down of access 
to Berlin was possible because of the extended options provided in the American nuclear arsenal. 
Incentives 
 The ability Eisenhower’s extended nuclear arsenal provided to him as a means of 
overcoming the Soviet military bolstered his incentives to stand up to Khrushchev’s actions.  As a 
means of avoiding crisis, Eisenhower sought political stability by first working through the Geneva 
conference and then on a one-to-one basis with Khrushchev as a means of regaining access to 
Berlin.  The efforts of Eisenhower prevailed when Khrushchev accepted his invitation to visit the 
United States and set-aside the six-month timeline to remove Western troops from the city.   
Strategic Stability 
 Strategic stability returned to normal as a result of incentives changes when Khrushchev 
accepted Eisenhower’s invitation.  Khrushchev’s acceptance led to the removal of the 
abovementioned six-month timeline, which also ended potential hostilities between the states, 
thereby reestablishing the status quo and returning strategic stability back to normal.   
Case summary 
The Berlin I case represents the first instance of a Type-I case in which it is possible to 
connect variations in nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability.  The increased inventory 
of United States bombers coupled with the previously negotiated placement of American nuclear 
missiles in Europe drove a brinkmanship situation when Moscow ordered the shutdown of access 
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into Berlin for the Western allies.  Although the placement of IRBMs did have an effect on the 
perceptions of what nuclear normalcy had become, the missiles had not been deployed in 
significant enough numbers to cause alarm.  Put differently, changed perceptions because of the 
IRBMs were not significant enough to become the sole driving force behind changed strategic 
stability.  Strengthened by an ability to conduct greater nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union 
than ever before, Eisenhower sought a peaceful process of negotiation to find resolution consistent 
with the earlier status quo.  The end result was a removal of the transport blockade into Berlin and 
a return to full strategic stability. 
3.2.1.3 1960: U-2 Shootdown 
The second Type-I case is the shooting down of a United States U-2 spy plane, which 
occurred just before the Paris Peace Talks between President Eisenhower and Chairman 
Khrushchev.  The Paris summit occurred in May 1960 and was to be the capstone peace summit 
between the East and the West.  Before the summit began, on 1 May 1960, a Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) flight of the U-2 spy plane had gone missing over Sverdlovsk, Russia, shortly after 
overflying the Tyuratam Missile Test Center.181    
The public denial by the United States of the overflight program and U-2 shootdown by 
the Soviets could not negate Khrushchev’s speech on 16 May 1960, in which he lambasted 
Eisenhower in front of the Paris Peace Talks opening session for the willful border incursion with 
the spy plane.  Bolstering Khrushchev’s castigation of Eisenhower were irrefutable pictures of the 
downed U-2 aircraft and captured pilot who was, remarkably, still alive.  Following the U-2 
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shootdown and Khrushchev’s public display of the captured pilot, the Soviet leader used the 
opportunity to demand an end to United States overflights, terminate the Paris Peace Talks, and 
discredit Eisenhower by postponing any further negotiations until the incoming presidential 
administration was in place.182  Responding to Khrushchev’s demands, Eisenhower conveyed a 
promise to cease overflights during the remainder of his presidency.183  
Nuclear capabilities 
 Determining changes in strategic stability alone does not verify a tight bonding with 
changes in nuclear capabilities.  To solidify the bond, the latter must have both occurred during 
the case and be the cause of the change in strategic stability.  Additionally, changes in nuclear 
capabilities can either be perceived or verified.  
 In February 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency published the National Intelligence 
Estimate 11-8-59 (NIE 11-8-59), which fueled the idea that a missile gap existed between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.184  In actuality, nuclear capabilities for both states across all 
three parts of the nuclear triad displayed in Table 3-1 contradicted NIE 11-8-59.  Instead of the 
drastic build-up of Soviet ICBM technology discussed in the NIE, the United States was the real 
driving force behind nuclear capability increases in 1960.  The United States, on the back of a 
significant surge in bomber capacity and the introduction and fielding of SLBM technology, 
increased its CRNC from 5 to 6.  Leading up to the shootdown of the U-2, changes in nuclear 
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capabilities existed for the United States as it perceived the growth of the Soviet ICBM fleet, as 
well as for the Soviets as the United States continued to surge its actual bomber fleet. 
Strategic stability 
Heading into the 1960 Paris summit, this case began with full strategic stability or 
Escalation Level-1.  The CIA’s U-2 overflight, vehemently protested by Khrushchev, was 
undertaken in response to the United States’ need for higher fidelity on the Soviet’s nuclear 
capabilities while trying to validate a suspected “missile gap.”  In July 1959, Eisenhower approved 
a single CIA U-2 flight over the Soviet Tyuratam test facility as a means of validating the current 
status of the Soviet missile program, but the intelligence gathered revealed no significant 
findings.185  Seven months later, the NIE 11-8-59 concluded the Soviets were increasing their 
ICBM production and “would provide on the order of 140-200 ICBMs on the launcher in mid-
1961.”186    
General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the JCS, used the 1959 NIE assessment to advocate 
for the increased frequency of U-2 flights.  Examining Table 3-1 shows, had NIE 11-8-59 been 
accurate in its assessment, that the Soviets would have had almost fielded enough ICBMs to pose 
a 4:1 lead over the United States’ ICBM program in 1961.  The increased Soviet ICBM fielding 
would equal a dramatic CRNC increase in favor of the Soviet Union, bringing them closer to parity 
with the United States. 
Beginning in 1959, with each U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union, the United States 
committed a border violation, an Escalation Level-4 event.  These border violations did not go 
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unnoticed by the Soviet Union’s military, which was capable of monitoring the border violations 
as they occurred but lacked the technical means of countering the high-flying spy plane.187   The 
Soviet military chose not to respond by increasing the Escalation Level until they had the 
appropriate technology to do so. 
In response to the May 1960 U-2 border incursion, the Soviet Defense Minister Marshal 
Rodion Molinovsky, speaking from the Kremlin, announced that “he had ordered the nations 
rocket forces to strike at any base from which a plane might violate the frontiers of the Soviet 
Union or of its allies.”188   Justifying his orders, Marshal Molinovsky emphasized that any plane 
crossing borders might be carrying a nuclear weapon, and would be dealt with as a threat.  
The Soviet military, on 1 May 1960, successfully countered the United States’ U-2 border 
violation.  Responding to the U-2 aircraft flying deep inside its borders, the Soviet Union was 
finally able to shoot the plane down, a response itself equal to an Escalation Level-4 through the 
use of force.  Additionally, a parallel Escalation Level-2 came from Molinovsky’s order to shoot 
down any new aircraft crossing the Soviet border.  This threat paled in comparison to the final 
demise through the actual use of force that brought down the U-2.Finally, Escalation Level-1 
resumed after the United States vowed not to restart overflights of Soviet territory and the 
Eisenhower administration ended, giving way to the incoming Kennedy administration.   
Case Analysis 
Capability 
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 The year 1960, as denoted in Table 3-1, saw a significant growth in the United States’ 
CRNC score with an increase of two points from the previous year.  This significant growth of 
nuclear capabilities represented a combination of increasing ICBMs from six to twelve, bringing 
thirty-two SLBMs onto alert for the first time, and most importantly the addition of almost six-
hundred nuclear-capable bombers and strategic nuclear warheads.  Driving this nuclear capability 
explosion was NIE 11-8-59, which predicted that the Soviet Union would out-produce the 
Americans’ nuclear arsenal and soon create a missile gap in favor of the Soviets.  The perceived 
deficiency in American nuclear capability production, compared with the Soviets, spawned high-
level efforts to produce even greater nuclear capability.  
Utility 
 The Americans, insecure about the size of their arsenal relative to that of the Soviet Union’s 
and wanting to keep a lead in nuclear-capability production, sought to verify the status of the Soviet 
arsenal.  Specifically, the Eisenhower administration had a choice to make between the pursuit of 
brinkmanship or deterrence policies and chose deterrence to avoid the potential risk of war, but he 
needed to verify the size and capabilities of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.  Keeping an American lead 
in nuclear arms production translated to maintaining the status quo and finding a way to deter the 
Soviets from surpassing the United States, as predicted in NIE 11-8-59.  To accomplish 
verification of the Soviet arsenal, the choice was made to conduct cross-border U-2 missions.  My 
research showed retrospectively that the American nuclear arsenal was not in danger of being 
overtaken by the Soviets, a fact that was not known to Eisenhower or the rest of the country at that 
time. 
Incentives 
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 Flush with uncertainty of the size and status of the missile gap, Eisenhower launched the 
ill-fated U-2 flight as a means of avoiding any potential disruption to political or crisis stability.  
A faltering of political stability could have led to a crash in crisis stability, resulting in war.  The 
breaching of the border into sovereign Soviet territory during the U-2 flight can be traced back to 
the variations of nuclear capabilities, both actual and perceived. 
Strategic Stability 
 Strategic stability changed multiple times because of the changes in nuclear capabilities by 
the United States and what Eisenhower perceived as current and future changes in Soviet nuclear 
capabilities.  To verify whether the United States still had the ability to maintain the status quo 
with the Soviet Union and refrain from devolving into a crisis, United States U-2 flights were 
authorized, the last of which ended in the aircraft being shot down.  The border violations of the 
U-2 and the subsequent shooting down of the aircraft both changed strategic stability.   
Case Summary 
 The shooting down of the U-2 spy plane on 1 May 1960 displays an association between 
variations in nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stabilities.  Strategic stability 
undoubtedly decreased as the United States crossed sovereign border regions and the Soviet Union 
shot down the U-2, which was an Escalation Level-4 action.  However, this is only a part of the 
bigger story.  As seen in numerous other cases, more than one change in strategic stability 
occurred, and each change was frequently the product of different drivers. 
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3.2.2  Type-II Cases  
3.2.2.1 1957: Sputnik 
The first Type-II case, the Soviet launching of the Sputnik space payload, shows a minor 
change in strategic stability that occurred without associated changes in nuclear capabilities.  
During 1957, the Soviet Union began flexing its burgeoning military might in displays of force 
and technology for all the world to see, especially the United States.  As noted in Table 3-1, in 
1957 the United States’ CRNC was two and half times that of the Soviet Union, with the Americans 
having outpaced Soviet efforts by fielding significantly more long-range bombers and strategic 
nuclear warheads.  Starting from a position of nuclear-capability disadvantage, the Soviet Union 
initiated a series of programs to start down the long road of catching up to the superior nuclear 
delivery capabilities of the United States. 
On 5 October 1957, the Soviets chose the thin veil of space exploration to test their 
burgeoning ICBM technology in the form of the R-7 rocket.189  During this launch, the Soviet 
government chose to put a small spherical satellite on top of the newly developed R-7 rocket.  This 
display of Soviet technical superiority was meant to serve a dual purpose: to beat the United States 
to space, thereby initiating the space race, and, more importantly, to convey a message that the 
Soviet Union was more advanced than the United States in the development and manufacturing of 
strategic nuclear-capability delivery rockets.  The Soviets succeeded on both counts. 
Commissioned before the death of Stalin, the R-7 missile’s range was 8,000 km while 
loaded with either a three- or five-megaton nuclear weapon.  The accuracy of the R-7 was 10 km.  
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It launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome and held both Alaska and Hawaii in its crosshairs 
while the follow-on technology of the R-7A and its much improved 12,000 km range held the 
entirety of North America hostage to the potential destruction of Soviet nuclear firepower.190   The 
high-visibility Sputnik payload was lofted in such a manner as to overfly the United States during 
its 90-minute orbit, providing a constant reminder that the Soviet Union could reach out and touch 
anywhere it wanted with little or no notice. 
Nuclear capabilities 
Classified as a Type-II case, the launching of Sputnik occurred during a year when no 
CRNC increase occurred on either side.  The lack of nuclear capability variance is not to say that 
neither side had nuclear capabilities.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union had not only 
nuclear capabilities but also the ability to use their nuclear arsenals against one another using at 
least one leg of the nuclear triad. 
In 1957, the United States only had one method to deliver strategic nuclear capabilities: 
their bomber fleet.  Noted in Table 3-1, the United States’ bomber fleet was capable of providing 
military planners with over twenty-one times the payload capacity of the Soviet Union.  This high 
number of bombers capable of delivering strategic nuclear capabilities gave the United States a 
CRNC score of 5, significantly greater than that of the Soviet Union.   
In 1957, the Soviet Union paled numerically in comparison to the United States.  With a 
total strategic bomber payload capacity of 116 in comparison to the United States’ 2,520, the 
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Soviet CRNC score of 2 accurately reflected the diminutive size of their nuclear capabilities.  
However, in 1957 the Soviets did field the R-11FM submarine launched missile.  The R-11FM 
was a single-stage, liquid-fueled rocket capable of carrying either a 10- or 0.5-kiloton nuclear 
warhead with a maximum range of 167 kilometers.191  Although the R-11FM had a limited range, 
submarine placement off the shoreline of the United States still meant that Soviet SLBMs put a 
significant number of coastal American population centers at risk. 
Strategic stability 
Unlike the 1960 Type-I U-2 shootdown and other Type-II cases, the Sputnik launch caused 
a very mild change to strategic stability.  At no point before, during, or after the launch of Sputnik 
did the United States respond by entering a higher state of military readiness or adjusting its display 
of military capabilities.  Indeed, the use of force from either side did not occur.  The new change 
in strategic stability came in the form of a modified United States view of Escalation Level-1 
following the launch of Sputnik.  Strategic rockets would afford those who have them the ability 
to launch a nuclear weapon with little or no warning.  The redefined Escalation Level-1 now 
accounted for the Soviet Union actively seeking, in advance of the Americans, a strategic rocket 
program.   
Through coincidence, immediately following the launch of Sputnik, the Joint Committee 
on Defense Production, commissioned from Congress, presented a report to the National Security 
Council originating from a charter received previously in April 1957.  The report was titled 
“Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” also referred to as the “Gaither Report,” and it 
accomplished two tasks.192   The first was to establish measures for enhancing the deterrent power 
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of the United States, which included closing the newly perceived missile gap, and the second task 
found was to bolster programs aimed at keeping the nation’s citizens and cities safe.  Delivered on 
the heels of the Sputnik launch, the report became potent fuel to many concerned members of 
Congress who believed Eisenhower was not doing enough to counter the new Soviet threat.   
The Gaither Report, fueled by the unexpected success of Sputnik, also served to begin 
redefining the United States’ military view of Escalation Level-1.  The report gave an impetus to 
each of the defense Service Chiefs to submit requests to increase necessary funding for programs 
that sought to enhance the United States’ deterrence capabilities.193  Neither Sputnik nor the 
Gaither Report changed the Escalation Level; however, their existence served a purpose in 
redefining how to view full strategic stability. 
Case analysis 
The 1957 Sputnik launch, as a Type-II case, by definition does not reflect the causal chain 
connecting variations in nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability.  However, this case 
redefined Escalation Level-1 between the United States and the Soviet Union for the remainder of 
the Cold War.  The United States now had a competitor on the international stage that could reach 
out and deliver nuclear weapons.   
A lack of change in strategic stability should be the summation of the case analysis; the 
Soviets successfully tested new dual-use rocket technology and the United States did not respond 
by raising the Escalation Level.  However, the Sputnik launch performed a vital service for the 
Soviets rarely seen in other cases: it redefined Escalation Level-1.  This meant the Soviets were 
on their way to building an ICBM force capable of striking the United States.  Once the Soviets 
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perfected the ICBM, full strategic stability would mean that the United States would be held 
hostage to the threat of a Soviet ICBM system capable of launching with little or no notice. 
The R-7 launch did not advance Soviet national interest by forcing the United States to 
change in favor of the Soviets.  Rather, the R-7 launch, if anything, was the result of a Soviet 
incentive to begin leveling out the CRNC disparity.  Although accurately predicting the instability 
resulting from unequal nuclear capabilities between the two parties, changes in utility failed to 
predict the lack of response by the United States.  
Case summary 
Contrary to the expected outcome of a case study challenging dyadic state stability, the 
Sputnik launch did not cause a change in the Escalation Level between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Following the Soviets’ successful launch, conclusions reached in the Gaither Report 
advocating for higher nuclear capability spending and deterrence programs gained unprecedented 
attention.  Congressional debate swirled around the idea that the United States was now second in 
space, in addition to Eisenhower’s intention, assuming the possibility that he had allowed the 
Soviets to beat the United States into orbit.194  However, without a measurable Escalation Level 
change, strategic stability was merely redefined, annotating the growing Soviet launch capabilities 
while at the same time remaining constant. 
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3.2.2.2 1961: Berlin II 
The last words Kennedy uttered to Khrushchev as they parted the ill-fated Vienna Summit 
of June 1961, “it would be a cold winter,” have come to be seen as the symbolic start to the final 
series of events leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.195   Vienna was supposed to be the 
summit Khrushchev wanted following the breakdown with Eisenhower in 1960 and the U-2 
shootdown incident.  Khrushchev, who continued Stalin’s mantra of a unified Berlin under Soviet 
control, also felt emboldened heading into the conference by the recent failure of the young new 
president during the botched Bay of Pigs invasion.196  Kennedy entered the Vienna conference 
fighting an uphill political battle with Khrushchev. 
Standing before Congress on 25 May 1961, before leaving for Vienna, Kennedy asked to 
bolster the number of Army troops to increase readiness in Europe by authorizing 89,000 men and 
ten divisions deployable within three to eight weeks and doubling Army combat power in less than 
two months.197  Following the breakdown in Vienna and in response to the Soviet build-up in 
Berlin, Kennedy put into motion his troop deployment in July 1961 by ordering six Army divisions 
to Europe after the first of the year but stopped short of declaring a national emergency, as had 
been advocated by his close advisor and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  Kennedy 
believed it necessary to deliberately escalate the readiness of the United States military presence 
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in Europe to combat the potential Soviet threat should Khrushchev decide to proceed with trying 
to unify Berlin.198 
Little had changed between the Eastern and Western powers in the city since the 1958–59 
Berlin Crisis.  Tensions mounted as a sea of humanity continued to flood across the border into 
West Germany; 30,000 crossed in July 1961 and a few thousand had already crossed in the 
beginning days of August.199  On 13 August, East-German troops began to install barbed wire and 
then a fortified concrete wall separating the East and West halves of Berlin.200  Prior to the erection 
of the new wall, talent and labor had joined in an exodus out of the East and into the West, 
threatening the existence of the very worker’s paradise that was established to watch over them.   
By October 1961, based on Kennedy’s preference for graduated military responses, the 
JCS published National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) 109, also known as the Poodle 
Blanket Paper.  As requested by Kennedy, NSAM-109 outlined a graduated United States response 
to a potential Berlin crisis beginning with small conventional retaliatory responses and culminating 
in full-scale nuclear war.201  Kennedy had two objectives: the first was to prepare the United States 
to respond to anything the Soviet Union was potentially going to do in Berlin, and the second was 
to actively try to reverse the massive retaliation policy of the Eisenhower administration by 
keeping strategic stability in the forefront and reducing the initial probability of full-scale war.  
The Poodle Blanket Paper marked the first codified policy of flexible response, representing a 
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significant move away from Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine and limiting how the 
United States should use their nuclear weapons. 
Khrushchev believed that NATO, under the leadership of the United States, was going to 
use the opening of the Twenty-Second Party Congress as its starting point for an invasion into the 
East to retaliate against the newly constructed wall.202   In preparation, the Soviet and East-German 
militaries moved troops, tanks, and supplies up to the border.  Finally, the inevitable occurred 
between 27 and 28 October 1961.  A Soviet tank and an American tank came within a hundred 
yards of each other during a direct challenge for power and access through Checkpoint Charlie, 
making a militarized confrontation between the East and West seem unavoidable.  The Soviets 
eventually withdrew first, and the situation resolved peacefully, but in the years (and eventually 
decades) that followed the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, the conception of full strategic 
stability in the dyadic state system was redefined to include the new wall. 
Nuclear capability 
Actual changes in nuclear capabilities measured through CRNC changes, compared with 
1960, did not occur during 1961.  However, significant advancements in situational awareness for 
the United States did ensue with the launching of the CIA’s Discoverer and SAMOS satellites.  
With the ability to cover more ground than a U-2, the imagery returned from SAMOS confirmed 
that any perceived missile gap was non-existent.203  Dispelling the missile gap publicly, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric gave a speech highlighting the United States’ nuclear 
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numerical superiority over the Soviets.204  The new Kennedy administration knew from early on 
in the White House that the Soviets did not have a substantial ICBM advantage over the United 
States as once thought. 
In 1961, with no change in CRNC scores represented in Table 3-1, Kennedy accepted the 
advice presented in the Acheson Report, extending the United States’ nuclear umbrella to NATO 
through the signing of NSAM 40: Regarding NATO and Atlantic Nations.205  Through NSAM-40, 
the United States committed to keeping nuclear weapons in Europe, using conventional resources 
to strengthen nuclear capabilities in the region, and expanding capabilities where possible with 
new technology.206  Moving missiles closer to the front line, as will be seen in the Cuba Missile 
Crisis case study, generally does not cause a variance in nuclear capabilities, even if such forward 
missiles are counted alongside strategic assets. 
Finally, Table 3-1 displays data showing that 1961 did see numerical growth of nuclear 
capabilities, although not enough to change the CRNC score.  The United States saw growth in 
their missiles, with both ICBM and SLBM stocks increasing modestly, while bombers remained 
relatively stagnant.  In the United States, ICBM payload and associated strategic nuclear warheads 
in 1961 increased to 57 from only 12 in the previous year.  Additionally, SLBM payload and 
associated strategic nuclear warheads in 1961 grew to 80 each from 32 just the year prior.  Not as 
aggressive in its build-up, the Soviet Union increased ICBM payload capacity to 12 from only two 
in 1960 while increasing SLBM payload capacity to 87 from 63 one year previously.  Also 
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increasing for the Soviets were bomber payloads, crawling up to 253 from 239 just one year before.  
Although growth occurred in the dyadic state system, it was not enough to cause a variance in the 
CRNC score for either state.  
Strategic stability 
The 1961 Berlin crisis comprised three changes in strategic stability, but none could be 
credibly connected to variances in American and Soviet nuclear capabilities.  During the 1961 
Berlin crisis, the first change to strategic stability occurred in May when Kennedy asked Congress 
to approve an additional 89,000 troops and 10 deployable divisions in relatively short order as a 
means of deterring “non-nuclear aggression.”207   This mobilization of military personnel equated 
to an Escalation Level-3 event and was explicitly not connected to changes in nuclear capabilities.  
Kennedy’s mobilization was in response to the breakdown of order in East Berlin and his desire 
to be ready in case he needed to deploy the Army quickly. 
The second change to strategic stability occurred when the United States and Soviet tanks 
came within yards of one another at Checkpoint Charlie.  Brought about by the inherent tensions 
at the border between the divided city of Berlin, this show of force resulted in an Escalation Level-
3 event.  No indication of nuclear capabilities influencing this change in strategic stability was 
evident in any of the sources.  However, had tensions boiled into actual combat, nuclear 
capabilities would have become a factor based on accepted Soviet strategy at the time, which 
dictated that any war with the United States would become a nuclear war.208 
The last change to strategic stability occurred immediately following the confrontation at 
Checkpoint Charlie.  On the morning of 28 October, the tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie 
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ended.209   No formal declaration of surrender or admission of guilt was made by either side.  The 
Soviet tank took the first move in retreat, followed by the American tank, then the Soviet, and so 
forth.  With tensions dissipated, the Escalation Level changed back to Level-1, reinstating full 
strategic stability in the United States and Soviet Union dyadic state system. 
Case analysis 
The Berlin II case did not occur at a time of nuclear capability change or progress down 
the causal path connecting variations in nuclear capabilities with changes in strategic stability.  
However, strategic stability changes obviously occurred.  Long before the tank stand-off at 
Checkpoint Charlie in downtown Berlin, President Kennedy’s call-up of 89,000 troops to deter 
non-nuclear Soviet aggression saw an immediate jump in Escalation Level from 1 to 3.  No 
changes in nuclear capabilities occurred, prompting Kennedy’s actions and the mobilized troops 
to only address conventional military issues.  The May 1961 call-up of troops purposely decreased 
strategic stability without any connection to variances in nuclear capabilities. 
The second change to strategic stability occurred during the tank standoff at Checkpoint 
Charlie.  Tensions had previously been high at the border as the East Germans and Soviets 
constructed the new wall with the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany on the 
opposite side.  As a different show-of-force event than the call-up of troops, the standoff represents 
a lateral movement to a new Escalation Level-3 event.  No indications presented in the case details 
pointed to either the United States or the Soviets purposely engaging in the actions leading to the 
standoff, and no changes in nuclear capabilities occurred. 
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Finally, following the initial move to pull back the Soviet tanks from the standoff at 
Checkpoint Charlie, the Escalation Level changed again from 3 to 1, re-establishing full strategic 
stability.  Consistent with the previous two changes in strategic stability for this case, no changes 
in nuclear capabilities contributed to the resumption of full strategic stability.  Lacking influence 
by nuclear capabilities, this last change in strategic stability was also non-nuclear. 
Case summary 
Two indisputable facts emerge from the Berlin II case: changes to strategic stability 
occurred, and variations in nuclear capabilities did not play a role.  The lack of nuclear capability 
changes, making this a Type-II case, means the capability–stability causal path is inapplicable. 
Erection of the wall occurred not as a result of variances in nuclear capabilities by the United States 
or any Western power.  Instead, it was a means of providing internal stability within East Berlin 
as talent fled to the freedoms promised in the West.  Consistent with each of the previous cases in 
this chapter, the Berlin II case does not contain only a single incident of change in strategic 
stability.  Instead, it follows the same pattern as the previous cases of multiple independent changes 
in strategic stability, each providing a different causal explanation. 
3.3 Conclusion 
During the 1958–1961 timeframe, variances in nuclear capabilities rarely influenced 
dyadic state strategic stability.  With two burgeoning nuclear powers, growing nuclear capabilities, 
and multiple cases of change in strategic stability, if variations in nuclear capabilities consistently 
and systematically affected change in strategic stability, there should be abundant evidence of that 
fact in this time period, there is not.  Only twice between 1957 and 1961 did either state’s CRNC 
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score change; however, most of the changes in strategic stability occurred before the 1960 change 
in the United States’ CRNC score.  Driving a wedge between any perceived bond is the timing of 
strategic stability changes with CRNC score changes.  The analysis of this timeframe drove a 
preliminary conclusion that nuclear capabilities are only sometimes sufficient to change strategic 
stability, but are not always required. 
Can the actual or threatened use of nuclear capabilities explain strategic stability changes 
occurring at the same time?  Did the manner in which each state leader perceived the other state’s 
nuclear capabilities have an effect on strategic stability?  Out of the six cases, each representing 
strategic stability, only two cases attributed variations in strategic stability to nuclear capabilities.  
Only the singular change to Escalation Level-2 following Khrushchev’s 10 November speech, 
where he cited the quantitative NATO missile emplacement, confirmed this hypothesis.  
Khrushchev changed strategic stability by threatening a military response to the missile 
emplacements even though the number of missiles did not change the United States’ CRNC score.  
His true motive was suspected to be the removal of Western occupation in West Berlin.  Therefore, 
the actual or threatened use of nuclear capabilities was sufficient to change strategic stability in 
one instance but was not necessary at all times. 
 The remaining two changes in strategic stability among the Type-I cases were attributed to 
state-level incentives.  During the 1958–1959 Berlin I case, the United States placing of missiles 
in Europe capitalized on the incentives of both deterring the Soviets and increasing the security of 
European allies.  During the May 1960 shootdown of the U-2 spy plane where the perceived 
change in Soviet nuclear capabilities drove changes in strategic stability, the incentive driving the 
United States to elevate the Escalation Level was the perception of the Soviets’ nuclear-capability 
status.  So great was this incentive that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
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approved the overflights in the knowledge that each was a border incursion.  However, not all 
sixteen changes to strategic stability can be traced back to incentives.  This result is comparable to 
those above, incentives are sometimes sufficient to change strategic stability but not always 
necessary. 
 Can changes in strategic stability be explained by causal mechanisms other than variations 
in nuclear capabilities?  Across the majority of Type-I and all Type-II changes in strategic stability, 
causal mechanisms other than the actual or threatened use of nuclear capabilities or incentives 
explained changes to strategic stability.  Stated differently, perceived or actual changes in nuclear 
capabilities were sufficient to drive changes in strategic stability but not always necessary.   
  Table 3-3 presents each of this chapter’s cases weighed and evaluated against accepted 
theories of strategic stability.  Following congruence testing, during the presentation of case 
details, it became apparent that all cases had at least one change in strategic stability.  The 
Escalation Level column annotates those cases with multiple changes in strategic stability.  After 
reviewing the details of each case, it became apparent that strategic stability change occurred as 
little as once and as many as three times during a single case.  Additionally, some changes in 
strategic stability occurred laterally, meaning the second incidence of Escalation Level change 
transpired but the new change was equal to the prior Level.  With each change in the Escalation 
Level, either laterally or vertically, an assessment is made in Table 3-3 applying the new change 
to either the indicators of strategic stability or, if no indicators apply, the non-nuclear column as a 
means of assigning causality produced by anything outside of nuclear capability variations.   
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Table 3-3: Analysis Summary: Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957–1961 
 
Finally, this chapter leaves a question for further research regarding the nature of the 
technology that spawned the nuclear capabilities: Do only variations in nuclear capabilities cause 
changes in strategic stability, or can a revolution in technology yield changes in strategic stability?  
As a dual-use technology, the R-7 rocket was equally important to the development of ICBMs as 
it was as a revolutionary breakthrough in space transportation.  Additionally, before the shootdown 
on 1 May 1960, the U-2’s technology was highly provocative to the Soviets while the Americans 
crossed into and out of Soviet border regions with impunity.  Finally, the Soviet missile 
advancements allowing for the shootdown the U-2 aircraft also drove a change in strategic 
stability.  It seems possible with further research that nuclear capabilities emblematically represent 
changes to strategic stability caused by technological revolutions. 
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4.0 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 
Over thirteen days in October 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States came close to 
engaging in a militarized confrontation and, according to dominant policy on both sides at the 
time, it would have certainly turned nuclear.  The United States’ nuclear capabilities in 1962 
quantifiably swelled as ICBM and SLBM production increased dramatically, in some cases 
quadrupling from 1961.  With the increase in nuclear capabilities, the United States was able to 
implement assured destruction, the ability to conduct a second strike.  
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union purposefully challenged the balance of power in the Western 
hemisphere through its placement of nuclear-capable medium- and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles on the island of Cuba.210  Continuing the Stalin-era mantra of dissolving the Potsdam 
Protocols through the removal of Western powers from post-WWII Germany, Soviet Chairman 
Nikita Khrushchev intended to use the missiles in Cuba to draw the United States into a fait 
accompli in Berlin.  Contrary to the theory presented in Chapter 1, where the state gaining nuclear 
capability posed a potential change in utility, Khrushchev wagered through high-stakes 
brinkmanship that the Kennedy administration would feel pressured by the Soviet military 
operations in Cuba to capitulate in Berlin.  His gamble failed. 
Following the errant shootdown of a U-2 surveillance plane, a naval quarantine, and 
Kennedy’s display of American resolve, the Soviet Union agreed to abandon its Cuban missile 
outpost, making a public proclamation of withdrawal on 28 October 1962.  Historical scholarship 
has treated the Cuban Missile Crisis as the quintessential instance of strategic stability disrupted 
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due to changes in nuclear capabilities.  Undoubtedly, the Soviets changing the location of nuclear 
weapons, moving them in proximity to the continental United States, was a factor in varying 
Escalation Levels in the Soviet–American dyadic system.  This chapter analyzes the events of 
1962 associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis and shows that nuclear capabilities, even during 
this most notable of cases, were not required at all times to change strategic stability. 
Publicly, Khrushchev admitted that he did not conceive of putting any missiles on Cuba 
until his May 1962 trip to Bulgaria, where he conceptualized the idea, in part, to protect the Soviet 
Union’s newly acquired bastion of socialism in the Western Hemisphere.211  In the United States, 
Kennedy, the American intelligence community, and many on the National Security Council 
became convinced that the missiles on Cuba were meant to force the Americans and other Western 
powers out of Berlin.212   Khrushchev’s Bulgarian revelation came at a time when the protection 
of Cuba was secondary to the Soviet Union’s primary policy objective: the expulsion of Western 
forces, specifically the United States, from Berlin.  Others in the United States including Kennedy 
and his advisors believed the missiles in Cuba were a way to bring to a head the Soviet discontent 
with Western troops in Germany.   
Prior to the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, removal of Western troops from Berlin was 
a chief Soviet foreign policy; it was the centerpiece of meetings in May 1962 between American 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin.  As summer progressed 
toward fall, the talks became increasingly blunt and the events associated with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis began to unfold.  Repeatedly, consistently, and with increasing fervor throughout this entire 
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212 Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile 
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time, Chairman Khrushchev expressed his mantra that troops from the West, in the eyes of the 
Soviets and East Berlin, were “persona non grata.” 
As tensions concerning Berlin continued to heat-up, Raul Castro traveled from Havana to 
Moscow on 2 July 1962 to seek additional weapons for the new Cuban government and build a 
relationship between Cuba and the Communist government in the Soviet Union.  Solidifying the 
relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was a victory for Castro, as Cuba was often 
viewed as a poor investment for Soviet contributions of material and economic support.213   On 10 
August 1962, the tangible results of Castro’s efforts were reported by the Director of Central 
Intelligence when military supplies and personnel were observed heading into Cuba.  
On 21 August 1962, the Director of Central Intelligence reported a revision to his previous 
assessment and began labeling the inflow of Soviet material and personnel into Cuba as 
significant.214    Furthermore, at this same meeting, a consensus had begun to build that the United 
States needed to respond, possibly militarily, to the inflow of Soviet supplies to Cuba.  McGeorge 
Bundy, President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, responding to talk of blockading Cuba, 
tied any actions against the island as possibly having reciprocal responses against the United States 
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in Berlin or near the United States’ bases in Turkey or Southern Italy.215  Working from the 
intelligence presented to him throughout August, on 7 September 1962, President Kennedy asked 
Congress for authorization to call-up 150,000 ready-reservists if needed to deal with Cuba.216   
Reviewing available photography from Cuba taken between 23 and 28 September helped 
analysts develop the hypothesis that Soviet activity on Cuba directly related to the construction of 
potential medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites.217  The Kennedy administration, 
responding to the intelligence analysis, approved on 14 October 1962 a rare flight of the U-2 to 
capture first-hand photography of newly arrived shipments.218  Analysis conducted on the U-2’s 
film by the intelligence community confirmed late on 15 October that the Soviet Union’s activities 
in Cuba included the delivery of nuclear-capable MRBMs.  Senior staff informed President 
Kennedy on the morning of 16 October. 
Starting with a late-morning meeting in President Kennedy’s office concerning options 
available to the United States and potential reasoning behind the Soviet’s activities, the following 
13 days brought increasing escalation and decreasing strategic stability.  By 21 October, the 
President had given orders to institute a naval quarantine of Cuba as a means of halting any new 
Soviet shipments of military supplies and personnel.  Although earlier in September the 
administration had made it known publicly that the Soviets were moving into Cuba, it was not 
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until 22 October 1962 that the President addressed the American people, revealing the proximity 
of Soviet MRBMs located on the island of Cuba.  Simultaneously raising military readiness to 
coincide with Kennedy’s address to the public, Prime Minister Fidel Castro responded by 
mobilizing Cuba’s troops.  Conflict seemed inevitable. 
More rapidly than the Cuban Missile Crisis had begun, it ended.  Termination of the crisis 
in Cuba began when Khrushchev sent a telegram to Kennedy on 26 October 1962 in which he 
agreed to the latter’s request to stop military shipments to Cuba in exchange for an American 
commitment to not invade the island.219   Before Kennedy could formally reply to Khrushchev, a 
second telegram arrived on 27 October 1962, repeating the stipulation of a promise of non-invasion 
but also adding a requirement for the removal of American missiles from Turkey.220   Following 
the easing of international tensions on 28 October 1962, the quarantine put into place by Kennedy 
took another month to conclude as each side participated in numerous negotiations to remove the 
Soviet nuclear capabilities from the island. 
Understood in the terms developed in this thesis, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a Type-II 
conflict.  As shown in Figure 4-1 below, it occurred at a time when the CRNC scores of neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union changed.  The Cuban Missile Crisis has long been thought 
of as a case that cleanly demonstrates a strong connection between variations in nuclear capabilities 
driving changes in strategic stability.  Through the examination of the case in this chapter, 
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however, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not the exemplar many assume it to be; during the crisis, 
not all changes to strategic stability were connected to changes in nuclear capabilities. 
Figure 4-1: Cuban Missile Crisis in Context: 1957–1967 
 
This chapter proceeds through the Cuban Missile Crisis in four parts.  Section 4.1, Nuclear 
Capabilities, addresses the changes in the two states’ nuclear capabilities occurring during 1962.  
Section 4.2, Case Events, covers the specific nuances of the Cuban Missile Crisis broken into three 
separate timeframes, correlating to various changes of strategic stability that occurred as the events 
unfolded.  Next, Section 4.3, Analysis, examines the events leading to changes in the DV, strategic 
stability.  Finally, Section 4.4, Conclusion, highlights how only two of the three instances of 
change in strategic stability during the Cuban Missile Crisis were tightly connected to changes in 
nuclear capabilities.  Although viewed as an illustrative case highlighting the strong association 
between nuclear capabilities and strategic stability, the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforces the notion 
developed elsewhere in this thesis that nuclear capability changes can sometimes be sufficient to 
change strategic stability but are not a necessary component. 
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4.1 Nuclear capabilities 
Similar to the previous chapter, Table 4-1 below represents the relative nuclear capabilities 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union.  Pitted against one another in the table, each leg of 
the nuclear triad highlights nuclear capabilities for each state.221  According to existing research, 
if strategic stability were to change, it would only do so in response to changes in nuclear 
capabilities, as seen in the United States’ change occurring from 1961 to 1962. 
The CRNC for both the United States and the Soviet Union remained constant between 
1961 to 1962.  As depicted in Table 4-1, the United States reported dramatic increases in both 
ICBM and SLBM nuclear capabilities in 1962 while maintaining more than ten times the bomber 
payload capacity over the Soviet Union’s equivalent capabilities.  Furthermore, between 1960 and 
1962, the United States added 191 ICBMs and 112 SLBMs, resulting in an increased payload 
capacity along with equally associated strategic nuclear warheads.  The United States entered 1962 
with a numerically superior bomber fleet while continuing to grow SLBMs and ICBMs at 
enormous rates, bolstering their overall relative nuclear capability. 
 
221 Recall the CRNC examines only strategic, or long-range, capabilities.  As each platform has the potential to carry 
more than one nuclear warhead, payload capacity and available strategic nuclear warheads are used to describe each 
from year to year.  The CRNC takes a total of all platforms in both the payload and warhead categories and assigns a 
relative numerical value, as compared to the Soviet Union, from 1 to 10.  The numerical value assigned for each 
category is then added together to produce the final CRNC score, which is then used to draw comparisons. 
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Table 4-1: US and USSR Nuclear Capabilities, 1960–1963222 
 
During this same period, from 1960 to 1962, the Soviet Union grew its nuclear capability 
inventory by modest amounts.  During this three-year period, the Soviets added 34 ICBMs while 
maintaining small but capable SLBM and bomber fleets.  These additional ICBMs increased the 
Soviet Union’s overall payload capacity across all three platforms.  Even with the significant 
increase in Soviet Nuclear capability from 1960, the United States still dominated with a CRNC 
score 3.5 times higher than that of their Soviet counterparts. 
Did the missiles placed on the island of Cuba make any difference to Soviet nuclear 
capabilities?  The answer should be no, as the CRNC score only accounts for strategic or long-
range nuclear capabilities.  However, moving the IRBMs and MRBMs into firing range of the 
mainland of the United States meant that nuclear weapons became deliverable to various targets 
inside the United States by strategic and non-strategic missiles.  In other words, those targeted by 
the effects of a nuclear weapon probably cared very little about how the nuclear capabilities would 
be delivered.   
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On the island of Cuba, along with matching warheads between 200 kilotons and 1 megaton, 
Khrushchev moved 16 SS-5 IRBMs with a range of 2,200 miles and 24 SS-4 MRBMs with a range 
of 1,100 miles.223  Photography analyzed from 16 October found 24 IL-28 bombers with a range 
of 600 miles still in their crates on Cuba.224  Combining these imported capabilities with the 
Soviet’s existing strategic nuclear capabilities increases the Soviets’ overall payload capacity 
capable of striking the United States by 64 along with matching nuclear warheads.  This nominally 
increased Soviet overall capability, but fell far short of the United States’ overall payload capacity 
of 3,267 at the time.  Although the spectacle of nuclear weapons appearing on the doorstep of the 
United States was enough to produce changes in strategic stability, the nuclear capabilities on Cuba 
did little to change the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Cuban Missile Crisis as a Type-II case 
Congruence testing, as previously undertaken for the cases examined in the previous 
chapter, sought to assess each case based on the theory that changes in the DV, strategic stability, 
are bound to variance in the IV, nuclear capabilities.225  During the Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear 
capabilities did not change on either side of the dyadic state system during 1962.  The result of this 
lack of CRNC change means that, although the Cuban Missile Crisis is viewed as the quintessential 
display of variations in nuclear capabilities driving change in strategic stability, the case did not 
pass congruence testing and was classified as Type-II.  As a Type-II case, the historically tight 
capability–stability assumption did not pass the basic congruence test.  The details of this case 
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require closer examination to ascertain whether a causal relationship exists between the change in 
the balance of nuclear capabilities and the variance in strategic stability experienced during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. 
4.2 Case events 
Often lumped into a single episode of conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis was composed of three parts, with four discrete events that 
affected American–Soviet strategic stability.  Only three of those events were associated with the 
states’ relative balance of nuclear capabilities.  Each part of the Cuban Missile Crisis comprised a 
change in strategic stability, but each change was not always associated with changes in nuclear 
capabilities.  The binding of variations to nuclear capability to changes in strategic stability is an 
essential issue because scholarship often conflates the entire crisis into a singular event that 
changed strategic stability solely because of changes in nuclear capabilities. 
To address the multiple changes that occurred in strategic stability for varying reasons, the 
following case analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis is broken into three distinct parts.  The first 
section,  Part 1: 1 January to 15 October 1962, examines the first time the United States became 
aware of Soviet military activities on Cuba and the initial response Kennedy took to address what 
he and the United States intelligence community perceived as a non-nuclear threat off the coast of 
Florida.  The second section, Part 2: 16–28 October 1962, addresses the height of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  During this timeframe, Kennedy reacted to the change in Soviet nuclear capabilities 
and made a corresponding change to the United States’ Escalation Level as a response.  Finally, 
the last section, Part 3: 29 October to 31 December 1962, examines the sustained Escalation Level 
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lasting from the traditionally ascribed end of the crisis until the verified departure of Soviet nuclear 
weapons from Cuba.  Across all three periods of the Cuban Missile Crisis, strategic stability 
changed multiple times for reasons that encompass both nuclear and non-nuclear capability 
explanations.  These changes, discussed later in this chapter, lack a consistently tight bond with 
changes in nuclear capabilities. 
4.2.1  Part 1: 1 January to 15 October 1962 
Chairman Khrushchev covertly initiated Soviet military actions leading to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis to force closure on the many long-standing issues with Western states occupying 
post-war Germany.  During the summer of 1962, Berlin policy took center stage amid official 
Soviet interactions with the United States while the Soviet military was covertly moving supplies 
into Cuba.226  On 30 May and again on 18 June 1962, Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to 
the United States, met with Secretary Rusk to convey Khrushchev’s sentiments on the United 
States’ withdrawal from Berlin.227  Specifically, Dobrynin informed Secretary Rusk of 
Khrushchev’s position that American, British, and French forces in Berlin should be replaced with 
United Nation troops.228  According to Khrushchev, it was his policy that “the Soviets would not 
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recognize any right of the West to maintain troops in West Berlin.”229  On 5 July, immediately 
following Raul Castro’s visit to Moscow, Khrushchev sent a direct communique to Kennedy 
reiterating his Berlin policy of Western power expulsion.230  In this July communique, Khrushchev 
proposed “the occupation regime in West Berlin will be abolished and during the first years the 
troops of the United Nations will be stationed there which will act as guarantors of independence 
and security of West Berlin.”231      
At the end of July, Llewellyn Thompson, the outgoing United States Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, had a face-to-face meeting with Khrushchev before relinquishing his post and 
returning to the United States.  During this meeting, Thompson recalled Khrushchev conveying 
his need to bring the Berlin issue to an end and further felt that the Soviets had placed themselves 
in a corner too deep to back out.  Pressed further by Kennedy, Thompson noted Khrushchev’s 
desire to push discussions with the US off until November, a time revealed in retrospect when the 
Soviet missiles on Cuba would have been fully in place.  Thompson’s assessment, delivered to 
President Kennedy and Congressional leadership, was that Soviet activity in Cuba was meant to 
bring the showdown Khrushchev wanted in order to close the long-standing Berlin issue.232   
As the Soviet Union increased forcefulness in its expression of Berlin policy throughout 
the summer of 1962, it quietly proceeded to initiate a military deployment to Cuba. Khrushchev 
intended the placement of missiles on Cuba to force either multilaterally, or unilaterally if 
necessary, a re-negotiation of the Potsdam Protocols under the guise of a “peace treaty” as Stalin 
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had wanted in the 1940s.  A unilateral peace accord would only occur between East Berlin and the 
Soviet Union.  Under a unilateral solution, any hostilities taken against East Berlin would drive an 
immediate response by the Soviet Union.233  Under a multilateral approach, the Soviet Union 
would propose ending the Potsdam Protocols and replacing forces from Western states in Germany 
with troops from the United Nations.  The United States viewed its presence in West Berlin as a 
solemn promise to the occupants of that city as a guarantor of freedom.  Kennedy, leading the 
response from Great Britain and France, would not tolerate any change to Potsdam. 
Publicly, Khrushchev justified his actions in Cuba by citing the threat NATO nuclear 
missiles posed to the Soviet Union from their bases in Turkey and Italy.234  Placing missiles in 
Cuba, with the permission of Fidel Castro, would be a comparable response to the threat perceived 
by the NATO missiles in Turkey and Italy.235  The cover story for this bold move onto the doorstep 
of the United States thus became the bolstering of defenses for the young socialist state from the 
threats posed by the looming capitalist power.  Khrushchev, entering the initial stages of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, embraced the NATO missiles, not because they were a threat to the Soviet Union 
but because they provided a reason to place missiles on the island of Cuba, projecting a policy of 
bloodless retaliation against the United States’ activities in Europe. 
On 7 September 1962, after receiving intelligence reports throughout the summer of Soviet 
military shipments of material and troops arriving in Cuba, President Kennedy sent a letter to 
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Congressional leadership requesting authorization to mobilize 150,000 ready-reservists.236  With 
no knowledge of the Soviet placement of nuclear capabilities on Cuba, Kennedy was willing to 
raise the Escalation Level, reducing strategic stability through the call-up of troops.  Six days later 
on 13 September, Kennedy went before the media explicitly conveying United States policy that 
“if at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in 
any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and 
space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba 
should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any 
nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the 
Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that 
of its allies.”237    
On 3 October 1962, President Kennedy’s request for troops was granted when Congress 
sent him for signature Public Law 87-736 giving the office of President the broad authority to 
“order any unit, or any member, of the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active-duty for not 
more than twelve consecutive months.”238  Actions taken by the United States in response to the 
quiet movement of the Soviet military onto Cuba, perceived as only a conventional force 
deployment void of nuclear capability changes, became an explicit change to Escalation Level-3 
and a decrease in strategic stability.   
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4.2.2  Part 2: 16 to 28 October 
On 15 October, using U-2 photography taken just the day prior, the Central Intelligence 
Agency confirmed the presence of nuclear-capable MRBMs on Cuba, less than two weeks after 
Public Law 87-736 had been signed.  On the morning of 16 October, aides informed President 
Kennedy of the intelligence showing Soviet nuclear-capable missile placement.239   Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union now knew of the missiles on Cuba and, coupled with the 
authorized American troop build-up, they could equally share in Escalation Level-3, a decrease in 
dyadic state strategic stability.  Internally, Kennedy and his staff began formulating possible 
responses as a means of addressing this new perceived threat as well as standing up to Khrushchev.  
By Saturday, 20 October, membership in the National Security Council had split into two 
camps, ‘hawks’ and ‘doves,’ based on their four solutions proposed for Kennedy’s 
consideration:240   
1) Air strike 
2) Blockade as a precursor to an air strike 
3) Blockade and determine later what actions to take 
4) Blockade as a means of forcing negotiations 
 
During a White House meeting of the National Security Council, Kennedy began 
formulating his centrist approach as a response to the Soviet missiles, advocating for a quarantine 
while demanding from the Soviets the immediate removal of the Soviet missiles and IL-28 
bombers from the island of Cuba.241   On Monday, 22 October, before addressing the nation about 
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the presence of missiles on Cuba, Kennedy explained his approach to Congressional leadership.  
The result of Kennedy’s Congressional briefing was that many expressed displeasure with the lack 
of a more aggressive approach in the form of a full-blown invasion.242    
Kennedy sculpted his administration’s messaging focused on two key concerns: allied trust 
in future American protection abroad and Soviet reaction to the United States’ actions.  Addressing 
Congressional leadership’s concerns regarding the lack of an immediate invasion, prior to his 
televised remarks to the American public, Kennedy retorted the following: “Khrushchev will seize 
Berlin and that Europe will regard Berlin’s loss, which is of such symbolic importance [to Europe], 
as having been the fault of the United States by acting in a precipitous way.  After all, they are 5 
or 6,000 miles from Cuba and much closer to the Soviet Union.  So these missiles don’t bother 
them and maybe they should think it should not bother us.  So that whatever we do in regard to 
Cuba gives him a chance to do the same in regard to Berlin.”243   For Kennedy, the gravity of this 
situation was significant.  The Soviet actions in Cuba had implications much more significant than 
protecting this tiny island state; Khrushchev needed Cuba to force his position in Berlin. 
Following his Congressional update on 22 October, Kennedy addressed the American 
public via a primetime televised speech from the Oval Office.  At the same moment Kennedy was 
in front of the TV cameras, he sent a direct telegram to Khrushchev, reaching out for the first time 
during the crisis outlining the United States’ response.244  Acknowledging the gravity of their 
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correspondence, Kennedy wrote, “I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in 
this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could 
win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the 
aggressor.”245    
In Kennedy’s televised speech to the American people, he outlined the United States’ 
seven-part policy defining his courses of action in response to the Soviet activities in Cuba.246  
Below, Table 4-2 outlines the policy along with the Escalation Level associated with each of the 
seven points.  As seen in Table 4-2, Kennedy responded to the Escalation Level-3 actions of the 
Soviet placement of MRBMs on Cuba with an Escalation Level-4 activity through the initiation 
of the naval quarantine.  Kennedy, knowing any war with the Soviet Union would turn nuclear, 
did not hesitate to raise the Escalation Level, thereby decreasing strategic stability.  During 1962, 
no changes to nuclear capabilities occurred, making this a Type-II case, and as such there was no 
causal pathway between changes in nuclear capabilities and changes to strategic stabilities.  This 
does not mean that strategic stability change did not occur, it most certainly did.  Not significant 
enough to drive a change in the Soviet Union’s CRNC score, the missiles on Cuba did influence 
Kennedy’s actions as he built the United States’ response. 
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Table 4-2: United States Responses to 1962 Soviet MRBMs on Cuba247 
 
In reaction to Kennedy’s televised statement on 22 October, Khrushchev reiterated to 
Kennedy his earlier public proclamations that Soviet activity on Cuba was for defensive purposes.  
Furthermore, Khrushchev pushed back on the quarantine, specifically with a warning that any 
prohibition of movement through international waters would bring the potential for initiating a war 
that inevitably would turn nuclear between the two states.  “The Soviet Government considers that 
the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of 
aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.”248  With the 
establishment of the quarantine in waters off the coast of Cuba, both Kennedy and Khrushchev 
appeared ready to annihilate one another. 
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Sampson, vol. VI, FRUS 1961–1963 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996). 
United States Policy Associated    Escalation Level
Initiation of naval quarantine 4
Increased surveillance 1
Respond to any nuclear missile 
launch from Cuba as a Soviet 
attack against the United States
2
Evacuated dependents and 
reinforce US Naval base in 
Guantanamo Bay
3
Call for meetings under the 
Organization of American 
States
1
Call for a meeting of the United 
Nation's Security Council 1
Call for Khrushchev to 
immediately halt movement of 
MRBMs into Cuba
1
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On the morning of 27 October, the situation in Cuba reached a boiling point.  With the 
United States quarantine in place, sixteen Soviet military ships turned back to home ports, but a 
Soviet chartered ship under a Swedish flag had run through the quarantine line just the day before, 
docking in Havana.249  The actions of the Swedish-flagged ship made the United States question 
if Moscow knew where the quarantine line was or if they simply did not care.  Low-flying 
reconnaissance missions over Cuba gave a dire picture.  In San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande, 
five MRBM sites appeared to be operational, and the remaining sites not currently operational 
would be in short order.250  Returning reconnaissance pilots began reporting that Soviet military 
had taken control of the Cuban air defenses and a U-2 assigned to take pictures of the island had 
been reported missing after not returning to base as expected.251  
The CIA’s analysis of the situation stated that “to be able to bring things to a head in Berlin 
before the end of the year, Khrushchev had quickly to rectify the imbalance in strategic striking 
power.  By moving in an atmosphere of peaceful East–West relations, he hoped to establish a base 
inside the US warning network and present the US with a fait accompli.  He undoubtedly expects 
some vigorous response from Washington, but felt the establishment of the nuclear sites was worth 
the risk.”252  Having been discovered before the sites were complete and all the missiles in place, 
Khrushchev would be denied the master plan of forcing the United States to a reckoning over the 
Berlin issue.  However, because of the placement of Soviet missiles on Cuba, this period of time 
reached a high of Escalation Level-4 following the placement of the United States blockade.  This 
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raise in escalation level put the United States and the Soviet Union just one step away from 
complete termination of strategic stability and the initiation of war. 
4.2.3  Part 3: 29 October to 31 December 1962 
Looking to provide a statesman-like response to a boiling military problem, Kennedy 
turned to the missiles in Turkey as a potential solution to the problem of removing missiles from 
Cuba.253  From Kennedy’s perspective, it was advantageous for the United States to offer the 
Turkish missiles as a sacrifice for the removal of the Cuban missiles since the Soviets had a 50% 
gain in nuclear capability by placing their MRBMs off the coast of Florida while the United States 
gained nothing with the Turkish missiles. 
As depicted in Table 4-1, the Soviets had a small handful of missiles that could already 
reach the United States.  Khrushchev’s addition of the Cuba-based MRBMs dramatically increased 
the Soviet missile capability to reach the United States, but it still was not enough to bring both 
sides to CRNC equality.  Prior to their installation, the Turkish Jupiter missiles were already 
outdated, and the United States already had a comparatively dominant bomber and ICBM force 
that could accomplish the same task of delivering nuclear capabilities if the need ever presented 
itself.  In short, even with the MRBMs in Cuba and removal of the Turkish Jupiter missile 
squadrons, the United States still dominated with a much larger nuclear capability. 
Anxious to stop his brinkmanship activities before “unintended disaster” became a reality, 
on Sunday 28 October, Khrushchev, wanting the fastest mode of delivery, chose to air the 
following message to Kennedy over Radio Moscow:  “In order to complete with greater speed the 
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liquidation of the conflict dangerous to the cause of peace, to give confidence to all people longing 
for peace, and to calm the American people, who, I am certain, want peace as much as the people 
of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the 
cessation of further work at building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the 
dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive’, and their crating and return to the 
Soviet Union.”254  
Khrushchev’s words, politically allaying the crisis at that moment, were not enough to 
terminate Escalation Level-4 with the United States since the missiles remained located and 
potentially mission-capable on Cuba.  Beginning on 29 October, and in the weeks following 
Khrushchev’s public call to stand-down Soviet military operations in Cuba, the United States and 
the Soviet Union underwent continuous negotiations at the United Nations as a means of setting 
amenable bilateral terms of withdrawal from Cuba.  During negotiations and United Nations 
verification of nuclear-capability removal, Kennedy kept the naval quarantine in place.   
Highlighting the importance each side gave to ending the crisis, from 29 October to 20 
November, Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged eight communiques addressing the various issues 
associated with the withdrawal of Soviet military capabilities from Cuba.  Kennedy offered 
reassurances of non-invasion coupled with the removal of the missiles from Turkey.  Reciprocally, 
Kennedy wanted Khrushchev’s nuclear capabilities removed from the island.  The missiles were 
the easiest to send back to the Soviet Union, but the primary sticking point was the removal of the 
IL-28 bombers, which the Soviet Union attempted to classify as a defensive capability afforded to 
the Cuban government.   
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Following the Soviets’ agreement to remove the aircraft and the subsequent verification of 
departure, President Kennedy conducted a press conference on 20 November to announce his order 
to lift the quarantine of Cuba and return the requested 150,000 mobilized troops to ready reserve 
status.255  The Soviets gave in to the pressures put in place by Kennedy, and in doing so removed 
the missiles from Cuba, returning to a pre-crisis balance of power.  With the termination of the 
quarantine and troop demobilization, strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet 
Union returned to what it had been before the call-up of reservists in September, Escalation Level-
1 or full strategic stability. 
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1  Dependent variable 
Changes in strategic stability, occurring on three separate occasions during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, transpired for several reasons.  The first change in strategic stability happened 
during Part 1, prior to 16 October and before the United States found missiles on Cuba.  The United 
States and the Soviet Union began in 1962 at Escalation Level-1, a state of full strategic stability 
where no militarized conflict was active.  Elevating to Escalation Level 3 on 3 October, following 
Congressional approval for Kennedy to call-up 150,000 ready-reservists, strategic stability 
diminished closer to war.  This degradation of strategic stability was driven solely by the Soviet 
troop build-up in Cuba and was not connected to any change in the balance of nuclear capabilities 
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(real or perceived), breaking the purported tight bond between changes in nuclear capabilities and 
changes in strategic stability.   
Nuclear capabilities played a part in a separate Escalation-Level-3 event, serving as a 
bridge from Part 1 of the Crisis to Part 2.  The U-2 photography of mainland Cuba captured on 14 
October discovered the now famous nuclear-capable MRBMs.  Shortly after discovering the 
missiles, Kennedy and his National Security Council responded by executing an elevated alert 
status among the military.  This second Escalation-Level-3 incident, finding new nuclear-capable 
missiles on Cuba, reinforces for the first time the tight bond between changes in strategic stability 
and changes in nuclear capabilities.  Based upon these two Escalation-Level-3 incidents, changes 
to nuclear capabilities appear to be sufficient, but not necessary, to change strategic stability. 
 The second change to strategic stability, transitioning from Escalation Level-3 to 
Escalation Level-4, occurred during Part 2 of the Crisis on 22 October when Kennedy established 
the naval quarantine around Cuba.  Effectively a military blockade under a different name, the 
establishment of the quarantine instituted Escalation Level-4, further reducing the dyadic state 
strategic stability to a point just short of war and a complete absence of strategic stability.  Between 
Escalation Level-3, justified through the discovery of MRBMs on the island during Part 1 of the 
Crisis, and the movement to Escalation Level-4, no significant new information developed.   
Feeling justified in elevating the Escalation Level on 22 October in response to the crisis, 
Kennedy intended his actions to stop the inflow of troops and equipment into Cuba and force 
Khrushchev to the bargaining table.  Khrushchev’s tactic had been one of brinkmanship as a means 
of driving Kennedy’s capitulation based on the perceived overwhelming Soviet force and a 
redefinition of the status quo.  In return, Kennedy, in keeping with his mantra of gradual military 
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build-up and a flexible response, replied with a measured escalation in hopes of returning to the 
status quo.  History proves that Kennedy chose a better path. 
 The third and final change in strategic stability, a return to Escalation Level-1, did not occur 
until after 28 October, when most historians mark the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  President 
Kennedy required verification of the complete withdrawal of Soviet nuclear capabilities from Cuba 
before removing the quarantine.  Confirmation of the removal of all nuclear capabilities occurred 
on 20 November following verification received by the United States from the United Nations.  
Only following assurances from the United Nations that all Soviet nuclear capabilities had 
departed Cuba did Kennedy decommission the naval quarantine and terminate the call-up of the 
150,000 ready-reservists.256  Just as the discovery of Soviet military forces and subsequent nuclear 
capabilities on Cuba drove the initial movement to Escalation Level-3, decreasing strategic 
stability, the validation of their complete removal increased strategic stability while returning to 
Escalation Level-1. 
4.3.2  Causal mechanisms 
This section examines which factors connected changes in the balance of strategic stability 
with changes in the balance of nuclear capabilities throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis.  If changes 
in strategic stability were tightly bound to changes in nuclear capabilities, then at least one or more 
existing theories of strategic stability should supply an adequate explanation.  However, this is not 
the case.  Changes to strategic stability occurred three times during 1962, over the course of four 
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separate incidents.  The Cuban Missile Crisis was a Type-II case; variations in nuclear capabilities 
were not connected to changes in strategic stability using the capability–stability causal pathway.   
Cuban Missile Crisis: Part 1 
The first change in strategic stability on 3 October during the call-up of the ready-reservists, 
caused by what Kennedy perceived as a non-nuclear Soviet force build-up on Cuba, did not 
connect with any changes in nuclear capability that would have caused alarm to Kennedy.  The 
last change in CRNC score occurred in 1960 with an increase in favor of the United States; no 
historical documentation has connected Khrushchev’s deployment decision into Cuba to the 1960 
changes in the United States’ nuclear capabilities.  The first change in strategic stability during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be connected to changes in nuclear capabilities or any existing 
theories.   
Before 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union had at least a minimal 
complement of capabilities in each of the three legs of the nuclear triad.  Coupled with the Soviet 
doctrine of ‘first strike,’ the Soviet Union was already a formidable enemy before placing missiles 
on Cuba.  On 18 October, Secretary McNamara was asked how nuclear weapons in Cuba change 
the military equation with the USSR.  He responded with, “it is not a military problem that we’re 
facing.  It’s a political problem.  It’s a problem of holding the alliance together.  It’s a problem of 
properly conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves.  And the problem of holding the alliance 
together, the problem of conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves, the problem of dealing 
with our domestic public, all required action that, in my opinion, the shift in military balance does 
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not require.”257  Khrushchev’s motives were to drive a political message through the placement of 
missiles on Cuba, not to force each state into a nuclear war. 
Khrushchev had political incentives to change the status quo with the United States.  Before 
1962, there had been three attempts to expel the Western powers from Berlin, one under Stalin in 
1948, and two under Khrushchev in 1958 and 1961.  Each had failed and the Western states, under 
the leadership of the United States, remained in Berlin, surrounded by Soviet controlled German 
territory.  Placing nuclear missiles on Cuba, a different technique for forcing a fait accompli in 
Berlin, provided Khrushchev with the hopes of changing the status quo, dissolving the Potsdam 
Protocols, and expelling the Western alliance from Berlin. 
Cuban Missile Crisis: Part 2 
 The second change in strategic stability occurred on 22 October, when Kennedy initiated 
the naval quarantine in response to the missiles on Cuba.  This change was a further decrease in 
the dyadic state strategic stability, with the overall situation having transitioned from Escalation 
Level-3 to Level-4.  The new change brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the edge 
of war and the potential demise of strategic stability through the tight binding of change of strategic 
stability to a change in nuclear capabilities. 
 There had been no significant new information or new threats driving the change from 
Escalation Level-3 from Part 1 to Kennedy’s decision to institute the quarantine, driving Escalation 
Level-4 in Part 2.  What did change between 16 and 22 October was the strategy of the United 
States.  Leading up to the televised announcement on 22 October was almost a week of internal 
maturations between Kennedy and his staff over the proper course of action.  The Executive 
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Committee, also referred to as EXCOM, had broken into two camps by 18 October, representing 
‘hawks,’ those advocating for aggressive military action, and ‘doves,’ those looking for a peaceful 
or non-militarized response to the missile placements.  Kennedy, credited for taking a measured 
approach, worked between both camps to develop the quarantine as a response to Khrushchev’s 
actions on the island of Cuba.   
Cuban Missile Crisis: Part 3 
 The last change in strategic stability occurred on 20 November with Kennedy’s order to 
remove the naval blockade and cancel the call-up of the 150,000 ready-reservists.  Although 
historians generally designate 28 October as the last day of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy 
continued the mobilization of reservists and the quarantine until he obtained verification that all 
Soviet nuclear capabilities had been removed from Cuba.  Following the verified removal, 
Kennedy’s actions changed the Escalation Level from 4 to 1, enhancing strategic stability for the 
first time since the United States, suspicious of the Soviet military activity on Cuba over the 
summer of 1962, had called up the ready-reservists.  As a Type-II case and assessed along the 
capability–stability causal pathway, this third change in strategic stability reinforces the lack of 
requirements to obtain nuclear capability variations in order to drive changes in strategic stability. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is still the quintessential Cold War case involving nuclear 
capabilities and changes to strategic stability.  However, as a Type-II case, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis breaks the bond between variations in nuclear capabilities driving changes in strategic 
stability.  Table 4-3 below shows the Cuban Missile Crisis broken into three separate stages.  None 
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of the stages exhibited variations in nuclear capabilities while changes in strategic stability 
occurred. 
Table 4-3: Analysis Summary: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 
 
Could the actual or threatened use of nuclear capabilities explain strategic stability changes 
occurring at the same time?  As a Type-II case, the easy answer to this question is no, actual or 
threatened use of nuclear capabilities played no role in changes in strategic stability.  Strategic 
stability was already reduced prior to 16 October through Kennedy’s call-up of ready-reservists.  
As a Type-II case, strategic stability did not change due to variations in nuclear capabilities. There 
were, however, perceptions that a significant change was afoot.  This was the only instance in my 
research where perceptions, not quantifiable variations in nuclear capabilities, were the primary 
driver of changes in strategic stability.  In this case, Kennedy’s perceptions of Khrushchev’s 
actions on Cuba, not actual nuclear capability changes, spawned a change in strategic stability.  
 Can changes in strategic stability during the Cuban Missile Crisis be explained by causal 
mechanisms other than variations in nuclear capabilities?  Yes, as a Type-II case, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis exhibited changes in strategic stability over four instances outside of variations in 
the CRNC score.  The Cuban Missile Crisis did not show an unadulterated representation of the 
effects that changes in nuclear capabilities had on strategic stability.  When examining the four 
OBSERVED 
CHANGE CM
C 
- 1
/1
 to
 1
0/
15
CM
C 
- 1
0/
16
 to
 1
0/
28
CM
C 
- 1
0/
29
 to
 1
2/
31
Nuclear Capability N N N
Utility
Incentives
Strategic Stability Y Y Y
1962
 158 
incidents where strategic stability either did or potentially could have changed because of changes 
in nuclear capabilities, the first incident stands out as different from the others.  The first incident, 
occurring on 3 October, exhibited changing strategic stability when Kennedy signed the public 
law allowing him the ability to mobilize the 150,000 ready-reservists.  This act represented a shift 
from Escalation Level-1 to Level-3 as the troops mobilized, thereby reducing strategic stability.  
What made this strategic stability reduction unique was Kennedy’s willingness to walk closer to 
war with the Soviet Union independently of any known changes to nuclear capabilities.  Existing 
theories based on changes in nuclear capabilities cannot explain a change in strategic stability that 
does not originate from a change in nuclear capabilities. 
Outside the scope of this dissertation, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis presents two 
tangential areas for further research.  The first is whether the Soviet Union, specifically 
Khrushchev, intended to place the missiles on Cuba as a means of forcing a fait accompli in Berlin.  
Although presented in this chapter as the justification for the Soviet movements onto the island of 
Cuba, the evidence presented is circumstantial and potentially biased.  All the evidence used in 
this chapter comes from sources based in the United States, such as the intelligence community, 
the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, various members of 
EXCOM, and others.  The circumstantial evidence is overwhelming, but direct evidence from 
Khrushchev and the Soviet Union is lacking.  Understanding why the Soviet Union proceeded with 
such a bold move onto Cuba will provide a building block to identify state intentions during long-
duration great power conflicts. 
The second area for potential future research delves into a counterfactual examination of 
Kennedy’s institution of SIOP-63 and his nascent flexible response strategy. The question is as 
follows: Had President Kennedy kept Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine, would the 
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breaking of the quarantine line by the Soviet chartered ship on 26 October have caused an armed 
response leading to general war?  One of the goals of President Kennedy’s flexible response 
strategy was the avoidance of an immediate reaction to aggression with general war, especially 
since each side knew such an undertaking would have meant certain nuclear annihilation.  
However, Eisenhower’s strategy, on paper, was unforgiving and similar to Khrushchev’s, leaving 
little room for gradual escalation with hopes of negotiated de-escalation.  Comparing the actual 
events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a confirmed case where variations in nuclear capabilities 
influenced strategic stability, with its counterfactual, would allow for a stronger comparison of the 
merits each nuclear strategy offered. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis reflects the results found in the previous chapter; not all cases of 
dyadic state strategic stability changes were caused by variations in nuclear capabilities.  
Consistent with the findings from the last chapter, the historic tight bonding between changes in 
strategic stability and variations in nuclear capabilities requires relaxing to accommodate those 
instances where changes to strategic stability occurred outside of variations in nuclear capabilities.  
If this trend continues, as suspected, the cases in the following chapter will present the same 
conclusion regarding the necessity or sufficiency of nuclear capabilities in changes in strategic 
stability. 
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5.0 Post-Cuban Missile Crisis, 1963–1967 
The years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1963–1967, continued to see both American 
and Soviet military challenges to strategic stability.  This chapter examines changes to strategic 
stability in the dyadic state system immediately following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
causal mechanisms driving said changes.  The analysis in this chapter weighs three Type-I cases 
against five changes in nuclear capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union over 
five years as a means of continuing to investigate the causal connection between variations in 
nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stability.  Given the high number of variations in 
nuclear capabilities and the continued presence of strategic stability changes, this timeframe 
provides another data-rich opportunity to validate the capability–stability bond if one exists.  
Consistent with Chapters 3 and 4, the multiple causal mechanisms identified in each of the three 
cases contributed to this chapter’s analysis results, resulting in a continued reinforcement that 
nuclear capabilities are sometimes sufficient to cause changes in strategic stability but are not a 
necessary component.  
Unique to this chapter, only Type-I cases occurred between the United States and the Soviet 
Union between 1963 – 1967.  Significant political changes occurred in both the United States and 
the Soviet Union, underpinning each of this chapter’s cases while spawning a new period of 
increases in nuclear capability.  In the United States, the assassination of President Kennedy 
brought about the Johnson administration and a shift to the assured destruction policy, fueling 
nuclear capability growth.  Across the globe, Khrushchev was forced from power and replaced by 
Brezhnev, a military hawk who saw the expansion of nuclear capabilities as imperative to keep up 
with the United States.  In the midst of the political turmoil, the CRNC score increased for both 
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the United States and the Soviet Union during each of the five years examined in this chapter.  
Significantly, only three cases of strategic stability change occurred.  
The unshaded area on the right of Figure 5-1 supplies an overview of the events reported 
in this chapter while providing context over the entire timeframe covered by this dissertation.  
Significant to the unshaded area of Figure 5-1 is the graphical representation of each case showing 
a change in strategic stability coupled with each variation in CRNC score.  The CRNC changes 
that occurred without any associated changes in strategic stability emphasize the point that nuclear 
capabilities are sometimes sufficient to change strategic stability, but not necessary. 
Finally, under the leadership of Brezhnev, the Soviet Union obtained its first CRNC score 
change in 1967.  Throughout the entire timeframe, 1963–1967, the United States continued to 
dominate the Soviet Union with nuclear capability.  However, in comparison to the years 1957–
1962, the frequency of cases decreased while the rate of variation in nuclear capabilities increased.  
This divergence between cases and CRNC score changes drives a further wedge in the capability–
stability connection. 
Figure 5-1: Post-Cuban Missile Crisis in Context, 1963–1967 
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This chapter proceeds in three sections, which analyze three case studies that occurred 
between 1963 and 1967, immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Section 5.1, Nuclear 
capabilities, provides an overview of each state’s nuclear capabilities, growth that took place from 
the beginning of the timeframe to the end, and any significant changes in the CRNC score.  Section 
5.2, Case studies, provides details for each of the three cases, and process-traces the causal factors 
using existing theories of strategic stability.  Finally, Section 5.3, Analysis and Conclusion, 
provides a summarized overview of the findings, looking across all of the cases; the section also 
presents a summary table showing how each case’s data points classified against existing theories 
of strategic stability.  
5.1 Nuclear capabilities 
In the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union made two significant changes to how they approached the nuclear competition.  The first is 
that both states changed their nuclear policies to actively deter either side from making any moves 
that increased the risk of war.  The second is that each state significantly increased its strategic 
nuclear ICBM productions, yielding CRNC scores that climbed aggressively.  According to 
scholarship, during 1963–1967, each state’s assertive approach to nuclear policy and nuclear 
capability expansion should yield a change to strategic stability occurring each time variance in 
nuclear capabilities arises.  However, discussed later in this chapter, the promise of strategic 
instability as the result of nuclear capability variances never materialized.   
Table 5-1 below outlines the relative nuclear capabilities for the United States and the 
Soviet Union between 1963 and 1967.  As with Chapters 3 and 4, the score represented in Table 
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5-1 is a two-state comparative CRNC score based on relative values assigned to fielded nuclear 
payload capacities and strategic warheads.  During the six-year timeframe covered in Chapters 3 
and 4 (1957 – 1962), the CRNC score climbed twice, both times in favor of the United States and 
both by an increment of one.  In a shorter period, 1963–1967, over five years with each side 
aggressively addressing strategic ICBM production, the CRNC score climbed five times, four 
times in favor of the United States, and, for the first time, once for the Soviet Union in 1967. 
Table 5-1: US and USSR Nuclear Capabilities, 1962–1967258 
 
Nuclear capability growth in the United States between 1963 and 1967 outpaced that of the 
previous six years thanks to the policies ushered in by McNamara under the Johnson 
administration.  Defining his concept of assured destruction, McNamara used the 1963 budget 
process to begin shaping American capabilities to “destroy, after a well planned and executed 
Soviet surprise attack on our Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Soviet government and military 
controls, plus a large percentage of their population and economy.”259  Table 5-1 shows aggressive 
 
258 Podvig and Bukharin, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces; Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic 
Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996. 
259 “Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson; Document 151, 6 December 
1963.,” 7. 
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nuclear capability growth for the United States during 1963–1967, including ICBM payload 
development from 597 in 1963 to 1,054 in 1967, and an increase in SLBM payload capacity from 
160 in 1963 to 1,552 in 1967.  The dramatic growth experienced by the United States in such a 
short period across ICBMs and SLBMs yielded two increases in CRNC score, both instances 
adding two points each.  According to available scholarship, each instance of CRNC score change 
in 1964 and 1966 should have yielded changes in strategic stability.  The reality is, however, that 
the 1966 CRNC score change went unanswered and did not have any associated changes in 
strategic stability. 
 The Soviet Union during the same 1963–1967 timeframe was just as aggressive in 
expanding its nuclear capability growth under the new direction of Brezhnev as the Americans had 
been under Johnson.  The policies put in place under Brezhnev, focusing heavily on ICBM growth, 
initiated in the mid-1960s and carried the Soviet nuclear capability expansion well into the 
1980s.260  The Soviet ICBM payload capacity growth was nothing short of impressive, increasing 
from 94 in 1963 to 820 in 1967.  Over the five years considered, the Americans’ 177% growth in 
ICBM payload capacity paled in comparison to the Soviets’ 854% growth.  Soviet nuclear 
capability growth during this timeframe also yielded the first increase in the Soviet CRNC score, 
increasing by two points in 1967.  Under the leadership of Brezhnev, the Soviets put their full 
effort behind ICBM production in ways that Khrushchev never had and, in the process, started a 
path of growth that outpaced American efforts. 
 
260 Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev, 60. 
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5.1.1  Congruence Testing 
Here, as in Chapters 3 and 4, congruence testing compared the details of each case against 
the hypothesis to determine if a state’s nuclear capabilities were sometimes sufficient to cause 
changes in strategic stability but not a necessary component.261  With three changes in the CRNC 
score, the 1963–1967 timeframe covered in this chapter should be fertile ground for DV changes 
caused by variations in the IV.  However, this was not the case.  With only three incidents of 
strategic stability change occurring during this timeframe and five variations in nuclear 
capabilities, it became quickly evident that not all variations in nuclear capabilities drove changes 
in strategic stability.  
In 1963, 1965, and 1966, the CRNC score changed with no associated cases of change in 
strategic stability.  The changing of CRNC scores without associated cases showing changes in 
strategic stability, was possibly due, in part, to the states’ progression toward MAD throughout the 
1960s, which reinforces the breaking of the capability–stability bond; although nuclear capability 
variations are sometime sufficient to change strategic stability, they are not necessary.  With the 
highest number of nuclear capability changes and least number of cases showing change in 
strategic stability, the data presented in this chapter did not support tight causality between changes 
in strategic stability driven by changes in nuclear capabilities. 
 
261 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 181–204. 
 166 
Table 5-2: Congruence Testing Case Stratification: 1963–1967 
 
Using congruence testing against the three cases of strategic stability change during 1963–
1967, Table 5-2 shows that all three cases passed and were labeled as Type-I cases.  Used in the 
previous chapters, Type-I represents those cases where strategic stability occurred at the same time 
as nuclear capability variance, whereas Type-II cases are those where strategic stability changed 
but not at the same time as a variation in nuclear capability.  No cases of strategic stability change 
occurred during the same timeframe that met the criteria as a Type-II case.  Furthermore, the Israeli 
Six-Day War case, occurring in 1967, represents the first case to match to the first Soviet CRNC 
score change without an associated change in the United States’ CRNC score.  The following 
section, organizing the cases according to their congruence testing typology, uses process tracing 
to examine each case to either confirm or deny the existence of the causal relationships suggested 
by the congruence testing results. 
5.2 Case studies 
In the years immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis (1963–1967), three additional 
cases of change in strategic stability occurred.262  Typological classifications resulting from 
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congruence testing between 1963 and 1967 determined all three cases were Type-I, each occurring 
at a time when changes in nuclear capabilities ensued.  Similar to the previous analytical chapters, 
this section accomplishes three tasks: it presents historical data on each of the three cases of 
conflict, applies data from each case to process tracing, and finally conducts an in-case analysis.   
The three cases presented in this section yielded twelve data points representing nine 
changes in strategic stability.  Analysis of this data revealed two results.  First, none of the twelve 
changes in strategic stability were tracible to variations in nuclear capabilities; all changes have 
explanations that are non-nuclear in nature.  Second, during this timeframe, nuclear variations 
occurred on three separate occasions: in 1964, 1966, and 1967, whereas changes in strategic 
stability only occurred in 1964 and 1967.  Furthermore, 1963, 1965, and 1966 were years of 
variation in nuclear capability without any associated changes in strategic stability.  These three 
years alone break the causal pathway by having variations in nuclear capabilities occur without 
any follow-on strategic stability change. 
Data analysis from this chapter revealed consistency with that reported in Chapters 3 and 
4.  Analysis of all three Type-I cases could not tie variances in nuclear capabilities with strategic 
stability change data points.  Overwhelmingly, this chapter casts doubts on the existence of the 
tight bond between strategic stability and nuclear capabilities.” 
 
manifested in interstate war.  As previously outlined, thresholds defining each of the Escalation Levels are based on 
a ranking from 1, full strategic stability, to 5, he complete absence of strategic stability or interstate war.:  Kahn, On 
Escalation; Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict”; Maoz et al., “The Dyadic Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0.” 
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5.2.1  Type-I Cases  
5.2.1.1 1964: T-39 and RB-66 border incursions 
Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, a little over a year passed with no departure from 
Escalation Level-1 in the dyadic state system.  Just as normalization settled in, however, issues 
surrounding tensions in East Germany began heating up.  Over three months, the Soviet military 
took part in two separate acts of aggression against United States military planes, yielding three 
total service member deaths and three prisoner exchanges.  By 1964, the Soviet government had 
communicated through their actions that they were willing to continue activities that could 
potentially draw each state closer to Escalation Level-5 and a complete lapse in strategic stability. 
During the final week of January 1964, Soviet forces in East Germany shot down an 
American T-39 Sabreliner training jet in East-German airspace.263  During the flight, the T-39 
aircraft drifted inside East-German airspace, drawing the attention of Soviet air defense forces.  
Immediately upon identifying the foreign aircraft, Soviet military forces launched fighters and shot 
down the errant training jet outside of Vogelsberg.  Soviet officials instantly took the opportunity 
to label the flight hostile because it was a military aircraft that had crossed into East-German 
airspace and demanded the United States apologize for the overt border incursion by militarized 
forces.  In response, the United States admitted to only an errant navigation error and publicly 
lambasted the willingness of the Soviet government to drive escalation levels higher 
haphazardly.264  By 30 January, the United States was able to gain access to the wreckage and 
 
263 Jack Raymond, “U.S. Says Soviet Shot Down Jet,” New York Times (1923-Current File), January 30, 1964. 
264 Ibid 
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recover the downed service members bodies, bringing this episode to a rapid conclusion and return 
to Escalation Level-1. 
Just over a month after the January 1964 incident, on 10 March, another aircraft shootdown 
threatened the strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.  In this second 
incident, a United States RB-66 photoreconnaissance aircraft set out to fly an operational mission 
along the inter-German border when equipment malfunctions caused it to drift into East 
Germany.265  After identifying the suspect aircraft, Soviet fighters launched and immediately 
began the process to bring it down through force.  Knowing the aircraft was about to be shot out 
of the sky, all three crewmembers ejected safely and were captured once they hit the ground.  Held 
prisoner for 17 days, the crew’s release only occurred after direct negotiations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States.266  As with the January incident, the Escalation Level between the 
United States and the Soviet Union returned to Escalation Level-1 following the release of the 
imprisoned aircrew. 
Nuclear capabilities 
 Leading up to 1964, the CRNC score increased for the United States during a period of 
significant growth in missile platforms.  Noteworthy for the size of growth that occurred, the 1964 
growth represented the first time that substantial progress in nuclear capabilities led to a score 
 
265 At the same time the RB-66 flew through the area, the Soviet military began demonstrating simulated nuclear 
attacks for high-level leadership.  Based on documentation available, crossing the border was not intentional, and 
nothing explicitly links the RB-66 mission to the Soviet nuclear exercise.  However, references in Peterson's work 
regarding this incident insinuate that the border incursion was an intentional aspect of this mission.  Since Peterson's 
information is presented as undocumented conjecture, this incident is classified as an unintentional elevation of the 
Escalation Level.  Peterson, “Maybe You Had to Be There: The SIGNIT on Thirteen Soviet Shootdowns of US 
Reconnaissance Aircraft”; Marcelle Size Knaack, Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: 
1945 - 1973, vol. Volume II, Reference Series (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force, Office of Air Force 
History, 1988), 429–30. 
266 Arthur J. Olsen, “Soviet Returns 2 Downed Airmen,” New York Times (1923-Current File), March 28, 1964, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 
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increase of 2 for either state.  Data presented in Table 5-1 show that the United States, from 1963 
to 1964, made significant increases in the number of fielded strategic nuclear missiles.  Starting 
with an ICBM payload capacity of 597 in 1963, just one year later the United States added 310, 
yielding a total payload capacity of 907 in 1964.  This pattern repeated itself with the payload 
capacity of SLBMs, starting with 160 in 1963, then 224 were added to bring the 1964 payload 
capacity of SLBMs to 384.  On a much smaller scale, even the bomber capability increased 
between 1963 and 1964.  Beginning with a payload capacity of 2,855 in 1963 and ending with 
2,953 in 1964, bombers had 98 payload capacity slots added during this timeframe.  Taking all 
three components of the nuclear triad together, the United States expanded its payload capacity by 
632 during 1963–1964, justifying the significant jump in the CRNC score and Type-I designation 
for both shootdown cases. 
 Show in Table 5-1, to a smaller degree than the United States’ nuclear capability growth, 
the Soviets increased ICBM and bomber assets along with an associated increase of one in the 
their CRNC score in 1964.  The Soviet ICBM payload capacity started at 96 in 1963 and grew by 
97 in just one year to 193 in 1964.  During the same timeframe, bomber payload capacity only 
increased by four.  Although this ICBM payload capacity growth was small in comparison to the 
United States, it is notable for the Soviets as the first of many high production years, where the 
increase in nuclear capability grew from the previous year. 
Strategic stability 
Undoubtedly, the strategic stability changed with both 1964 shootdowns.  Examination of 
the case details showed that not only did the strategic stability change multiple times, but the 
changes followed the same pattern as the 1958 shootdowns of the DC-6 and C-130 as well as the 
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1960 U-2 shootdown.267  Consistent with the previous shootdown cases, the details of both the T-
39 and RB-66 shootdowns followed the same pattern of heightened Escalation Levels driven by 
nonhostile United States border incursions prompting Soviet militarized responses.  Resumption 
of full strategic stability occurred in all cases following a period of political negotiations or public 
apologies.  In all the shootdown cases presented in this dissertation, especially the T-39 and RB-
66 cases outlined in this chapter, the actions of the United States, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, drew hostile fire from the Soviet military resulting in a momentary decline in 
strategic stability. 
The first change in strategic stability for both the T-39 and RB-66 cases was the United 
States’ unintentional border incursion into East-German territory.  The crossing of the border, 
constituting an Escalation Level-4 event, drew an immediate identification of the intruders by 
Soviet forces and launching of a Soviet militarized response.  Spawning a second Escalation Level-
4 event, the Soviet militarized response in both cases involved shooting down the aircraft.  The 
United States’ actions of border incursion acted as the causal node, yielding an armed Soviet 
militarized response. 
 Finally, following the two Escalation Level-4 events, a return to Escalation Level-1 
occurred following the intervention of diplomacy for the return of either the remains of the service 
members, as in the T-39 case, or the return of the living RB-66 aircrew.  In both cases, tensions 
melted between the United States and the Soviet Union, resulting in the reinstatement of full 
strategic stability. 
Case Analysis 
 
267 See Chapter 3 for details on each of these cases 
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 The 1964 shootdowns of the T-39 and RB-66 followed the precedent established during 
similar type cases that occurred in 1958 and 1960.  The pattern begins with peaceful strategic 
stability broken during a border incursion by aircraft from the United States.  This Escalation 
Level-4 event drew a militarized Soviet response, and then a second Escalation Level-4 event, 
resulting in a shootdown.  Restoration of full strategic stability, Escalation Level-1, followed a 
brief period of heightened tensions at Escalation Level-4, and then state-level diplomacy occurred, 
resulting in a transfer of casualties or prisoners. 
Was a causal mechanism from an indicator of strategic stability identified?  Nuclear 
capabilities in 1964 increased for the United States, triggering the significant capability gap 
between the two states to grow even larger, placing the Soviets further behind.  This significant 
shift in nuclear capabilities, if theories are correct, should have been part of the causal pathway 
leading to a change in strategic stability.  However, examining both the T-39 and RB-66 
shootdown cases, no causal mechanisms for any of the indicators of strategic stability match either 
case.  Both cases are credited to unintentional aircrew errors causing Soviet and East-German 
troops to perceive American military aircraft as hostile in nature, and the errant turns that brought 
the aircraft into East-German airspace and the resulting shootdowns.268  The T-39 and RB-66 
shootdowns differed from the Type-I 1960 U-2 shootdown in that no connections to nuclear 
capabilities were clear.  Classification for both cases was non-nuclear, based on evidence 
suggesting errant aircrew actions.  
 
268 Peterson, “Maybe You Had to Be There: The SIGNIT on Thirteen Soviet Shootdowns of US Reconnaissance 
Aircraft,” 37. 
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5.2.1.2 1967: Israeli Six-Day War 
Whereas the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union led to multiple 
exchanges of direct hostilities, the states’ interactions during the 1967 Israeli Six-Day War started 
indirectly.  Nestled firmly amid unfriendly neighboring states, Israel found itself in the summer of 
1967 preparing for an offensive operation on two fronts.  Backed loosely by the United States, 
Israel was preparing for a confrontation in the south with Soviet-backed Egypt, and to the north 
with Syria and Jordan.   
Beginning in 1950, Egypt closed access to the Straits of Tiran, provoking Israel in 1956 
into an attack on the Sinai Peninsula.  In return for renewed access to the straits, Israel agreed to 
withdraw from the Sinai and a tenuous peace ensued.  Eleven years later, in May 1967, Egypt 
announced a new closure to the Straits of Tiran, compelling Israel to respond similarly to the way 
it had done in 1956.   
On 23 May 1967, upon indications of heightened tensions in the Middle East, the United 
States dispatched the USS Liberty, an electronics intelligence gathering ship, to observe any 
potential conflict by taking up watch in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Israel.269  Moscow, 
seeing both the interest from the United States and the actions of Israel, began a public campaign 
to lay the blame for any hostilities on the shoulders of Jerusalem.270  Before the USS Liberty’s 
arrival on station during the morning of 5 June 1967, Israel began successful and devastating 
military operations both on the Sinai Peninsula against Egyptian forces and in the north against 
Syrian and Jordanian troop emplacements near the Golan Heights.  Using the established ‘hotline’ 
 
269 Schnabel, Watson, Condit, and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:175. 
270 Peter Grose, “Moscow Blames Israelis in Crisis,” New York Times (1923-Current File), May 24, 1967, 
117434258, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times with Index. 
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between Washington, DC and Moscow, President Johnson began direct communications with 
Soviet Chairman Kosygin as a means of reducing potential miscommunications regarding each 
superpower’s actions in the region.271   
On the morning of 8 June 1967, the USS Liberty arrived in the Mediterranean Sea, setting 
anchor 15 miles off the coast of Israel.  Israel commenced attacks on the USS Liberty in the early 
afternoon with fighter jet strafing runs followed up by multiple torpedo boat attacks.  The Israeli 
government, amid confusion and fog of war on land, claimed to have mistaken the USS Liberty 
for an Egyptian naval vessel of war.   
Israel’s mistake cost the United States the lives of 34 sailors and wounded another 171.  
Johnson used the hotline to Moscow following the attack to inform Kosygin that the United States 
was redirecting the Sixth Fleet to the region in order to establish control.  The Soviet Union, 
reacting to the movement of the United States’ Sixth Fleet, proceeded with a movement toward 
Escalation Level-2 by threatening direct involvement in the region on 10 June 1967.  The Soviet 
threat to interject themselves in the Mediterranean drove the Chairman of the JCS, General Earle 
Wheeler, to consider an additional increase to Escalation Level-3 by composing orders directing 
the United States airborne nuclear forces under Strategic Air Command (SAC) to initiate an 
airborne alert posture.272  Simultaneously to both the actions of the Soviets and General Wheeler, 
the Israelis independently initiated a ceasefire with the Egyptians.  Upon consultation with the 
 
271 The “Hotline” was established in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In June 1963, Khrushchev and Kennedy 
instituted a hotline, or direct line of communications, between the White House and the Kremlin as a means of 
decreasing tensions during times of crisis, cutting time when each needed to communicate with the other.:  
Khrushchev, “Chapter 10: The Military-Industrial Complex, 1953-1964.” 
272 Schnabel, Watson, Condit, and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:175. 
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Service Chiefs, Wheeler never executed the SAC alert and, with Israel’s ceasefire in place, the 
Escalation Level between the Soviet Union and the United States returned to Level-1. 
Nuclear capabilities 
 Data presented in Table 5-1 highlights the 1967 Israeli Six-day War as the very first time 
the Soviets increased their CRNC score while the Americans, with a CRNC score almost three 
times greater, remained the same from the year prior.  The United States made only a minimal 
ICBM growth from 1966 to 1967 as the payload capacity of the weapon system increased by only 
50.  Furthermore, the SLBM payload capacity for the United States during this same timeframe 
increased notably to 1,552 from 1,264 in 1966, an increase of 288.  Finally, American bombers 
increased their payload capacity by 149 from the year prior, totaling 3,192 in 1967. 
 Payload capacity and strategic nuclear warheads for the Soviets finally increased enough 
to push the CRNC score higher by two, the first time this had occurred since 1957.  Prior to this 
point, the Soviets had not been able to sufficiently increase manufacturing to add nuclear 
capability, resulting in a CRNC score increase.  The increase in Soviet capability was not enough 
to bring parity with the United States, as the Soviets lagged by seven CRNC score points, 
signifying continued American supremacy. 
Strategic stability 
The 1967 Six-Day War has become known as a war fought through proxies, with the 
United States aligning itself with Israel while the Soviet Union supported Egypt.273  Making this 
particular conflict unique is the indirect nature in which the United States and the Soviet Union 
 
273 The Soviet Union, in addition to being political allies to Egypt, prior to the 1967 Six-Day War, also provided 
Egypt with military hardware.:  Asaf Siniver, ed., The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 2; Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, and Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the 
October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente, Monographs in International Affairs (Coral Gables, 
Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), 30. 
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interacted with one another.  The United States, following the bombing of the USS Liberty, was 
already in the midst of a complex international crisis with Israel but faced greater complications 
following the interjection of the Soviet Union as it interjected with the idea it was going to bring 
stability to the chaotic events in Israel. 
Strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union, resulting from the 
forced involvement of the Soviet military, changed three times.  The first change to strategic 
stability occurred on 10 June 1967 when the Soviets threatened involvement in the region after 
learning the Americans were sending the USS Liberty to observe the situation from the 
Mediterranean Sea.  Had the Soviets become involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict, the United 
States would have come in on the side of the Israelis.  The Soviet threat of bringing instability to 
the region, insinuating a militarized response, translated to an Escalation Level-2 event. 
The second change to strategic stability, a shift to Escalation Level-3, occurred without the 
knowledge of the Soviet military.  General Wheeler began the process of generating SAC forces 
in preparation for conflict with the Soviets while also providing orders to his staff for the initial 
phases of battle preparation.274  Although all the actions directed by Wheeler were put into motion, 
justifying an Escalation Level-3 designation, almost everything stayed internal.  Two hours after 
initiating the planning process for conflict with the Soviet Union, the Israelis started a ceasefire.  
The cessation of hostilities by the Israelis against the Egyptians brought the conflict to a close, 
defusing the American–Soviet tensions and returning strategic stability to Escalation Level-1. 
 
 
 
274 Schnabel, Watson, Condit, and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:175. 
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Case Analysis 
Analysis of the 1967 Six-Day War reveals that nuclear capability variations did not play a 
part in changing strategic stability.  The first change in the Escalation Level was brought about by 
the Soviets threatening to interject militarily in the Arab–Israeli conflict.  The second Escalation 
Level change occurred as the Americans prepared for war, and the third was a return to full 
strategic stability following the Israeli move to a ceasefire.  All three Escalation Level changes can 
be explained through means other than variations of nuclear capabilities. 
Did any indicator of strategic stability predict the outcome of the cases?  Three changes to 
strategic stability occurred, but none could be tied back to variations in nuclear capabilities or the 
indicators of strategic stability causal mechanisms.  Without any connection to the causal 
mechanisms, none of the indicators of strategic stability predicted the outcome of the cases. 
The 1967 Israeli Six-Day War marks the first time a change in strategic stability occurred 
when variations of Soviet nuclear capabilities outpaced those of the United States.  Facts and 
analysis from the war revealed no connection between variations in Soviet nuclear capabilities, 
represented through the CRNC score increase, and the three changes to strategic stability.  Since 
the causal mechanisms for this case do not align with nuclear capability variances, the non-nuclear 
column provides the best explanation for each change in strategic stability. 
5.3  Conclusion 
During the 1963–1967 timeframe, variations in nuclear capabilities did not change strategic 
stability.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union aggressively expanded their nuclear 
capabilities, resulting in five CRNC changes. If variations in nuclear capabilities drive changes in 
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strategic stability, this would have been an easy period in which to prove the connection exists.  
The cases presented in this chapter did not support the capability–stability connection.  Across all 
three cases, nine changes to strategic stability occurred, but none were credited to changes in 
nuclear capabilities.  Below, Table 5-3 shows each of the three cases presented in this chapter 
according to the results from congruence testing and evaluated against accepted theories of 
strategic stability.   
Table 5-3: Analysis Summary: Post-Cuban Missile Crisis, 1963–1967 
 
Consistent with Chapters 3 and 4, an examination of each case resulted in the discovery of 
multiple changes in strategic stability under the guise of a single case.  Also consistent with 
previous chapters, some changes in strategic stability occurred laterally.  Lateral strategic stability 
changes resulted from a second event occurring during a case yielding an equal Escalation Level 
from the preceding one. 
5.3.1  Hypothesis Comparison 
Hypothesis 1 stated that actual or threatened use of nuclear capabilities explain strategic 
stability changes occurring at the same time.  All three Type-I cases were not attributable to either 
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a threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons and therefore this hypothesis was invalid.  The 1964 
shootdown causes were navigational errors, not anything closely related with actual or threatened 
use of nuclear capabilities.  Likewise, the 1967 Six-Day War was caused by a disagreement 
between Israel and Egypt where the United States and the Soviet Union were only tangentially 
involved.  The 1967 returned to Escalation Level-1 followed the movement toward peace made by 
the Israelis and before the Soviet Union could become involved militarily.  Of all nine changes to 
strategic stability during 1963–1967, none were associated with actual or threatened use of nuclear 
capabilities. 
 Can strategic stability be explained through the perceived or actual incentives received by 
the state and occurring at the same time?  In the cases covered between 1963 and 1967, no changes 
in strategic stability could be attributed to perceived or actual incentives received by the state 
causing variations in nuclear capabilities.  None of the actors in the three case studies outlined in 
this chapter used nuclear capabilities, or changes in nuclear capabilities, to justify changes in 
strategic stability.   
 Can changes in strategic stability between 1963 and 1967 be explained by causal 
mechanisms other than variations in nuclear capabilities?  In none of the three cases outlined in 
the chapter do variations in nuclear capabilities connect to changes in strategic stability through 
the causal mechanisms hypothesized by scholars who have asserted such a connection.  Process-
tracing the 1964 shootdown cases highlighted errant navigation issues as the causal mechanism 
that resulted in immediate elevation to Escalation Level-4 when the United States’ aircraft was 
shot down over East Germany.  During the Six-Day War, the Soviet threat of direct involvement 
following the commitment of the United States’ Sixth Fleet coupled with American General 
Wheeler’s generation of SAC personnel and equipment both increased the Escalation Level while 
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simultaneously decreasing strategic stability.  The changes to strategic stability were not caused 
by variations in nuclear capabilities by either the United States or the Soviet Union, but rather by 
a host of non-nuclear activities.  
Finally, the cases in this chapter and the subsequent analysis spawn three questions for 
future research.  The first is whether by 1967 a normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons 
had developed.  The lack of nuclear-weapon use in the midst of episodes of strategic instability 
prior to 1967 feeds into Nina Tannenwald’s nuclear taboo theory.275  Implied in this question is 
that consistent and multiple conflicts occurred within the dyadic state system between 1957 and 
1967, although no conflicts spawned the use of nuclear weapons, despite proliferation and 
availability.   
The second question is whether nuclear weapons still hold a preeminent and unique status 
among policymakers today.276  Contemporary news headlines questioning the need for a 
functioning nuclear triad, or the price tag of modernization in the face of peer competitors, call 
into question the importance that nuclear capabilities have today. 
The third and final question is whether the nuclear taboo, if it does exist, translates to new 
weapons of technological mass destruction.277   The CRNC score for both the United States and 
the Soviet Union changed each year, five times, during this chapter’s timeframe, but only nine 
changes in strategic stability occurred across three cases in two years.  As a relatively new 
technological weapon, neither state was willing to use the massive destruction power of its nuclear 
arsenal. 
 
275 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” 
International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433–68. 
276 Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, Appendix A. 
277 Gartzke and Lindsay, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar.” 
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6.0 Conclusion 
This dissertation questions existing scholarly assumptions that variations in nuclear 
capabilities cause changes in strategic stability.  Challenging the tight capability–stability 
coupling, this research used qualitative case study methods to examine the highly volatile dyadic 
nuclear state interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1957 to 1967, a 
period when confrontation between the nuclear powers was most likely.  This chapter offers a 
summary of the findings previously outlined across the ten cases examined in Chapters 3 through 
5, representing twenty-nine individual changes to strategic stability. 
 At the core of this dissertation is the following question: Are variations in nuclear 
capabilities both necessary and sufficient to drive changes in strategic stability?  To examine the 
capability–stability connection, this dissertation used a two-step qualitative case analysis process.  
The first step identified periods of variations in nuclear capabilities on either side of the dyadic 
state complex.  Process-tracing techniques were used as a means of identifying causal mechanisms 
during instances of strategic stability change identified as occurring concurrently with periods of 
nuclear capability variations.  Analysis of the research conducted found that only three out of 
twenty-nine instances of strategic stability change were attributable to variations in nuclear 
capabilities. 
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6.1 Findings 
This section critically summarizes the causal chain from nuclear capability variations to 
strategic stability change.  Figure 6-1 describes the capability–stability causal chain implicit in 
existing scholarship.  The causal chain begins with variations in nuclear capabilities, a numerically 
represented summation of strategic nuclear warheads and launch vehicle payload capacity.  For 
those cases with calculated nuclear capability changes, the causal chain moves onto changes in 
utility.  The utility component describes the possible usage state leaders leverage on nuclear 
capabilities, represented either offensively through brinkmanship or defensively through 
deterrence.  For states showing changes in utility, the next step in the causal chain measures 
changes in incentives for those states.  The incentives encompass both political stability and crisis 
stability.  State leaders pursuing incentives cause changes in strategic stability.  The escalatory 
actions taken by one or both states as they moved to or from war affords a tool of measurement of 
changes to strategic stability, originating from variations in nuclear capabilities. 
If the causal chain developed from strategic stability research is accurate, instances of 
change in strategic stability would start at variations in nuclear capabilities.  Next, instances of 
strategic stability change would continue to decrease as determinations of changes in utility occur.  
Finally, a further decrease in instances of strategic stability change would occur as deviations in 
incentives are determined.  After conducting each of the first three stages of this causal chain, only 
cases showing variations in nuclear capabilities driving changes in strategic stability would remain. 
Figure 6-1: Capability–Stability Causal Chain 
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Using the analysis found in Chapters 3 through 5, case details were applied to the causal 
chain, determining how many cases had a connection between variations in nuclear capabilities 
driving changes in strategic stability.  The results from this analysis revealed that only two Type-
I cases met all phases of the causal chain.  However, all seven Type-I cases and all three Type-II 
cases had changes in strategic stability, regardless of variations in nuclear capabilities. 
Nuclear capability variations occurred often during the 1950s and 60s.  Table 6-1 below 
contains data showing CRNC scores from 1957 to 1967; numbers annotated with (*) denote 
instances where the state CRNC score changed from the year prior.  The years 1964 and 1965 
appear to be unique in so far as the CRNC for both the United States and the Soviet Union increased 
at the same time.  However, during 1964, the United States CRNC score change of +2 was 
proportionately greater than the USSR’s CRNC change of +1.  The eleven years represented in 
Table 6-1 yielded only four years where no change in strategic stability occurred and seven where 
a measurable change could be observed.  Had existing assumptions been correct in tightly binding 
changes in nuclear capabilities with changes in strategic stability, every year where nuclear 
capabilities changed, a corresponding change in strategic stability should have also occurred.  This 
assumption did not hold true in 1963, 1965, and 1966 when variations in nuclear capability 
occurred without any corresponding changes in strategic stability.  Furthermore, in 1957, 1961, 
and 1962, changes in strategic stability occurred without any corresponding variations in nuclear 
capabilities. 
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Table 6-1: US vs. USSR Nuclear Capability Score Comparison 
 
The analysis conducted over the course of this dissertation revealed that variations in 
nuclear capabilities were never necessary and only sometimes sufficient to drive changes in 
strategic stability.  The results from my research run contrary to those of existing scholarship that 
have held that variations in nuclear capabilities are both necessary and sufficient for changes in 
strategic stability.  The point where my research diverged from existing scholarship on this topic 
was found in the number of years where either variations in nuclear capabilities occurred without 
any corresponding changes in strategic stability, or where strategic stability changes occurred 
without any prodding from varying nuclear capabilities.  The fact that changes in nuclear 
capabilities were only sometimes sufficient to cause, and explain, changes in strategic stability 
suggested that any relationship between the variables was quite weak indeed. 
Nuclear capability variations 
 Not all years with changes in nuclear capabilities had corresponding changes in strategic 
stability.  Three years, 1963, 1965, and 1966, all had variations in nuclear capability occur but did 
not have corresponding changes in strategic stability.  Moreover, years when nuclear capabilities 
did not vary, changes in strategic stability still occurred.  Over the course of 1957, 1961, and 1962, 
United States Soviet Union
9 1957 2
10* 1958 2
10 1959 2
12* 1960 2
12 1961 2
12 1962 2
14* 1963 2
16* 1964 3*
17* 1965 4*
20* 1966 4
20 1967 6*
* Denotes state changing nuclear capability
 185 
nuclear capabilities did not have any measurable variations, yet changes in strategic stability still 
occurred.  
 Validating the capability–stability connection prevalent in available scholarship resulted in 
congruence testing being applied to all examined cases between 1957 and 1967.  According to 
modern research, each of the ten cases researched for this dissertation should be classified as Type-
I, superficially representing a connection between capability and stability.  However, this was not 
the case.  Three cases that occurred in 1957, 1961, and 1962 had to be designated as Type-II 
following analysis showing the lack of ability to anchor changes in strategic stability to variations 
in nuclear capabilities.  Only the seven Type-I cases continued onto process-tracing analysis as a 
means of seeking a capability–stability connection.  The congruence testing allowed for the first 
cut to be made among all ten cases and provided the first indication that nuclear capability 
variations were not necessary and only sometimes sufficient to change strategic stability. 
Utility changes 
 Changes in utility refer to how states with varied nuclear capabilities had the ability to drive 
changes in strategic stability.  Specifically, scholarship points to varied nuclear capabilities 
manifesting in a states’ ability to change strategic stability through two distinct avenues: 
brinkmanship and deterrence.  States wanting to use varied nuclear capabilities as a means of 
changing the status quo, through capitulation while instilling a mutual risk of war, will engage in 
brinkmanship.278  Likewise, states looking to use varied nuclear capabilities as a means of 
maintaining the status quo through dissuasion rely on deterrence.279   
 
278 Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve”; Schelling, Arms and Influence; Powell, “Nuclear 
Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power”; Kahn, “Escalation as a Strategy”; Williams, Crisis Management. 
279 Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror”; Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century; Mazarr, 
“Perspective: Understanding Deterrence”; Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” 19. 
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Of the seven Type-I cases analyzed in this dissertation, only two represented actual changes 
in utility, which then led to confirmed cases where strategic stability change could be traced back 
to a nuclear capability variation.  In both cases, changes occurred when either deterrence or 
brinkmanship drove changes in the incentives to use nuclear means.  The result was a change in 
strategic stability. 
 The 1958 Berlin I case exemplifies brinkmanship resulting from changes in the United 
States’ nuclear capabilities.  During 1958, the United States had a quantified increase in nuclear 
capabilities, driving a CRNC change of +1, while the Soviet Union did not change at all.  
Additionally, beginning in 1957, Secretary of State Dulles began pushing to enact with NATO 
allies Eisenhower’s policy of placing nuclear-capable missiles in Europe, which contributed to 
Khrushchev’s decision to shut down access to Berlin and means of attempting to push the Western 
states out of the city.280  In response to the shutting down of Berlin, Eisenhower began a public 
campaign of pushing back on Khrushchev to the point of threatening war.  Out of view from the 
public, Eisenhower continued his threats of war by approving a war plan focused solely at dealing 
with the Soviet Union’s closure of Berlin.281   
The brinkmanship that ensued after the Soviets cut off American and Allied access to 
Berlin increased the potential for war, which would have turned nuclear.  In the Berlin I case, the 
Americans had the ability to start a war with the Soviets over access to Berlin not only through the 
local conventional forces but also the newly strengthened strategic nuclear forces.  By 1959, 
Eisenhower had at his disposal new ICBMs with the ability to strike the Soviet mainland from the 
 
280 Watson, Secretaries of Defense Historical Series; Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960; Schnabel, Watson, Condit, 
Fairchild, et al., History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
281 Slusser, “The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 and 1961.” 
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continental United States.  Additionally, Eisenhower adopted a set of graduated attack plans that 
included the ability to use nuclear capabilities to counter the Soviet aggression.282  Likewise, the 
Soviets had the ability to start a war with the Americans over access to the city while also having 
the ability to drive a crisis within the West German population if they decided to halt food and 
supplies over a longer period of time.   
In 1959, the American CRNC score grew, increasing their ability to stand up to potential 
Soviet aggression in Berlin.  The Soviets responded to the bolstered American arsenal through 
brinkmanship, risking war through imposing a blockade on the city.  The American CRNC score 
increase drove the Soviets to enact a brinkmanship scenario, mutually heightening the risk of war, 
as each had the ability to escalate the tensions and make the situation worse.   
 In 1960, the United States, believing an international gap existed with the Soviet Union in 
the numbers of nuclear weapons and available missiles, continued increasing nuclear capabilities, 
resulting in an elevated CRNC score of +2 from the year prior.283  The American government 
wanted the ability to keep the Soviet’s from attacking but did not have the appropriate information 
to determine whether current nuclear capabilities were sufficient to deter a potential Soviet attack.  
The United States expanded nuclear capabilities blindly while in pursuit of the Soviet Union’s 
unknown arsenal.   
Eisenhower’s fear of a potential missile gap resulted in his initiating brinkmanship-like 
behavior.  To confirm the ability to deter the Soviets, the United States in 1960 authorized the 
high-flying U-2 spy plane to overfly the Soviet Union as a means of gathering intelligence.284  
 
282 Slusser; Lockwood and Lockwood, The Russian View of U.S. Strategy. 
283 Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-8-59, Document #88, 9 February 1960.” 
284 Peterson, “Maybe You Had to Be There: The SIGNIT on Thirteen Soviet Shootdowns of US Reconnaissance 
Aircraft.” 
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Wanting to keep the status quo and verify what needed to be done to deter the Soviets going into 
the future, the United States’ leadership decided to encroach the sovereign borders of the Soviet 
Union, driving an armed response.285  Information gathered from previous U-2 flights began 
painting a picture that the suspected missile gap did not exist and the United States obtained a 
sizable lead over the Soviet Union.  The significant American lead in strategic missiles and nuclear 
warheads bolstered the ability of the United States to keep the Soviets at bay and maintain the 
status quo. 
  The remaining five Type-I cases did not represent changes in utility, breaking the 
capability–stability bond for these cases.  The 1958 and 1964 DC-6, C-130, T-39, and RB-66 
United States aircraft shootdown cases all represent instances of heightened Escalation Levels and 
decreasing strategic stability.  The 1967 Israeli Six-Day war case was not initiated by changes in 
nuclear capabilities either; the United States arrived off the coast of Israel to observe the conflict 
before being erroneously attacked.  However, unlike the Berlin I and U-2 cases highlighted above, 
the causal mechanisms driving each of these cases were unintentional mistakes and not intentional 
actions taken by one government against another.  Although each of the Type-I shootdown 
incidents decreased strategic stability, these five cases did not decrease strategic stability due to 
changes in nuclear capabilities. 
Incentive changes 
For the two cases driving changes in the states’ utility, did the nuclear-capability variation 
change the incentives each set of leaders had to change strategic stability?  The closing off of 
Berlin by the Soviets was an attempt to change the status quo in response to the United States’ 
 
285 Troyanovsky, “Chapter 9: The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy.” 
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policy to place nuclear-capable missiles in Europe and another attempt to end the continued 
occupation of West Berlin by France, Great Britain, and the United States.  The enhanced nuclear 
capabilities of the United States bolstered the incentives for the Soviets to draw an end to American 
occupation of West Berlin.   
The United States sought to maintain the status quo in Germany.  Supported by NATO 
alliance members abroad and faced with an expanding nuclear capability at home, the Americans 
pushed back on the Soviet Union through various threats of war.  Prior to the Berlin I incident 
reaching crisis instability, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought political stability 
through the 1959 Geneva Conference.  The Geneva conference did not yield tangible results as 
Khrushchev continued to advocate for the United States to remove the missiles promised to NATO 
partners.286  However, a cooling of tensions occurred when Eisenhower invited Khrushchev for a 
tour of the United States.287  Following Eisenhower’s invitation to Khrushchev, the Berlin crisis 
subsided and the status quo in Germany resumed. 
The changes in utility during the U-2 shootdown case resulted in a change in incentives for 
the United States.  Research into the potential nuclear capability gap caused the United States to 
encroach on Soviet borders while Eisenhower believed he was far behind in both growth and 
development.  Changes in utility resulting from the U-2 shootdown case resulted in Eisenhower’s 
push to obtain political stability with the Soviet Union, where he promised Khrushchev that the 
United States would cease border violations through Soviet territory flyovers. 
Strategic stability change 
 
286 Slusser, “The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 and 1961.” 
287 Slusser; Schnabel, Watson, Condit, Fairchild, et al., History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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The only two Type-I cases in which changes in nuclear capabilities drove changes in 
strategic stability are the Berlin I and the U-2 case.  However, following this study’s analysis, the 
reality of each Type-I case was that while each had variations in nuclear capabilities in addition to 
changes in strategic stability, the IV was not associated with the identified DV.  The causal chain 
outlined did not apply to the majority of the Type-I cases.  In each of the five Type-I cases outside 
of Berlin I and the U-2 shootdown, although nuclear capability variations had been present, 
changes in strategic stability occurred because of causal mechanisms not associated with nuclear 
capability variations. 
In addition to the Type-I cases with variations in nuclear capabilities not associated with 
changes in strategic stability, all three Type-II cases changed strategic stability without variations 
in nuclear capabilities.  The fact that changes to strategic stability occurred without nuclear 
capability variations calls into question the necessity of any suspected capability–stability bonding.  
Changes to strategic stability occurring independently of variations in nuclear capabilities 
eliminates, at a minimum, the necessity of nuclear capabilities driving any changes to strategic 
stability while leaving sufficiency intact. 
Summary 
My research analyzed ten cases but focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis.  This crisis, an 
emblematic display of changes in nuclear capabilities driving changes in strategic stability, did not 
yield the results the majority of modern research said that it should.  As a single case, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, like all the other cases in my research, was consistent with my overall findings.  
Because there was no change in nuclear capabilities during 1962, any change to strategic stability 
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could only be credited to non-nuclear capability causal mechanisms.288  As an isolated case, 
changes in nuclear capabilities occurred at a low level, insignificant to drive any change in the 
CRNC score.  Lacking a significant change to nuclear capabilities, analysis of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis reinforced that changes in nuclear capabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient to change 
strategic stability.  However, an examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a part of the entire set 
of ten cases revealed it contributed to the conclusion that variations in nuclear capabilities were 
sometimes sufficient to change strategic stability but never necessary. 
During the entire 1957–1967 timeframe, war did not occur between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, meaning strategic stability in some variation maintained.  Concurrently, 
numerous variations in nuclear capabilities occurred for each state in the nuclear dyad.  The 
majority of available academic work suggests a tight causal link between strategic stability changes 
and nuclear capabilities given the high number of hostile interactions between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  This assumed tight capability–stability causal relationship simply did not 
materialize.  Below, Table 6-2 shows a consolidated view of each of the ten cases discussed in this 
dissertation, along with the twenty-nine instances of changes to strategic stability.  Congruence 
testing, coupled with process tracing, found only two of the ten cases researched held changes in 
strategic stability attributable to variations in nuclear capabilities. 
 
288 I am not intending to say nuclear capabilities played no role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, they most certainly did.  
However, using CRNC score calculations, my point is that nuclear capabilities did not start the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
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Table 6-2: Case Study Summary, 1957–1967 
 
6.2 Hypotheses 
The Table 6-3 below represents classifications of the ten cases according to either H1 or 
H2 based on analysis of individual case details.  This section evaluates each of the hypotheses in 
addition to the statements of necessity and sufficiency presented in Chapter 2.  It is shown that 
variations in nuclear capabilities are not needed as part of the causal chain driving changes in 
strategic stability.   
Table 6-3: Hypotheses Comparison 
 
Can a state’s variations in nuclear capabilities drive changes in potential usage, affecting 
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stability?  Stated differently, does the causal chain, starting with variations in nuclear capabilities 
and ending with strategic stability changes, make sense?  The short answer is yes but only in a 
small percentage of cases.  Supporting this answer is a vast trove of scholarship drawing tight 
causal connections between variations in nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stability.  
However, the results of my research created a strong caveat to existing scholarship by indicating 
that the capability–stability connection was only accurate in a small number of cases.  Put 
differently, variations in nuclear capabilities are not necessary to change strategic stability.  Often, 
variations in nuclear capability were not even sufficient to change strategic stability. On occasion, 
however, as with the Berlin I and U-2 shootdown cases, it sometimes had the ability to drive a 
change in strategic stability.   
The scholarship speaking to strategic stability tightly draws the capability–stability 
connection.  Additionally, given the high number of changes in strategic stability that occurred 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the timeframe of 1957–1967 should have supplied 
more than enough evidence to confirm nuclear capability variations driving changes in strategic 
stability.   
The first hypothesis, H1, is based on the premise that all cases of nuclear capability 
variations have correlated changes in strategic stability.  This direct correlation tying variations in 
nuclear capabilities to changes in strategic stability existed, but only in two out of ten cases, not 
all seven Type-I cases and certainly not all ten cases overall.  The Berlin I and U-2 case both 
showed a causal capability–stability connection, but these two cases were in the minority among 
the ten cases examined.  The remaining eight cases were unable to support H1 since they did not 
tie capability variations to changes in strategic stability.  Since two cases did show capability–
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stability connections, H1 was not fully discredited.  However, for the majority of cases analyzed 
over the course of this dissertation, H1 was not considered true for all cases. 
Can changes in strategic stability be explained by causal mechanisms other than variations 
in nuclear capabilities?  The majority of the cases analyzed over the course of this dissertation 
confirmed that causal mechanisms, other than variations in nuclear capabilities, drove changes in 
strategic stability.  As with H1 above, nuclear capabilities may have been sufficient to sometimes 
cause changes in strategic stability, but they were not sufficient all the time and were never 
necessary.  For the majority of the eight cases, the causal mechanism driving changes in strategic 
stability was an accidental provocation of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet 
Union that led to a sharp increase in the Escalation Level while decreasing strategic stability.289   
The facts contained in eight of the ten cases, all showing changes of varying degrees in strategic 
stability, supported H2 by having changes in strategic stability caused by a wide array of different 
causal factors, which did not include variations in nuclear capabilities. 
Definitively, the absolute claims of necessity and sufficiency of nuclear capabilities when 
referencing changes to strategic stability were disproved during the analysis of the ten cases 
covered in this dissertation.  The claim that variations in nuclear capabilities are both necessary 
and sufficient at all times for changes in strategic stability was not proven true when referencing 
any Type-II case in addition to any Type-I case that was not the Berlin I crisis or the U-2 
shootdown.  Furthermore, case analysis proved false the statement that variations in nuclear 
capabilities are never sufficient or necessary for changes in strategic stability.  Variation in nuclear 
 
289 Specifically, the cases caused by accidental provocation of hostilities include the 1958 shootdowns of the DC-6 
and C-130, 1964 shootdowns of the T-39 and RB-66, and the 1967 Israeli Six Day War. 
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capabilities was sufficient on some occasions to drive changes in strategic stability but, across all 
cases during 1957–1967, it did not prove to be a necessary component. 
6.3 Limitations in the Research 
The research conducted for this dissertation had three limitations: sample size bias, 
subjective measurement, and timeline restraints.  The first, sample size bias, refers to both the 
states selected for this research and the timeframe from which I harvested data.  The data presented 
in Chapter 2 confirmed that 1957–1967 was a period when the greatest number of acts of hostility 
occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union.  This high level of hostility coupled with 
nuclear capability build-up is not repeated in any other nuclear state dyadic match-up.  
Furthermore, given the high number of nuclear weapons both the United States and the Soviet 
Union stockpiled during this timeframe, a possible bifurcated tension in the balance of power arises 
among nuclear states, between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots,’ or worse yet, the ‘haves’ and the 
‘have more.’  
 One of the most difficult tasks undertaken in this research was finding a suitable method 
for conducting relative nuclear capability measurements.  Two reasons for this difficulty existed: 
access to nuclear stockpile numbers and a lack of widely accepted measurement methodologies.  
The first cause of difficulty, access to nuclear capability numbers, is one of the largest possible 
areas of concern.  All nuclear capability numbers were obtained through open source data, meaning 
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through nonmilitary or nonstate data sources.290  Data obtained through open source or public 
afford easy access to information that is, by tradition, a closely guarded state secret, even years 
after the fact.  It is possible to imagine that future research may gain access to better, different, or 
more exact numbers than those used in my studies. 
In addition, future researchers uncovering nuclear capability numbers from dissimilar 
sources that do not match my research will cause the CRNC tables and measurements to skew, 
altering the analytical outcome.  According to the explanation of how the CRNC is calculated in 
Chapter 2, variations of as little as 580 payload capacity slots and 623 strategic warheads for either 
the United States or the Soviet Union will change the entirety of the CRNC calculation table.  
Given the secretive nature of the nuclear bomb industry in the 1950s and 1960s, these variations 
may not be too unrealistic.  If new numbers are applied to the existing method of CRNC 
calculation, it is suspected that cases will shift into and out of Type-I and -II designations.  
However, regardless of type, the overall findings should remain the same; nuclear capability 
variations are never necessary to change strategic stability and are only sometimes sufficient. 
The second cause of difficulty, a lack of widely accepted means of measuring nuclear 
capability and how it was addressed in this research, is less of a risk.  Without any widely accepted 
means of measuring comparative nuclear capabilities in a dyadic state system, I took the basic 
components presented in this research and used a scale of ten as a source of measurement.  Another 
researcher may decide to use a different scale, different nuclear components, or other factors not 
included in this research.  Every effort was made, exhaustively in many instances, to ensure the 
greatest level of accuracy in the numbers and formulas used for relative nuclear capability 
 
290 Norris and Cochran, US-USSR/Russia Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996; Catudal, Soviet Nuclear 
Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev; Podvig and Bukharin, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
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comparison.  Additionally, the framework for analysis was presented in its entirety to be as 
transparent as possible for future use or adoption by other researchers. 
This is a good point at which to readdress the topic of perceptions explained in Chapter 2 
and occasionally mentioned throughout the case studies in Chapters 3 and 4.  A review of my 
research and analysis showed that perceptions were undeniably part of many of the state leaders’ 
decision-making processes as they shifted Escalation Levels.  However, the model presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation specifically addressed the focal point in my research, 
variations in nuclear capabilities as a driving factor in strategic stability changes.  Where nuclear-
capability changes can be consistently quantified throughout each state’s leadership 
administration, perceptions are highly based on the views of the individuals making decisions and 
change with each new leader, making accounting difficult at best to maintain consistently.  
Incorporating perceptions to my more objective measure of change in nuclear capabilities would 
have added little analytical leverage to each case while needlessly increasing the complexity of 
analysis, thereby reducing my goal of creating a parsimonious examination of the effects that 
nuclear-capability variations had on changes to strategic stability. 
 Finally, the timeframe itself posed one of the biggest limitations to the research conducted 
for this dissertation.  More precisely, the years 1957–1967 represent a unique period when there 
were few external constraints placed upon the United States and the Soviet Union by multinational 
treaties or obligations.  Following 1967, the two nations underwent an extended period of bilateral 
and multilateral peace initiatives aimed at constraining the numbers, type, and deployment of 
nuclear weapons.   
A common theme emerged in the years following 1967, codified in multiple international 
agreements such as the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and II, the 1987 
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Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I and II, 
the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks.291  The common theme after 1967 was a normalization of either nuclear capability non-use 
or controlled use.  The data collected to draft this dissertation were premised on pre-1967 free and 
unconstrained development and the use of nuclear capabilities by both the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Normalizing a constrained nuclear capability as it occurred following 1967, coupled 
with drastic reductions in bilateral conflicts at any level, means many of the scenarios analyzed in 
this dissertation are less likely to be replicated. 
6.4 Implications for Future Scholarship 
Outlined in this dissertation is a causal path starting with variations in nuclear capabilities 
leading to changes in utility, yielding changes in leaders’ incentives, driving changes in strategic 
stability.  Describing changes to strategic stability using this causal pathway allows for a suitable 
linear explanation of how the IV leads to changes in the DV.  However, the following questions 
must still be answered: Does this causal pathway remain consistent across all cases of strategic 
stability change?  Can skipping any of the intermediary steps still yield the same results in changes 
in strategic stability?  Is it possible to measure smaller variations in nuclear capabilities yielding 
changes in strategic stability?  If smaller variations are effective, what effect does they have on 
utility and incentives?   
 
291 Arms Control Association, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Fact Sheets and 
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I believe the causal path presented in this dissertation is not an absolute path from varied 
nuclear capabilities to changed strategic stability since varied nuclear capabilities are not sufficient 
and only sometimes necessary, as discussed in my findings.  However, changing the incremental 
measurements of the CRNC score could have significant effects on the outcome.  It is possible, if 
seeking greater precision of measurement, to incrementally dissect each state’s nuclear capabilities 
so tightly that every minor increase in nuclear capability should yield a change in strategic stability.  
However, this may not matter as nuclear capability change is only sometime sufficient.  Studying 
this causal path is important to understanding how, in some limited scenarios, variations in nuclear 
capabilities directly translate to changes in strategic stability. 
Does size matter?  Can the causal path still drive changes in strategic stability when nuclear 
states of divergent sizes confront one another?  These questions connect the causal path to nuclear 
dyadic state balances of power.  My research focused on the United States and the Soviet Union, 
two large nuclear states with a high number of dyadic state conflicts and outsized nuclear arsenals 
compared with the rest of the world.  However, conducting this same research using India and 
Pakistan during the 1990s might yield different results because India was a larger nuclear power 
compared with Pakistan.  Similarly, can the causal pathway put forth in this dissertation explain 
interactions between the United States and North Korea over the past five years?  Finally, between 
two competitive states, is there a point when the size of a state’s nuclear arsenal matters more or 
less?  The research covered in this dissertation covered near-peer competitors, but the outcomes 
may have been different had one state been drastically larger than the other. 
The research conducted for this dissertation led me to suspect that size does matter, but 
only for a brief period at the very beginning of a new nuclear state’s growth.  This is a balance-of-
power scenario applied exclusively to divergent-sized nuclear states.  In situations where two states 
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confront one another, one representing a mature large nuclear arsenal and the other representing a 
new or fledgling nuclear arsenal, size matters significantly.292  Even if the smaller nuclear state 
happens to fire a single nuclear weapon against the larger state, the balance of power is in favor of 
the larger state that has the ability to inflict considerable harm to the smaller competitor.293  
However, as parity develops in nuclear capability numbers and technological advancements, the 
power dominance once enjoyed by the larger state will slip away as the smaller state increases in 
capability.294   
Would the causal pathway outlined in this dissertation hold true if some other form of 
weaponized technology supplanted nuclear capabilities?  Put differently, does this causal pathway 
hold true for all technological innovations of war or is it just applicable to nuclear weapons?  Or, 
is it just applicable to significant technological innovations?  Recently, a tremendous amount of 
research has been published that has contended that space, cyber, and artificial intelligence all can 
either individually or in conjunction with one another cause equally devastating effects on society 
as seen with nuclear weapons.295  Is this true?  Are nuclear weapons only an emblematic display 
of technological destruction in war?  Nuclear capabilities have been around for over seventy years 
and have only used twice at the very beginning.  However, warfare and technology continue to 
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advance at an exponential pace.  It is possible, even though nuclear capabilities have had a taboo 
imposed upon a state’s usage, that other technologies are waiting in the wings to come forward 
and supply a shift in the balance of power. 
I strongly suspect that the causal path outlined in my research transcends nuclear weapons 
but only in instances when a technological advancement is so great that it can cause widespread 
death or destruction.  In other words, technological advancements need to mimic the results of 
nuclear weapons in order to be treated like nuclear weapons.  The causal path outlined in my 
research would not go very far if a researcher was evaluating a cyber virus that shut down a single 
bank or turned off all the streetlights in any city.  None of those effects mimic the destruction of 
nuclear weapons, and therefore, they would not change strategic stability.  However, if a cyber 
weapon was used to shutoff the power grid in northern Wisconsin during a winter deep-freeze, the 
results would be drastically different.  Keeping the population from escaping the reaches of an 
arctic blast because there is no fuel, power, food, or means to escape would have devastating 
effects on some, if not many.  The loss of life from a well-placed cyber weapon may have 
widespread and deadly effects that drive state leadership to consider a decrease in strategic 
stability. 
Finally, in bipolar conflict with more than two nuclear states, do changes in nuclear 
capabilities occurring on one side or the other drive changes in utility?  This question seeks two 
different answers, the first being whether the causal path applies when more than two states take 
part in an interstate conflict.  In a conflict scenario where two states ally against a third, does this 
swell of power on one side negate the causal path or does the causal path maintain as a constant?  
Second, this primary question seeks to determine if variations in nuclear capabilities in a multistate 
war (greater than two participants) have any effect on the interior components of the causal path.  
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Nuclear conflict is traditionally addressed in a dyadic state role, but modern warfare values 
international coalitions when entering conflict.  Thus, does multilateralism change the causal path 
between variations in nuclear capabilities and changes in strategic stability? 
The research conducted for and presented in this dissertation led me to suspect that nuclear 
state multilateralism resulting from interstate conflict may mimic traditional dyadic state conflict, 
but only in instances when the confrontation is bipolar.  Stated differently, as long as three or more 
states distribute between only one of two sides of a conflict, the causal path outlined in my research 
will continue to make sense.  I also suspect that the outlined causal pathway will continue to hold 
up if three or more divergent states come into conflict with one another.  Nothing about changes 
in either perception or incentives require a dyadic state relationship.  However, in a multistate 
conflict with more than two states at war with each other, a state’s ability to conduct either 
brinkmanship or deterrence becomes greatly reduced depending on the amount and quality of 
resources available at that time.   
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